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Abstract
This thesis focuses on the dynamics of currency premia. Specifically, we study the
time-series and cross-sectional variation of currency carry trade and momentum
strategies.
In the first chapter, we study the role of domestic and global factors on payoffs
of portfolios built to mimic carry, dollar carry and momentum strategies. We
construct domestic and global factors from a large dataset of macroeconomic
and financial variables and find that global equity market factors render strong
predictive power for carry trade returns, while U.S. inflation and consumption
variables drive dollar carry trade payoffs and momentum returns are driven by
U.S. inflation factors. In addition, global factors can capture the countercyclical
nature of currency premia. We also find evidence of predictability in the exchange
rate component of each strategy and demonstrate strong economic value to a
risk-averse investor with mean-variance preferences.
In the second chapter, we propose a measure of global political risk relative
to U.S. that captures unexpected political conditions. Global political risk is
priced in the cross-section of currency momentum and it contains information
beyond other risk factors. Our results are robust after controlling for transaction
costs, reversals and alternative limits to arbitrage. The global political environ-
ment affects the profitability of the momentum strategy in the foreign exchange
market; investors following such strategies are compensated for the exposure to
xi
the global political risk of those currencies they hold, i.e., the past winners, and
exploit the lower returns of loser portfolios.
In the third chapter, we identify a unique dimension of currency carry trades
that it is related to the intensity of technology transition across countries. Par-
ticularly, we show that technology diffusion is a fundamental determinant of
currency premia and it is priced in the cross-section of currency excess returns.
We define a novel risk factor that captures the cross-country diffusion of tech-
nology. Investment currencies load positively on the global technology diffusion
factor while funding currencies load negatively. Intuitively, we show that carry
traders require a risk premium for financing risky innovation in countries with
low technology diffusion.
xii
Overview
This thesis aims to provide a deeper understanding of the forward premium puz-
zle and its implications for currency investment strategies that exploit deviations
from the Uncovered Interest Rate parity condition (hereafter UIP). To this end,
we study the time-series as well as cross-sectional variation of the most profitable
strategies in the foreign exchange market, namely carry, dollar carry and momen-
tum strategies. In the first chapter we identify the macroeconomic exposures of
currency premia. To do that, three widely used currency investment strategies
are examined, namely the carry trade strategy (i.e. going long in high-interest
rate currencies and short in low-interest rate currencies), dollar carry trade (i.e.
a carry trade strategy relative to the U.S. dollar) and momentum. All strategies
exploit deviations from the well-known uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) con-
dition according to which, under risk neutrality and rational expectations, the
forward exchange rate should be an optimal predictor of the future spot exchange
rate. However, many studies (e.g. Bilson, 1981; Fama, 1984; Froot and Thaler,
1990) document the empirical rejection of UIP, the so-called forward premium
puzzle (Froot and Thaler, 1990; Taylor, 1995; Sarno and Taylor, 2002). Thus, the
apparent profitability of the carry trade and momentum strategies has captured
the attention of many academics and practitioners. A particularly noteworthy
feature of these strategies is the presence of downside risk, as witnessed by the
strong appreciation of the funding currencies under periods of stress.
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As noted above, the currency carry trade involves a short position in low
interest rate (funding) currencies and a long position in high interest rate (in-
vestment) currencies. In addition, Lustig et al. (2014) propose a different version
of the carry trade - the dollar carry trade - where investors short the dollar when
the average short-term interest rate of the foreign currencies is greater the U.S.
short-term interest rate and go long in the dollar otherwise. This strategy is
driven by the U.S. business cycle, since the investors sell the dollar just before
the start of the NBER recessions and purchases the dollar after the trough (end
of the NBER recessions).
A momentum strategy is based on the assumption that currencies that were
appreciating well in the past will render higher excess returns in the future in
comparison to currencies with poor past performances; in other words, investors
buy forward foreign currency units that were worth buying forward in a previous
time period.
Despite the fact that a lot of research has been carried out in recent years
on carry and momentum strategies, it is still questionable whether the macroe-
conomic environment can explain the average time-series profitability of those
strategies. If so what is the statistical and economic value of this finding for a
U.S. investor and how can she protect herself from erratic macroeconomic condi-
tions? Consequently, the fundamental questions that drive our analysis are: (i)
whether the macroeconomic environment plays an economically significant role
in determining currency excess returns and exchange rate changes, and (ii) which
macroeconomic or financial variables are driving this phenomenon. Answers to
both issues provide crucial implications for the forward premium puzzle.
The difficulty of finding a strong empirical link between macroeconomic fun-
damentals and currency premia has also been documented (see, e.g. Lustig et al.,
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2014), and may be explained in various ways. Firstly, it may be argued that many
macroeconomic variables are imperfectly measured and that a small number of
variables cannot capture the high variability of exchange rates (Flood and Rose,
1995). Thus, the first principal component of a panel of many different proxies of
the same macro variable may be more informative in this respect than one official
measure of the macro variable itself. Interestingly, Lustig et al. (2014) point out
that macro variables exhibit low predictive power per se, but their common move-
ments could contain important information for carry trades. Secondly, the carry
trade and momentum strategies exploit disparities observed in global macroeco-
nomic conditions and especially between debtor and creditor economies (Plantin
and Shin, 2011; Della Corte et al., 2013). Therefore, dynamic factor analysis is
a valid methodology as it gives us the opportunity to confine those disparities in
a few unobserved variables.
Taking the U.S. investors viewpoint, we apply dynamic factor analysis in or-
der to obtain U.S. (domestic) and global (mainly from G10 countries) factors that
capture the variability of a large panel of macroeconomic and financial variables.
This methodology has extensively been used in different strands of the literature.
In particular, Stock and Watson (2002a,b, 2004, 2006) show that dynamic fac-
tor models applied to large datasets can enhance the forecasting power of many
macroeconomic variables. Ludvigson and Ng (2009, 2011) find that U.S. static
factors have strong predictive power for future U.S. excess government bond re-
turns over and above the information contained in the Cochrane and Piazzessi
(2005) predictor. They also show that static and dynamic factors exhibit sim-
ilar predictive power. Bernanke and Boivin (2003) and Bernanke et al. (2005)
came to the same conclusion regarding the forecastability of static and dynamic
factors in their analysis of Federal Reserve policy in a data-rich environment. In
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the foreign exchange literature, Engel et al. (2012) develop static factors from a
panel of exchange rates and employ the idiosyncratic diversions from the factors
as a predictor of exchange rates. Their findings with regards to predictability
are mixed.
Our domestic panel contains 127 monthly U.S. time series that capture a vari-
ety of categories: real output, employment, consumption, housing starts, orders,
stock prices, exchange rates, interest rates, money and credit quality aggregates,
price indices, earnings, international trade, capacity utilization, and others. Like-
wise, the global factors are obtained from a panel of 97 macro variables gathered
from developed countries.
We construct times-series of the payoffs based on spot and forward exchange
rates of 48 currencies vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar after taking into account bid and
ask quotes. We also focus on a smaller sample of 15 developed countries in order
to guard against capital constraints and pegged currencies. In addition, we
consider only dynamically rebalanced strategies, because they seem to be more
profitable and also mimic the behavior of foreign exchange investors (Bakshi and
Panayotov, 2013).
A number of recent contributions in the research literature focus on the cross-
sectional variation of carry trade and momentum strategies. In particular, Lustig
et al. (2011) develop a factor model that resembles the Fama and French (1993)
model for the foreign exchange market; they find that a carry trade factor that
goes long a basket of high interest rate currencies and short a basket of low inter-
est rate currencies, together with a dollar factor that is defined as the average re-
turn across portfolios each month, can price the cross-section of currency returns.
In the same spirit, Menkhoff et al. (2012a) introduce a volatility risk factor and
Mancini et al. (2013) a liquidity factor that explain most of the cross-sectional
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variation in monthly carry trade returns. We deviate from these studies, as we
focus on the time-series variability of carry trades. Similarly, Menkhoff et al.
(2012b) examine a momentum strategy in a cross-sectional framework.
Our in-sample empirical results indicate that carry trade returns are more
exposed to the global economy rather than to U.S. economic conditions. In
particular, we find strong evidence of predictability in global factors that capture
the macroeconomy of the G7 countries as well as the global stock market. This
finding might be related to the exit strategies in the G7 economies during the
financial crisis and the tendency of the domestic currency to depreciate when
the home equity return exceeds the foreign counterpart (Hau and Rey, 2006).
Regarding the domestic economy, we find that real and inflation factors are highly
significant. The dollar carry trade is mainly driven by domestic variables because,
as mentioned previously, investors focus more on the U.S. economy when they
form expectations with regard to the dollar carry trade. Thus, global factors
do not seem to provide useful information, but U.S. inflation and consumption
factors have strong predictive power. The momentum returns are mainly driven
by U.S. inflation factors. We also find predictable components in the exchange
rate returns gathered from the aforementioned strategies.
The forecasting ability of the factors is also verified by out-of-sample tests
based on positive out-of-sample R2 of Campbell and Thompson (2008) and one-
sided p-values of the MSPE-adj statistic following Clark and West (2007). More-
over, combination forecasts emphasize the out-of-sample performance of the in-
dividual models and provide an overall improvement over the individual predic-
tions.
We also consider a decision-rule that takes into account our forecasts in order
to evaluate the economic significance of our results. We find an increase in
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the Sharpe ratios and an improvement in the skewness of the payoffs for all
three strategies and a mixed strategy, which invests only on the strategies that
are profitable according to the signals obtained from our forecasts. Then, we
question whether a risk-averse investor with mean-variance preferences would
acquire economic value from the use of the factors. To do that, we estimate the
certainty equivalent return gain and find that a U.S. investor would be willing to
pay a management fee in order to benefit from the predictive regression forecasts.
Our analysis takes into consideration other factors in the literature, such as
the Bakshi and Panayotov (2013) predictors or average forward discounts in order
to estimate conditional predictive regressions of the common factors. We find
that our factors can forecast currency excess returns over and above commodity,
volatility, and liquidity factors as well as average forward discounts. The only
exception is the momentum strategy where only U.S. inflation factors seem to
contain useful information.
In the second chapter, we try to understand better the reasons behind the
disconnection between time-series momentum and fundamentals. Here, we follow
a cross-sectional perspective and investigate the role of political risk in momen-
tum strategies. In particular, we question whether global political risk can price
the cross-section of currency momentum returns. Specifically, we develop a novel
measure of political risk that captures the differences between the political envi-
ronment of the U.S. economy and the rest of the world. A striking feature of this
measure is that it is sensitive to unexpected global political changes, meaning
that it captures political events that are less likely to be predicted by a naive
investor. We thus examine whether global political shocks affect the momen-
tum profitability, helping us to understand better the determinants of currency
premia. To this end, we construct a two-factor asset pricing model that incor-
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porates the information contained in the our global political risk measure. More
precisely, the first factor is a level factor (i.e. DOL) as originally introduced by
Lustig et al. (2011) which is measured as the average across portfolios on each
occasion. This traded factor resembles a strategy that buys all foreign currencies
and sells the dollar. As such it is highly correlated with first principal component
of currency excess return portfolios. The second factor is our global political risk
that it is replaced by innovations so as to account for its high persistence. We
find that global political risk is priced in the cross-section of currency returns
being that it is able to capture a significant bulk of currency excess returns. Our
main intuition in regard this finding is linked to the fact that investors require
a higher premium for taking on global political risk which is attached to the
winner portfolios. On the other hand, investors accept a lower premium from
investing in loser portfolios as they provide a hedge against adverse movements
of currency returns in bad states of the world. We mainly focus on momentum
strategies that rebalance their portfolios every month and use a formation period
of one, three and six months. The main reason for focusing upon these particular
strategies is related to their high profitability (Menkhoff et al., 2012b). However,
we show later that our results are robust to longer formation periods.
Our results are robust both in economic as well as statistical terms. Firstly,
we show that global political risk can explain the time-series variation of cur-
rency momentum returns even after controlling for other predictors in the litera-
ture such global FX volatility, FX liquidity, FX correlation and changes in CDS
spreads. However, it captures only a small part of the time-series variability as it
is suggested by the R-squares. Thus, we question whether political risk is able to
capture the cross-sectional variation of currency premia that it is related to cur-
rency momentum. We employ both unconditional and conditional momentum
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returns and find that conditional momentum returns sorted into portfolios based
on exposures with political risk provide a monotonic pattern which suggests that
investors require a higher premium when currency exposure to political risk in-
creases. This pattern is less pronounced for unconditional returns as we observe
a nonlinear pattern that could be related to differences in beliefs in the currency
market that is plausibly led by the global political environment (Bakshi et al.,
2010). In any case the extreme portfolios render a positive spread that indicates
the pricing ability of global political risk.
In regard to the asset pricing tests employed in the paper we show that
our asset pricing model exhibits a strong cross-sectional performance both in
statistical and economic terms. Firstly, we display results of Fama and MacBeth
(1973) regressions as well as GMM procedures. Here we find highly significant
risk factor prices that are related to global political risk with standard errors,
corrected for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity (HAC) following Newey and
West (1987) methodology using the optimal number of lags as in Andrews (1991)
along with Shanken (1992) that control for potential error-in-variable issues. In
addition, our results demonstrate strong cross-sectional behaviour in term of
goodness of fit. Specifically, we show that we cannot reject the null; that is, all
the pricing errors are jointly equal to zero as it is depicted in terms of the very
large p-values of the χ2 test statistic. In addition, the cannot reject the null
that the HJ distance is equal to zero and the cross-sectional R2 range from 66%
to 99% for formation period from one to six months. Our results are similar
whether we employ a mimicking portfolio or the raw measure.
In the next stage, we examine whether global political risk is priced even
after accounting for other determinants of currency premia. We start with id-
iosyncratic volatility and skewness so as to determine whether we can explain a
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different measures of limits to arbitrage. Thus, we double-sort conditional ex-
cess returns into two portfolios based on their idiosyncratic volatility (skewness).
Then within each portfolio, we sort them according to their exposure to global
political risk. We find that currency excess returns are larger in high political
risk portfolios than in low political risk baskets under low or high idiosyncratic
volatility portfolios implying a statistically significant and positive spread. We
perform a similar exercise by replacing the idiosyncratic volatility with illiquidity,
volatility and correlation variable to come to the same conclusions. Therefore,
global political risk is priced in the cross-section of currency returns.
Finally, we perform a few robustness checks so as to verify our results. In
order to make our analysis more realistic we apply a few filters to the data to
check for currencies that do not belong in the exchange rate regime 3 or 4 of
the IMF coarse classification, as well checking for the degree of capital account
openness (Chinn and Ito, 2006) in the market following Della Corte et al. (2013).
We find that the results have improved in most of the cases. In addition, we show
that the implementation cost of the strategies does not affect the cross-sectional
predictive ability of global political risk. We also ask whether currency reversals
could potentially alter our findings. To this end, we estimate the conditional
weights of the mimicking portfolio by using as conditional variable the previous
month’s momentum return. Here we find that the results are similar. Finally,
we perform currency-level cross-sectional regressions for both unconditional and
conditional returns and demonstrate the pricing ability of global political risk.
Overall, our empirical evidence suggests that global political risk is able to
capture most of the dispersion of currency momentum returns. This finding
suggests that political risk might be one of the fundamental determinants of the
momentum strategy in the foreign exchange market.
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In the third chapter, we provide a novel explanation for the carry trade prof-
itability. Particularly, we study the impact of technology diffusion in currency
carry trades. To do that, we employ the Cross-country Historical Adoption of
Technology (CHAT) dataset as a proxy of technology diffusion in order to create
a country-specific technology diffusion factor that is constructed as the average
across technologies per country/time pair. Then we construct an asset pricing
model, in the same spirit with Lustig et al. (2011). Specifically, we employ
two factors, a dollar factor (i.e. DOL) and a technology diffusion factor (i.e.
LMHT D). The dollar factor is defined as the average across portfolios each time
and the technology diffusion is a zero-investment portfolio that goes long low
technology diffusion baskets and sells high technology diffusion portfolios. We
show that technology diffusion is priced in the cross-section of carry trade returns
as it is able to capture most of the carry trade variability.
Our results are robust to different specification tests. Particularly, we show
asset pricing tests for individual currencies and show that our model performs
well in capturing the carry trade profitability. The pricing ability is also verified
by beta-sorted portfolios, where a positive and statistically significant spread is
obtained. The results are also robust after taking into account transaction costs.
Finally, technology diffusion is able to price conditional excess returns.
Overall, we find that technology diffusion is a priced factor in the cross-section
of currency returns. High interest rate currencies load positively on the technol-
ogy diffusion factor and low interest rate currencies load negatively. Intuitively,
carry trades require a risk premium for holding low technology diffusion curren-
cies as a compensation for financing risky innovation. On the other hand, they
invest on high technology diffusion currencies, despite the low profitability that
they offer because it provides a hedge against downside movements of carry trade
10
profitability.
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Chapter 1
Common Macro Factors and
Currency Premia
1.1 Introduction
In this chapter we investigate the domestic and global drivers of currency pre-
mia. To do that, three widely used currency investment strategies are examined,
namely the carry trade strategy (i.e. going long in high-interest rate curren-
cies and short in low-interest rate currencies), dollar carry trade (i.e. a carry
trade strategy relative to the U.S. dollar) and momentum. All strategies exploit
deviations from the well-known uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) condition
according to which, under risk neutrality and rational expectations, the forward
exchange rate should be an optimal predictor of the future spot exchange rate.
However, many studies (e.g. Bilson, 1981; Fama, 1984; Froot and Thaler, 1990)
document the empirical rejection of UIP, the so-called forward premium puzzle
(Froot and Thaler, 1990; Taylor, 1995; Sarno and Taylor, 2002). Thus, the ap-
parent profitability of the carry trade and momentum strategies has captured
the attention of many academics and practitioners. A particularly noteworthy
12
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feature of these strategies is the presence of downside risk, as witnessed by the
strong appreciation of the funding currencies under periods of stress.
As noted above, the currency carry trade involves a short position in low
interest rate (funding) currencies and a long position in high interest rate (in-
vestment) currencies. In addition, Lustig et al. (2014) propose a different version
of the carry trade - the dollar carry trade - where investors short the dollar when
the average short-term interest rate of the foreign currencies is greater the U.S.
short-term interest rate and go long in the dollar otherwise. This strategy is
driven by the U.S. business cycle, since the investors sell the dollar just before
the start of the NBER recessions and purchases the dollar after the trough (end
of the NBER recessions).
A momentum strategy is based on the assumption that currencies that were
appreciating well in the past will render higher excess returns in the future in
comparison to currencies with poor past performances; in other words, investors
buy forward foreign currency units that were worth buying forward in a previous
time period.
Despite the fact that a lot of research has been carried out in recent years
on carry and momentum strategies, it is still questionable whether the macroe-
conomic environment can explain the average time-series profitability of those
strategies. If so what is the statistical and economic value of this finding for a
U.S. investor and how can she protect herself from erratic macroeconomic condi-
tions? Consequently, the fundamental questions that drive our analysis are: (i)
whether the macroeconomic environment plays an economically significant role
in determining currency excess returns and exchange rate changes, and (ii) which
macroeconomic or financial variables are driving this phenomenon. Answers to
both issues have crucial implications for the forward premium puzzle.
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The difficulty of finding a strong empirical link between macroeconomic fun-
damentals and currency premia has also been documented (see, e.g. Lustig et al.,
2014), and may be explained in various ways. Firstly, it may be argued that many
macroeconomic variables are imperfectly measured and that a small number of
variables cannot capture the high variability of exchange rates (Flood and Rose,
1995). Thus, the first principal component of a panel of many different proxies of
the same macro variable may be more informative in this respect than one official
measure of the macro variable itself. Interestingly, Lustig et al. (2014) point out
that macro variables exhibit low predictive power per se, but their common move-
ments could contain important information for carry trades. Secondly, the carry
trade and momentum strategies exploit disparities observed in global macroeco-
nomic conditions and especially between debtor and creditor economies (Plantin
and Shin, 2011; Della Corte et al., 2013). Therefore, dynamic factor analysis is
a valid methodology as it gives us the opportunity to confine those disparities in
a few unobserved variables.
Taking the U.S. investors viewpoint, we apply dynamic factor analysis in or-
der to obtain U.S. (domestic) and global (mainly from G10 countries) factors that
capture the variability of a large panel of macroeconomic and financial variables.
This methodology has extensively been used in different strands of the literature.
In particular, Stock and Watson (2002a,b, 2004, 2006) show that dynamic fac-
tor models applied to large datasets can enhance the forecasting power of many
macroeconomic variables. Ludvigson and Ng (2009, 2011) find that U.S. static
factors have strong predictive power for future U.S. excess government bond re-
turns over and above the information contained in the Cochrane and Piazzessi
(2005) predictor. They also show that static and dynamic factors exhibit sim-
ilar predictive power. Bernanke and Boivin (2003) and Bernanke et al. (2005)
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came to the same conclusion regarding the forecastability of static and dynamic
factors in their analysis of Federal Reserve policy in a data-rich environment. In
the foreign exchange literature, Engel et al. (2012) develop static factors from a
panel of exchange rates and employ the idiosyncratic diversions from the factors
as a predictor of exchange rates. Their findings with regards to predictability
are mixed.
Our domestic panel contains 127 monthly U.S. time series that capture a vari-
ety of categories: real output, employment, consumption, housing starts, orders,
stock prices, exchange rates, interest rates, money and credit quality aggregates,
price indices, earnings, international trade, capacity utilization, and others. Like-
wise, the global factors are obtained from a panel of 97 macro variables gathered
from developed countries.
We construct times-series of the payoffs based on spot and forward exchange
rates of 48 currencies vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar after taking into account bid and
ask quotes. We also focus on a smaller sample of 15 developed countries in order
to guard against capital constraints and pegged currencies. In addition, we
consider only dynamically rebalanced strategies, because they seem to be more
profitable and also mimic the behavior of foreign exchange investors (Bakshi and
Panayotov, 2013).
A number of recent contributions in the research literature focus on the cross-
sectional variation of carry trade and momentum strategies. In particular, Lustig
et al. (2011) develop a factor model that resembles the Fama and French (1993)
model for the foreign exchange market; they find that a carry trade factor that
goes long a basket of high interest rate currencies and short a basket of low inter-
est rate currencies, together with a dollar factor that is defined as the average re-
turn across portfolios each month, can price the cross-section of currency returns.
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In the same spirit, Menkhoff et al. (2012a) introduce a volatility risk factor and
Mancini et al. (2013) a liquidity factor that explain most of the cross-sectional
variation in monthly carry trade returns. We deviate from these studies, as we
focus on the time-series variability of carry trades. Similarly, Menkhoff et al.
(2012b) examine a momentum strategy in a cross-sectional framework.
Our in-sample empirical results indicate that carry trade returns are more
exposed to the global economy rather than to U.S. economic conditions. In
particular, we find strong evidence of predictability in global factors that capture
the macroeconomy of the G7 countries as well as the global stock market. This
finding might be related to the exit strategies in the G7 economies during the
financial crisis and the tendency of the domestic currency to depreciate when
the home equity return exceeds the foreign counterpart (Hau and Rey, 2006).
Regarding the domestic economy, we find that real and inflation factors are highly
significant. The dollar carry trade is mainly driven by domestic variables because,
as mentioned previously, investors focus more on the U.S. economy when they
form expectations with regard to the dollar carry trade. Thus, global factors
do not seem to provide useful information, but U.S. inflation and consumption
factors have strong predictive power. The momentum returns are mainly driven
by U.S. inflation factors. We also find predictable components in the exchange
rate returns gathered from the aforementioned strategies.
The forecasting ability of the factors is also verified by out-of-sample tests
based on positive out-of-sample R2 of Campbell and Thompson (2008) and one-
sided p-values of the MSPE-adj statistic following Clark and West (2007). More-
over, combination forecasts emphasize the out-of-sample performance of the in-
dividual models and provide an overall improvement over the individual predic-
tions.
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We also consider a decision-rule that takes into account our forecasts in order
to evaluate the economic significance of our results. We find an increase in
the Sharpe ratios and an improvement in the skewness of the payoffs for all
three strategies and a mixed strategy, which invests only on the strategies that
are profitable according to the signals obtained from our forecasts. Then, we
question whether a risk-averse investor with mean-variance preferences would
acquire economic value from the use of the factors. To do that, we estimate the
certainty equivalent return gain and find that a U.S. investor would be willing to
pay a management fee in order to benefit from the predictive regression forecasts.
Our analysis takes into consideration other factors in the literature, such as
the Bakshi and Panayotov (2013) predictors or average forward discounts in order
to estimate conditional predictive regressions of the common factors. We find
that our factors can forecast currency excess returns over and above commodity,
volatility, and liquidity factors as well as average forward discounts. The only
exception is the momentum strategy where only inflation factors seem to contain
useful information.
The remainder of this chapter is set out as follows. The carry trade, dollar
carry trade and momentum strategies are presented in Section 2. In Section 3 we
describe dynamic factor analysis while in Section 4 we provide a brief description
of the data. In Section 5 we discuss the empirical results of the chapter. Section 6
provides an economic evaluation of the forecasts and Section 7 offers a number of
robustness checks on our analysis. Finally, in Section 8 we offer some concluding
remarks.
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1.2 Multi-Currency Investment Strategies
In this section, we consider currency excess returns of the most profitable in-
vestment strategies in the foreign exchange market. In particular, we construct
payoffs of currency portfolios built to mimic carry trade, dollar carry trade and
momentum strategies. The carry trade strategy involves a long (short) posi-
tion in a basket of high (low) interest rate currencies. The profitability of this
strategy emerges from the violation of uncovered interest rate parity, as high
interest rate currencies are assumed to appreciate on average, rather than de-
preciate, as UIP would predict. Thus, investors earn the difference between the
risk-free interest rates of the domestic and foreign country while facing the risk
of currency depreciation. In the dollar carry trade the investors buy the dollar
when the U.S. short-term interest rate exceeds the average interest rate of the
foreign countries and invest in the basket of all foreign currencies otherwise. In
this strategy, investors short the dollar before the start of the U.S. recessions and
take an opposite position at the end of the U.S. recession. A momentum strategy
focuses on past performances of currency excess returns. That is, if a currency
was worth buying in the past (formation period) it is assumed it will render
higher excess returns in the future (holding period) in comparison to currencies
with poor past performances. Thus, deviating from currency level approaches,
we explore predictable components and potential commonalities in the variation
of the payoffs across basket-level investment strategies.1
Currency Excess Returns. We employ end-of-month series of spot and
one-month forward rates. St represents the level of the nominal exchange rate at
time t and Ft denotes the one-month forward rate, known at time t. Taking the
1Among others, Burnside et al. (2011a); Lustig et al. (2011, 2014); Menkhoff et al. (2012a,b)
provide a very clear description of these strategies.
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U.S. investors perspective, all currencies are expressed in foreign currency units
per U.S. dollar, meaning that a rise in St implies a depreciation of the foreign
currency. The level of the currency excess return (RXt) resulting from going
long the foreign currency in the forward market at time t and then selling the
same currency at time t+ 1 in the spot market can be expressed as:
RXt+1 =
Ft − St+1
St
=
Ft − St
St
− St+1 − St
St
. (1.1)
As can be seen in equation 1.1, excess returns can be decomposed into two
parts; the forward discount and the change in the spot exchange rate. In addition,
under the covered interest rate parity condition, the forward discount must be
equal to the interest rate differential: FDt =
Ft−St
St
' iˆt − it, where iˆt is the risk-
free interest rate of the foreign country and it is the home country counterpart.
2
Thus, under the assumption that the aforementioned arbitrage condition holds,
excess returns are equal to the interest rate differential corrected for the rate of
depreciation: RXt+1 ' iˆt − it − (St+1 − St/St).
Transaction Costs. Our analysis takes into account the implementation
cost of the strategies in order to estimate the actual realized excess returns. In
particular, bid and ask quotes are employed for the spot and forward contracts
and the long and short position are modified as follows. The net position of
buying the foreign currency forward at time t using the bid price (F bt ) and selling
it at time t + 1 in the spot market at ask price (Sat ) is given by: RX
l
t+1 =
(F bt −Sat+1)/Sbt . Whereas the corresponding short position in the foreign currency
2Many studies in the past (e.g., Taylor, 1987, 1989; Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo,
2006; Akram, Rime, and Sarno, 2008; Baba, and Packer, 2009; Levich, 2013) have shown
that deviations from CIP (at daily or lower frequencies) are very small and infrequent, when
transaction costs are taken into consideration. Nevertheless, this condition was significantly
violated during the crisis of 2008 for some currencies, mainly because of liquidity constraints
and counterparty risk.
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(or short in the dollar) will render a net excess return of the form: RXst+1 =
(F at − Sbt+1)/Sat+1. Throughout the chapter we consider only net currency excess
returns and net exchange rate changes.
Carry Trade Portfolios. We build two baskets of currencies. The first bas-
ket contains a set of 48 currencies, which we label All countries, and the second
basket consists of 15 currencies, which we label Developed countries (Section
4 provides a detailed description of the currency baskets). Then, we sort cur-
rency excess returns into six (five) portfolios using the sample of All countries
(Developed countries) based on forward discounts.3 Thus, the first portfolio con-
tains the lowest yielding currencies and the last portfolio is associated with the
highest interest rate currencies. Each portfolio is rebalanced on monthly basis.
The payoff to a carry trade strategy (ψHMLt+1 ) represents a long position in the
last portfolio while taking a short position in the first portfolio each month. A
similar procedure is carried out for the exchange rate component of the excess
return.
Dollar Carry Trade Portfolios. We also design a different version of the
carry trade strategy that was first introduced by Lustig et al. (2014). Specifically,
we consider an equally weighted portfolio that goes long all foreign currencies
when the average foreign short-term interest rate of the Developed countries is
greater that the home countrys (U.S.) analogue as inferred through the aver-
age forward discount (AFD). The AFD is defined as the mean of the forward
discounts across portfolios each month. In other words, investors short the dol-
lar when the AFD of the developed countries is positive and go long otherwise.
Consequently, the payoff to a dollar carry trade (ψUSDt+1 ) is given by:
3Our results are largely the same when sorting currencies of All countries into five portfolios,
instead of six. However, we follow this approach in order to be consistent with the literature.
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ψUSDt+1 =

(
F bt −Sat+1
Sbt
) if AFDt > 0,
(
Sbt+1−Fat
Sat
) if AFDt ≤ 0.
(1.2)
where AFDt denotes the average forward discount at time t. As before, we
focus on two baskets of currencies and the positions are rebalanced on a monthly
frequency. Results for the resulting exchange rate returns are reported.
Momentum Portfolios. We also construct portfolios of currencies based
on the past performances. Particularly, currency excess returns of All countries
(Developed countries) are allocated into six (five) portfolios each month accord-
ing to the lagged excess return over the previous period. Thus, we consider a
formation period of one month and the investors hold the portfolio until next
month. The first portfolio corresponds to the loser portfolio and the last portfo-
lio serves as the winner portfolio. We focus on a momentum portfolio (ψWMLt+1 )
that buys the last portfolio and sells the first portfolio each month. An important
feature of this strategy (which also holds for the carry trade) is that it is dollar
neutral as the dollar cancels out when subtracting one portfolio from another.
We also report results for the spot exchange rate component because, consistent
with Menkhoff et al. (2012b), we show that it captures a significant amount of
the momentum portfolios variability.
1.3 Dynamic Factor Analysis
This section introduces the econometric framework. We consider two large panels
of macroeconomic data4 as well as financial variables and we apply dynamic
factor analysis in order to extract common factors that can capture most of
4The data is winsorized so as to control against rare events.
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the variability of each panel. The first panel consists of 127 variables from the
U.S. economy and we label the corresponding factors as domestic factors (hit).
5
The global factors (gjt) are estimated from the second panel, which comprises
97 variables obtained mainly from G10 countries. The main reason for making
the separation between the domestic and global factors is that the strategies of
interest are exposed to different shocks. In particular, the carry trade strategy
is mainly affected by the disparities observed among countries and so we expect
the global factors to be stronger predictors. On the other hand, the dollar carry
trade is mainly driven by U.S. economic conditions, as its risk premia will be
negatively correlated with the U.S. business cycle and domestic factors should
therefore be more informative for this strategy. Then, the profitability of the
momentum strategy is subject to limits to arbitrage, such as transaction costs,
liquidity levels, country risk, idiosyncratic volatility (Menkhoff et al., 2012b). To
that end, we expect both domestic and global factors to have explanatory power
on the momentum payoffs.
There are many methodologies proposed in the literature regarding the ap-
propriate estimation method of the factors. We apply principal component anal-
ysis (PCA) as in Stock and Watson (2002a,b, 2006) for two reasons. Firstly,
the factors obtained when other more computationally demanding methods are
employed have not in general rendered stronger predictive power, because the
precision of the factors remains the same;6 for example, the Bayesian posterior
means are very close to the corresponding PCA estimates. In addition, the esti-
mation of dynamic factors, using methods such as the EM algorithm or Bayesian
approaches has not improve the forecasting performance of the factors, as is also
5Recall that we take the U.S. investors perspective, which means that the U.S. dollar is
the domestic currency.
6For more details see Ludvigson and Ng (2011).
1.3. DYNAMIC FACTOR ANALYSIS 23
verified in the literature.7 Therefore, we follow a methodology that has exten-
sively been used in many other studies (e.g. Ludvigson and Ng, 2009, 2010;
Bernanke and Boivin, 2003; Bernanke et al., 2005; Kim and Taylor, 2011). How-
ever, we need to stress here that it is harder to interpret static factors, as they are
unobserved. In contrast, it is easier to explain dynamic factors, since the data is
organized into blocks, but they do not allow for cross-sectional correlation of the
idiosyncratic errors and also the precision achieved from those factors is quite
similar.
As discussed in in Section 2, we denote the payoff of a strategy at time
t + 1 as ψit+1, where i = HML when we consider the payoffs to a carry trade
strategy, i = USD for the dollar carry trade and i = WML when we examine the
performance of the momentum strategy. Therefore, we can assess the in-sample
predictive ability of a set of K predetermined predictors at time t, provided by
a K × 1 vector Zt8 , by estimating the following model:
ψit+1 = α + γ
′Zt + εt+1 for i = HML,USD,WML (1.3)
For example, the consideration of the panel of the U.S. macro variables leads
to a restrictive model as the cross-sectional dimension of the panel increases. In
particular, assume that we have a T×N panel of macroeconomic variables, where
T denotes the time dimension and N represents the cross-sectional dimension. As
the cross-sectional dimension (N) increases a dimensionality issue arises. More
precisely, when N + K > T the model runs into degrees of freedom, which
means that standard econometric techniques are not appropriate, as it is not
apparent how to explore the information contained in such very large panels.
7Bai and Ng (2008) provide a very comprehensive survey on factor models.
8Zt could contain the panel of domestic or global variables. We can also include other
predictive variables.
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Let us assume that each element in the macro panel is denoted by xit and xt is
a vector of macro variables at time t. Therefore, we conjecture that xit has a
factor structure of the form:
xit = λ
′
iht + uit, (1.4)
where ht denotes a k × 1 vector of latent common factors (k  N), λ′i repre-
sents the corresponding k × 1 vector of factor loadings and uit is the vector of
idiosyncratic errors.9 Therefore, we consider the following regression:
ψit+1 = α + β
′Ht + γ′Zt + εt+1 for i = HML,USD,WML (1.5)
where Ht is a subset of ht and Zt could be a benchmark.
10 As already mentioned
the common factors (ht), estimated by principal component analysis, are unob-
served so we denote them by hˆt. The main feature of the PCA is that the factor
space is estimated precisely as the time series and cross-sectional dimensions in-
crease significantly (i.e. as N, T → ∞). More specifically, the estimated factors
are linear combinations obtained optimally by minimizing the sum of squared
residuals (xt − Λht), where xt denotes the vector of panel elements and Λ the
corresponding N ×K matrix of latent factor loadings.
The number of common factors (kˆ) is determined by the panel information
criteria detailed in Bai and Ng (2002). More precisely, a random number kmax
is selected in such a way that is not greater than the minimum of T and N.
Then, we obtain the optimal number of common factors by solving the following
optimization problem:
9A limited cross-sectional correlation among the idiosyncratic errors is allowed. Particu-
larly, the idiosyncratic covariances are limited to the total variance of x as the cross-sectional
dimension of the panel increases.
10We will consider different benchmark in a later section.
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kˆ = arg min
0≤k≤kmax
h(k) = ln (V (k)) + kg(N, T )), (1.6)
where g(N, T ) denotes a penalty function11 and the average sum of squared
residuals with k factors (V (k)) could be expressed as:
V (k) =
1
NT
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
(zit − λˆki hˆkt )2, (1.7)
where hˆkt is a matrix of k factors and λˆ
k
i is the vector of the corresponding factor
loadings. Thereafter, we estimate the kˆ common factors with principal compo-
nent analysis, as described above. In addition, we employ different information
criteria, so as to determine the most informative set of static factors for currency
premia. We consider linear, non-linear and lagged values of the factors.12 In
particular, we form different subsets of the factors and for each candidate sub-
set we project the ψt+1 on Ĥt = [hˆ1, hˆ2, . . . , hˆkˆ], and we compute the Bayesian
Information Criterion (BIC), Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), log-likelihood
(LL) and adjusted coefficient of determination,(R¯2). The log-likelihood function
and the adjusted R-squared are used as decision tools in case of inconsistency be-
tween the BIC and the AIC criteria.13 According to Stock and Watson (2002a,b,
2006), we can obtain the optimal set of factors Hˆt, by getting the minimum BIC
estimates. That is, we find the most informative factors for currency premia, as
follows:
ψit+1 = α + βĤt + εt+1 for i = HML,USD,WML (1.8)
where Ĥt ⊂ hˆt and denotes all the possible subsets of the factors. Moreover, we
11i.e. g(N,T ) = N+TNT ln
NT
N+T .
12i.e. squared or cubed terms.
13We also try to identify the optimal set of factors in a forecasting context. However, we
find that the two methodologies lead to the same subset of factors in most of the cases.
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estimate the global factors in the same way and we denote them by gˆt. Therefore,
we get the following regression:
ψit+1 = α + β
′Ĝt + t+1 for i = HML,USD,WML (1.9)
where Ĝt ⊂ gˆt.
Thus, our analysis focuses on two regression models. In the first model we
examine the unconditional predictive power of the domestic and global factors.
This version of the model tests whether the coefficients of the factors in the
following model are statistically different from zero,
ψit+1 = α + β
′Ĥt + γ′Ĝt + ut+1 for i = HML,USD,WML (1.10)
Later, we consider the performance of the static domestic and global factors
conditional on the information provided by other predictors in the literature
denoted by Zt. That is,
ψit+1 = α + β
′Ĥt + γ′Ĝt + δ′Ẑt + vt+1 for i = HML,USD,WML (1.11)
where Ĥt represents the optimal subset of the U.S. static factors, and Ĝt repre-
sents the optimal subset of global factors, all at time t.
It is apparent that the use of dynamic factor analysis for the estimation of
the common factors as well as the use of information criteria that determine the
relevant factors leads to a parsimonious model that may capture the variability
of currency premia. In addition, the factors may be more informative than
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other variables used in the literature as they exploit the information content of
a large number of macro variables and capture the common trends of the major
economies that are involved in our sample.
1.4 Data
US data. The domestic data consist of a large balanced panel of 127 monthly
macroeconomic and financial series of the U.S. economy spanning the time pe-
riod 1985:07-2012:03; the data was downloaded from Datastream. Moreover, the
panel covers a variety of categories of the U.S. economy: real output, employ-
ment, consumption, housing start, orders, stock prices, exchange rates, interest
rates, money and credit quality aggregates, price indices, earning, international
trade, capacity utilization and miscellaneous. In addition, the raw data have been
standardized and transformed according to simple stationarity tests. Table B.1
in the Data Appendix offers a detailed description of the data.
Our data set spans almost three decades. However, the inclusion of obser-
vations before 1985 leads to an unbalanced panel, since many variables have
missing values, which is common when dealing with macroeconomic data. There
are many different ways of tackling this problem, such as interpolation, EM al-
gorithm, or Kalman filter methods. However, we exclude the unbalanced panel
and apply the methodology only on the balanced panel, since all of the above
methodologies smooth the data.
Global Data. The global variables comprise a panel of 97 macroeconomic and
financial variables collected (mainly) from G10 countries for the period 1985:07-
2012:03. The reasoning behind the inclusion of G10 countries corresponds to the
tradability of their currencies. In particular, the G10 currencies are the most
1.4. DATA 28
actively traded currencies in the foreign exchange market, and thus we suspect
that the macroeconomic and financial environment of those countries would affect
the variability of our strategies and reveal potential commonalities.14 The data
cover a broad spectrum of the macroeconomic and financial environment of the
economies in question, namely real output, employment, consumption, stock
prices, price indices, interest rates, international trade, reserves and aggregate
variables of the G7 countries.15 All the series are transformed based on unit root
tests and standardized prior to estimation of the global factors. Tables A.10 and
A.11 in the Data Appendix provides a detailed description of the global data.
A very important characteristic of our domestic and global data is that we
do not include only macro variables in the panel, but we also consider financial
variables. This feature of our data gives us the opportunity to identify busi-
ness cycle variations in currency premia as they are depicted in comovements in
financial and real variables.
Spot and Forward Exchange Rates. We begin with daily spot and 1-
month forward exchange rates vis-a`-vis the U.S. dollar for the period 1985:07-
2012:03. The data are available on Datastream from WM/Reuters and Barclays
Bank International (BBI). Moreover, we create end-of-month series of spot and
forward rates (i.e. we take the last business day of each month) as in Burn-
side et al. (2011). Afterwards, bid, middle and ask quotes are employed, so as
to take into consideration transaction costs. The whole sample consists of the
following 48 currencies: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada,
Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Euro area, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy,
14According to BIS triennial Survey 2010 the top 10 currencies account for almost 90% of
the average daily foreign- exchange turnover that reached $4 trillion.
15United States, Japan, Germany, UK, France, Canada, and Italy.
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Iceland, Japan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slove-
nia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand,
Ukraine and United Kingdom. We label this sample All countries.
The inclusion of some of the above currencies could be problematic because
of capital constraints or the fact that some them are pegged to other currencies.
That is, the investors may experience difficulties trading some of the currencies
in significant volumes despite the availability of their forward contract. In order
to tackle this problem and make our analysis more realistic, we also consider a
smaller sample of 15 Developed countries, namely: Australia, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Euro Area, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. The Euro Area curren-
cies are excluded from the sample after the introduction of the Euro in January
1999 and thus the sample is narrowed down to G10 currencies. This sample is
similar to the one employed by Lustig et al. (2011, 2014) and Menkhoff et al.
(2012b). Consistently with other studies, we delete observations for which we
observe significant deviations from the CIP condition.16
1.5 Empirical Results
In this section we offer descriptive statistics of the payoffs as well the common
factors before turning to the in-sample and out-of-sample analysis. We also
provide an economic interpretation of the factors that were selected to enter the
optimal samples.
16In particular, we remove the following data: South Africa for the periods 1985:07-1985:08
and 2001:12-2004:05; Indonesia for the periods 1997:06-1998:03, 2001:01-2002:09 and 2008:11-
2009:02; and Kuwait for the period 2001:03-2001:04.
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1.5.1 Summary Statistics of the Currency Excess Returns
Carry Trades. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the payoffs to carry
trade and dollar carry trade strategies. In particular, ψHML is the payoff to
a carry trade strategy and ψUSD denotes the return of a portfolio that mimics
the dollar carry trade strategy. We report annualized estimates of the mean,
standard deviation, Sharpe Ratio and Sortino Ratio. The annualized mean of
the carry trade is 4.24% with a Sharpe ratio of 0.46 for the group of All countries
and 2.79% with a Sharpe ratio of 0.27 for the Developed countries. The Sortino
ratio is a measure of downside risk and is measured as the average excess return
divided by the standard deviation of negative excess returns only. The currency
excess returns exhibit left skewness and excess kurtosis, which is in line with
other studies in the literature such as Brunnermeier et al. (2008) and Burnside
et al. (2011b). AR1 represents the first order autocorrelation coefficient, and is
0.20 for the case of All countries and 0.11 for the Developed countries. Thus, we
can infer that the carry trade payoffs exhibit positive autocorrelation with low
persistence.
The annualized mean of the dollar carry trade strategy is 3.93% for the whole
sample with a Sharpe ratio of 0.55 and 5.86% with a Sharpe ratio of 0.69 for the
Developed countries. This finding is in line with that of Lustig et al. (2014), who
show that the dollar carry is more profitable than the carry trade for the case
of the developed countries. However, the reverse is observed when we take into
account all the countries of our sample. As is pointed out in Lustig et al. (2014),
the strategies under consideration are not highly correlated (not reported in the
table) and deliver significantly different mean returns and thus Sharpe ratios.
The main reason for this observation lies in the fact that the two strategies exploit
the variation between different economies. That is, the dollar carry trade is more
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exposed to the U.S. economy, since the investors short the dollar before the NBER
recessions and go long the dollar right after the end of the U.S. recessions. On
the other hand, the carry trades are more affected by variations of the global
economic environment rather that the home countrys condition. As in the case
of the carry trade, the dollar carry trade displays negative skewness and excess
kurtosis with negative and low autocorrelation. We also report the corresponding
summary statistics for the exchange rate component of the strategies. As can be
seen, a large bulk of the profitability comes from exchange rate returns, which
implies potential exchange rate predictability.
Momentum. Table 1 also reports summary statistics for the momentum
strategy (ψWML). The annualized mean is 5.17% (1.57%) and the annualized
standard deviation is 9.57 (8.74) yielding a Sharpe ratio of 0.54 (0.18) for the
full sample (Developed countries). The payoffs exhibit positive skewness and
excess kurtosis with almost zero first-order autocorrelation for both samples.
We also report descriptive statistics for the exchange rate changes. Figure 1
displays annualized payoffs of the strategies and the shaded areas represent the
NBER recessions for the U.S. economy.
1.5.2 Summary Statistics of the Static Factors
Table 2 reports summary statistics for the domestic and global factors. The Bai
and Ng (2002) criterion suggests the use of the maximum number of factors in
the case of the domestic data and three factors for the global data. Therefore,
we estimate nine static factors17 for the U.S. economy and three global factors.
The first factor in each case explains the largest proportion of the total variation
in the panel and then each factor explains the largest fraction of the variation
17In-sample and out-of-sample examination of the factors suggests the use of nine factors.
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conditional on the information provided by the previous factors. In other words,
the R2i is defined as the sum of the first i largest eigenvalues divided by the sum
of the eigenvalues of the panel x′x, which determines the total variation of the
panel. As can be seen from the table, the first three domestic factors capture
more than 60% of the total variance of the U.S. data, while three global factors
capture less than 25% of the variation of the global data.
Table 2 also reports the first-order and second-order autocorrelation coeffi-
cients of the common factors. The top factors exhibit high persistence, while
the bottom factors have very low persistence. Thus, there is substantial hetero-
geneity across factors as depicted in the high dispersion of the coefficients. In
particular, the first order autocorrelations coefficients (AR1) in the case of the
domestic factors range from 0.03 to 0.97, whereas the corresponding range for
the global factors goes from 0.11 to 0.95.
Optimal Subsets of Factors. As was mentioned in Section 3, the optimal
set of factors is determined based on information criteria (i.e. BIC and AIC).
The optimal subset of factors represents the candidate subset that has the min-
imum value of the corresponding BIC and AIC. The log likelihood function and
the adjusted R-squares are used as decision tools if there is an inconsistency
between the two information criteria. More specifically, we first estimate all the
combinatorial subsets of the factors in sets of n, where n = 2, . . . , kˆ− 1 and then
make the final decision based on BIC and AIC. Table C in the Internet ap-
pendix presents information criteria and adjusted R-squares for each competing
set of factors for each strategy. For example, in Panel A we report the compet-
ing subsets for the carry trade strategy, where G1 is the factor with the smallest
BIC out of all the possible univariate regressions. G3 contains all the available
factors and G2 is the set of factors with the smallest BIC when taking into
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consideration all possible pairs. A similar procedure is followed for the set of the
domestic factors (i.e. H) and when we merge the domestic and global variables
(i.e. HG).
Thus, the optimal subsets of global factors18 (Ĝt ⊂ gˆt) are the following:
ĜHMLt = (gˆ2t)
′ , ĜUSDt = (gˆ3t)
′, ĜWMLt = (gˆ3t)
′. The sets of domestic factors for
the three currency strategies (Ĥt ⊂ hˆt) are given by ĤHMLt = (hˆ2t, hˆ3t, hˆ4t, hˆ6t)′
, ĤUSDt = (hˆ6t, hˆ7t)
′, ĤWMLt = (hˆ1t, hˆ4t)
′ and the corresponding subsets of all
factors (ĤGt ⊂ hˆgt) are ĤG
HML
t = (hˆ6t, gˆ2t, gˆ3t)
′, ĤG
USD
t = (hˆ6t, hˆ7t, gˆ3t)
′,
ĤG
WML
t = (hˆ1t, hˆ4t, gˆ3t)
′ . Later, we also examine nonlinear and lagged forms of
the factors.
1.5.3 In-sample Analysis
In this section we conduct the in-sample analysis. The main advantage of this
approach has to do with the fact that all the available information in the sample
can be used, whereas the out-of sample tests use only a part of the available in-
formation which lowers their power and increases the forecast error significantly.
This phenomenon is amplified in smaller samples. However, both tests are useful
for different reasons. That is, the in-sample test helps us understand the rela-
tionship between the optimal subset of common factors and the payoffs of the
strategies employed in the chapter. On the other hand, the out-of sample anal-
ysis provides information regarding data mining, overfitting, structural changes
or model instability as well, as it resembles the behavior of an investor in real
time.
Tables 4, 5 and 6 report in-sample predicting regressions of the form of equa-
tion 6 for currency excess returns as well as exchange rate changes. We take into
18We report results for the full sample.
1.5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 34
consideration transactions costs in all cases. First, we ask whether the global
factors (domestic factors) have unconditional predictive power on each payoff.19
To do that, the slope coefficients of the global factors (domestic factors) are
restricted to zero. Thereupon, we further examine the predictive ability of the
factors when the prediction is conditional on the information contained in do-
mestic regressors. Thus, we present estimates of the slope coefficients of the
regressions, the corresponding t-statistics and adjusted R2 for each regression.
NW denotes the t-statistics20 with asymptotic standard errors that are corrected
for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (HAC) based on the Newey and West
(1987) correction with the optimal number of lags selected following Andrews
(1991). B denotes two-sided p-values based on a wild bootstrap with 10, 000
bootstrap iterations in order to account for potential small-sample bias in the in-
ference about the models in use. Our bootstrap procedure is similar to that used
by Mark (1995), Kilian (1999), Kilian and Taylor (2003), Amihud et al. (2009)
and Bakshi and Panayotov (2013). In particular, we estimate the bias-adjusted
standard errors by simulating a data generating process (DGP) that generates
10,000 samples (with replacement) of the payoffs and factors from a vector au-
toregression (VAR) under the null of no predictability. The number of lags in the
VAR is determined by information criteria (i.e. BIC). The use of bootstrapping
is very important because of the persistence of the predictors, which can lead to
biased slope coefficients with greater dispersion than the asymptotic distribution
(Bekaert et al., 1997; Stambaugh, 1999). Below the R-squares we report the
corresponding χ2 and p-values for joint tests of parameter significance.
19The results for log returns are very close to those presenting here for raw returns.
20Our results are also verified by the estimation of Hansen and Hodrick (1980) standard
errors.
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Carry Trades. Table 4 reports in-sample predictions for the carry trade using
the optimal subset of factors analyzed in the previous section. Panel A reports
results for the excess returns and Panel B reports estimates for exchange rate
changes. Firstly, we consider predictive regressions with global factors. As can
be seen for the full sample and the group of Developed countries, the slope coef-
ficients are highly statistically significant yielding an adjusted R-square of 0.05
(0.04) for All countries (Developed countries), which is comparable with the cor-
responding goodness-of-fit statistics of those found in previous studies. However,
the domestic factors provide much smaller R-squares (i.e. 0.02-0.03), verifying
our assumption concerning the exposure of carry trades in the global environ-
ment rather than the domestic. However, most of the slope coefficients of the
domestic factors are highly significant both for excess returns and exchange rate
returns, although when we examine the set of global and domestic factors only
the slope coefficient of the sixth domestic factor remains statistically significant
in contrast to the global factors, which yield highly significant coefficients.
Dollar Carry Trades. Table 5 displays results for the dollar carry trade
strategy when considering the most informative set of factors. Here we observe
results that are in many ways opposite to those reported above. In particular,
the global factors are not statistically significant, yielding an adjusted R-square
of 1%, whereas the set of domestic factors (hˆ6, hˆ7) provide high t-statistics
and R-squares around 4% both for excess returns and exchange rate changes.
The consideration of both global and domestic factors leads to highly signifi-
cant estimates and an R-square around 5%. These results are verified from the
bootstrapped p-values and results are in line with our conjecture regarding the
exposure of the dollar carry trade to the U.S. economy and to lesser extent the
global environment, consistent with Lustig et al. (2014). Once again, the factors
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provide strong exchange rate predictability as can be viewed in the second panel
of the table.
Momentum. Table 6 provides estimates of the predictive regressions when
considering momentum returns. Firstly, we examine the conditional predictive
power of the global factors and we find very low R-squares (1%) and insignificant
slope coefficients. The inclusion of domestic factors shows that the fourth domes-
tic factor is highly significant for both samples when examining excess returns
as well as exchange rate changes. However, the third global factor and fourth
domestic factor contain valuable information for currency momentum profits at
the 10% significance level, offering adjusted R-squares of 2−4%. Overall, we find
that the optimal set of domestic factors as well as the second global factor pro-
vide evidence of in-sample predictability mainly for the sample of the developed
countries.
1.5.4 Economic Interpretation of the Factors
In this section we attempt to provide an economic intuition behind the common
factors. We need to be very careful when analyzing the factors because they are
unobserved since they capture the variation of the whole panel and thus absorbing
information from all the economic variables. Thus, labelling the predictors could
be problematic, as we cannot link the factor directly with specific economic
series, such as unemployment or consumption. However, some factors seem to
load heavily on particular economic or financial variables that help us make
inferences with regards to the identity of the factors.21
Figure 2 (Figure 3) provides a graphical illustration of the marginal R-squares
from regressing each of the 127 (97) economic and financial series onto each
21Ludvigson and Ng (2009) follow a similar procedure.
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domestic (global) factor. The individual series are grouped into more general
categories, as in the Appendix (tables B.1. and B.2.) and follow the same
numbered ordering. Table 3 displays the names of the economic series that
exhibit the highest correlation with the common factors. Once again, we use
this table as a verification tool of the marginal R-squares and we do not try to
link particular series with the factors.
Domestic Factors. Figure 2 displays marginal R-squares of the domestic
factors that were selected for the optimal subsets. The second factor (hˆ2) is an
interest rate factor as it exhibits higher marginal R-squares for interest rates. The
third factor (hˆ3) loads heavily on series that measure real output, employment
and consumption, but also on measures of money and credit and price indices. A
similar pattern is observed for the fifth factor (hˆ5) with slightly lower correlations.
The eighth factor (hˆ8) exhibits low correlation with price indices and loads heavily
on real output, employment and consumption. Thus, we label hˆ3, hˆ5 and hˆ8 real
factors. The fourth factor (hˆ4) load heavily on price indices, money and credit
variables and to a lesser extent on real variables (e.g. U.S. personal income);
thus, we label it as inflation factor. The sixth and seventh factor (hˆ6,hˆ7) load
heavily on measures of consumption and thus we call them consumption factors.
Global Factors. Figure 3 shows graphically the marginal R-squares from
projecting each of the series in the global panel onto each global factor for the
period 1985:07-2012:03. The first global factor (gˆ1) loads heavily on variables that
measure international trade and is highly correlated with variables that measure
employment (i.e. 0.77), so we label gˆ1 as international trade factor. The second
and third global factors (gˆ2, gˆ3) contain information for the global stock market
of the countries in the sample, since they are highly correlated with variables
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that capture the variation of the stock market. In addition they load heavily on
interest rates and reserves. In the same vein, the marginal R-squares provide the
same information as we obtain R-squares around 40% for stock market indices
as well as interest rates. Therefore, we name them money & credit factors.
As we saw in the previous section, the second global factor seems to be a
very strong predictor, especially for the carry trades. This is not surprising as
the link between the global stock market and the foreign exchange market is quite
strong. For example, Hau and Rey (2006) show empirically and theoretically that
under circumstances of incomplete hedging in the foreign exchange market that
the foreign currency appreciates when the return in the home equity market is
greater than the foreign counterpart.
Longer horizons. We also look at the predictive power of the factor for
longer horizons. We find in table A.6. that the slope coefficients of the factors are
highly significant and the R-squares increase from 6− 25% for average exchange
rates and dollar carry returns obtained from Lustig et al. (2014). These payoffs
consider forward rates of longer horizons. However, table A.7. shows that the
R-squares are quite high even when we ignore the information of longer horizon
forward rates.
1.5.5 Out-of-sample Analysis
In this section we report the results of out-of-sample analysis in order to assess
further the forecasting power of the common factors. A particularly noteworthy
feature of this approach has to do with the implications for the scapegoat the-
ory developed by Bacchetta and Wincoop (2004); Bacchetta and Van Wincoop
(2013), and empirically tested (in a different context) by Fratzscher et al. (2013).
More precisely, we employ recursive estimates of the factors and parameters us-
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ing data up to time t in order to forecast at time t+1, accounting in this way for
potential look-ahead bias. We question whether an economic agent can obtain
better forecasts from the use of the factors than simply relying on the historical
mean.
Table 7 reports out-of-sample R2 as in Campbell and Thompson (2008):
(R2OOS = 1−
∑T−1
t=1
ψit+1−µˆt+1)2
(ψit+1−µt+1)2
), where µˆt+1 represents the one-step ahead condi-
tional forecast from the model of interest and µt+1 is the historical mean of the
payoff. Thus, a positive R2OOS statistic means that the competing model out-
performs the benchmark model because it has a lower mean square prediction
error.
Then, we test the forecasting ability of the above models using the mean-
squared prediction error statistic (MSPE-adj) following Clark and West (2007).
Under the null hypothesis the mean square error of the competing model is
expected to be greater than the mean square error of the benchmark model.
Therefore, we construct fˆt as:
fˆt = (ψ
i
t − µt)2 − [(ψit − µˆt)2 − (µt − µˆt)2]. (1.12)
and then fˆt is regressed on a constant and rejecting the null of a zero estimated
coefficient then implies that the competing model out-performs the benchmark
model, so the factors forecast better that the historical mean.
The in-sample period spans the first 180 observations (out of 321) that cor-
respond to the period 1985:07-2000:05.22 The factors are fixed and we follow an
expanding window approach. The recursively estimated factors provide positive
R2OOS but not as high as those obtained from the fixed factors. Table 7 offers
out-of-sample R2OOS as well as one-sided p-values of the MSPE-adj statistic for
22Many different in-sample periods have been employed and render similar results.
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the competing models described in the passage against the benchmark model.
All the sets of factors that are statistically significant in the in-sample test pass
the out-of-sample test with R2OOS that range from 1%−10%, all statistically sig-
nificant. Furthermore, most of the one sided p-values of the MSPE-adj statistics
are not greater than 0.05, verifying further the forecasting ability of the factors.
Very similar results are obtained for exchange rate changes.
Combined Forecasts. The out-of-sample results are reinforced by combi-
nation forecasts, following Stock and Watson (2004). This approach is based
on the idea that the weighted averages of the individual predictions obtained
from different models may exhibit a significantly better performance than the
individual models. Therefore, we consider mean predictions as well as weighted
predictions based on the performance of the predictions in the holdout period, p.
In particular, as in Rapach et al. (2010), each prediction i at time t is associated
with a weight ωit, such that:
ωit =
1/φit∑N
j=1(1/φ
j
t)
, (1.13)
where φit = θ
t−1−k∑t−1
k=p(ψ
i
k+1− µˆik+1)2 and µˆik+1 is the i-th individual prediction
for the k+1 month and the discount factor θ is less than unity providing a higher
weight to the latest prediction. Here, we consider a holding period of p = 180
months and a holdout period of 141 months. In addition, we set θ = 0.9 as in
previous studies, although other values of θ provide similar results.
Table 7 also reports R2OOS and one-sided p-values of the MSPE-adj based on
combined forecasts. The superscript Mean denotes mean forecasts and the su-
perscript Weighted the corresponding weighted forecasts. The subscripts denote
the set of forecasts that we used. Overall, the results align with those obtained
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from individual forecasts. For instance, all the out-of-sample R-squares are pos-
itive and overall better than before and the associated one-sided p-values of the
MSPE-adj statistic are largely significant. Once again the results confirm the
existence of forecast ability in the carry and momentum returns.23
1.5.6 Data-Mining Concerns
One might raise concerns regarding the presence of data fishing in our method-
ology.24 The main reasoning behind this claim might arise from the way that
the factors are extracted from the large datasets. The main advantage of the
dynamic factor analysis, however, is its robustness against data mining. For ex-
ample, Ludvigson and Ng (2011) came to the same conclusion when they tried
to guard against data snooping. More precisely, instead of following the proce-
dure detailed in section 3, they consider all possible combinations of linear and
nonlinear forms of the factors (i.e. 106762 models) and evaluate the best per-
forming set of factors based on in-sample and out-of-sample information criteria
(i.e. BIC). They find that the optimal set of factors that is proposed by this
extensive search of the data is the same with the one suggested by the initial,
less intense, method. This might suggest that data mining does not affect the
findings of this method.
However, we demonstrate the robustness of our methodology against data
snooping by utilizing a statistically more powerful approach. Specifically, we
follow Clark and McCracken (2012) who extended the White (2000)’s reality
check, using a wild fixed-regressor bootstrap so as to account for the fact that
the competing models nest the benchmark model (i.e. the historical average).
23Table A.8 provides out-of-sample results for a different sample that employs information
until 2007.12. The purpose of this exercise is to see whether the factors performed well during
the recent financial crisis.
24We would like to thank the editor and the referee for pointing this out.
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Particularly, we test the null hypothesis that the MSFE of the historical mean
does not exceed the minimum MSFE of all the competing models (maxMSFE-F
statistic). To that end, we simulate the innovation term (i.e. εˆt), obtained from
a kitchen sink model estimated using the whole sample so as to generate the
pseudo payoffs (i.e. ψ∗t ) for each strategy, such that
ψ∗t = α0,T + ηtεˆt, (1.14)
where α0,T is the sample mean of each strategy and ηt is drawn from a standard
normal distribution. Then the optimal factors are used to forecast the pseudo
samples. We employ 1, 000 replications and the p-value is measured as the
mean of a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if maxMSFE-F statistic of all
competing models from the simulation is greater than the sample counterpart
and 0 otherwise. For carry trade excess returns we find a maxMSFE-F statistic
of 8.22 for the whole sample and 4.98 for the developed countries with p-values of
0.01 and 0.03 respectively. The corresponding statistic for the dollar carry trade
is 10.66 for all countries with a p-value of 0.01 and 7.56 for the group of the
developed countries with a p-value of 0.01. Regarding the momentum strategy,
we find significant results for the group of the developed countries, which is not
surprising because our macro factors exhibit stronger predictive power when we
consider the smaller group of currencies. Particularly, the maxMSFE-F statistic
for the momentum returns of the developed countries is 6.07 with a p-value of
0.04. Overall, the Clark and McCracken (2012) statistic suggests that the out-
of-sample predictive power of the factors for the currency strategies cannot be
linked to data mining.
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1.5.7 Countercyclical Currency Premia and Policy Impli-
cations
In this section we question whether the forecasts of the currency excess returns
can reveal the countercyclical nature of currency premia. According to theory
(i.e. Ludvigson and Ng, 2009; Lustig et al., 2014) the forecasts of excess returns
should be countercyclical reflecting the decrease in the global risk aversion during
good states of the world and vice versa. Lustig et al. (2014) show that currency
premia exhibit countercyclical behavior that could be captured by forward dis-
counts. In the term structure literature, Ludvigson and Ng (2009) find that the
forecasts of bond risk premia demonstrate countercyclical movements only when
they consider the macro factors. Thus, we attempt to see whether our domestic
and global macro factors could help predict this behavior. To this end, figure
A.1 (A.2) in the appendix show standardized 12-month moving average of carry
and dollar carry trade excess returns - when considering the global (panel A)
or domestic (panel B) factors - as well as the corresponding US (G7 countries)
IP growth. We find that the inclusion of the global factors reveals the counter-
cyclical nature of currency premia, while the domestic factors lead to acyclical
or reverse results.25 In line with Lustig et al. (2014), the dollar carry trades
exhibit a stronger countercyclical component (−0.82 correlation with the US IP
growth) in comparison to the carry trade analogue (−0.22). This finding might
be of interest to policy makers as it could help them adjust currency premia with
the appropriate monetary policy or examine the interaction among risk premia,
monetary policy and the economic environment (e.g. Ireland, 2014).26
25We come to a similar conclusion when we employ other predictors. The results are similar
for US and G7 IP growth because they are highly correlated. We also obtain similar results
when, we exclude the US from the sample of the G7 countries.
26We would like to thank the referee for pointing this out.
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1.6 Economic Evaluation of the Forecasts
In order to assess the economic value of the forecasts, we develop a strategy that
resembles a decision rule. In particular, the investor is involved in one of the
strategies at the end of month t if the forecast of the corresponding strategy is
positive for the month t + 1, otherwise she does not enter into a position. We
use the forecasts of domestic and global factors as well as combination forecasts.
Then, we examine the performance of the factors when investing in all strategies
at the same time. In this case, identical weights are assigned to each strategy.
Table 8 displays Sharpe ratios (Panel A) and skewness (Panel B) of the condi-
tional and unconditional payoffs. The unconditional payoff embodies the realized
value of the payoff, while the conditional payoff is determined by a decision rule.
As can be seen in the table, there is an overall significant increase in the Sharpe
ratios and an improvement in the skewness profile of the payoffs both for whole
sample and for the group of the Developed countries. In curly brackets we report
p-values estimated based on 10, 000 stationary bootstrap samples (Politis and
Romano, 1994), for the null hypothesis that the Sharpe ratios of the conditional
strategy do not exceed (statistically) the unconditional counterparts, which take
a position in the FX strategy regardless of the sign of the prediction. With the
exception of the momentum strategy, where there is no big improvement, the
forecasts provide strong out-of-sample economic value for an investor who ap-
plies the strategies of interest. In addition, the mixed strategy that combines
all the three strategies provides exceptionally high annualized Sharpe ratios of
around 1.06 with positive skewness.
Figure 4 illustrates rolling Sharpe ratios, using a 12-month window for carry,
dollar carry and momentum strategies as well as the mixed strategy. The solid
lines represent rolling Sharpe ratios of conditional payoffs obtained from the
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forecasts of the optimal subset of factors (black) and the combination forecasts
(blue). The dashed line displays the realized value of the payoffs. There is clearly
an improvement in the rolling Sharpe ratios, especially during the crisis. Our
decision rule shows that an investor could gain very high Sharpe ratios during the
recent financial turmoil (2008-2009) if she had taken into account the domestic
and global macroeconomic environment.
Overall, the out-of-sample study revealed a strong economic value in the pay-
offs to carry, dollar carry and momentum strategy. In addition, the consideration
of the factors improves not only the overall Sharpe ratio and the skewness profile
of the payoffs, but also helps to mitigate the downside risk experienced during
the recent global financial crisis.
Dynamic Asset Allocation. The decision rule does not amalgamate the
investors risk preferences into the asset allocation decision. Thus, we ask whether
our forecasts can benefit a risk-averse investor with mean-variance preferences
who allocates her wealth on a monthly basis across risky assets (i.e. equities and
currency strategies) and risk-free assets (i.e. U.S. Treasury bills). Particularly,
we ask whether an investor could benefit from a currency investment strategy
that it is appended by a traditional institutional investors 60/40 portfolio.27 To
this end, we estimate the certainty equivalent return (CER), following Campbell
and Thompson (2008) and Ferreira and Santa-Clara (2011).
The investor rebalances her portfolio at the end of month t, forming the
weights of the currency strategies (wit) for investing at time t+ 1 as:
wit =
(
1
γ
)(
ψˆit+1
σˆ2i,t+1
)
for i = HML,USD,WML (1.15)
27We would like to thank the referee for pointing this out.
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where ψˆit+1 is the forecast of the payoff for the i-th strategy, σˆ
2
i,t+1 the correspond-
ing forecast of the variance and γ denotes the investors absolute risk aversion.
Therefore, the portfolio return at time t+ 1 is given by:
Rip,t+1 = w
i
tψ
i
t+1 +Rp60/40t+1 for i = HML,USD,WML (1.16)
where Rp60/40t+1 is the return of a traditional 60/40 portfolio that allocates 60%
on equities (i.e. S&P 500) and 40% on risk free bonds at time t + 1 . As in
Campbell and Thompson (2008) the variance of the payoffs is estimated on the
basis of a five-year rolling window, the risk aversion coefficient equals five and
the weights for the risky asset are confined in a particular interval (i.e. between
0 and 1). In this way, we do not allow for leverage. Thus, the average realized
utility or CER is defined as:
CERip = µˆ
i
p −
(
γσˆ2i,p
)
2
for i = HML,USD,WML (1.17)
where µˆip is the mean and σˆ
2
i,p is the variance of the portfolio when investing in
each of the three strategies over the out-of-sample period.
The certainty equivalent return is the risk-free return that a mean-variance
investor would consider sufficient in order to avoid investing in the strategy.
The CER gain represents the difference between the average realized utility of
the forecasts and the corresponding value of the historical average. It can be
interpreted as the fee that an investor is willing to pay in order to utilize the
forecasts rather than relying on the historical mean. Thus, a positive value
of the CER means that the investor prefers the forecasts over the estimate of
the historical mean when forming expectations with regard to the strategies of
interest.
Panel C of table 8 presents CER gains for the carry, dollar carry and mo-
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mentum strategy. In agreement with the R2OOS and the one-sided p-values of
the MSPE-adj, the CER gains are positive with the exception of the momentum
strategy and the carry trade strategy only when we consider all the sample of all
countries. Thus, there is a predictable component in the carry and dollar carry
trade strategy that provides strong economic value to a risk-averse investor with
mean-variance preferences.
1.7 Robustness and Other Specification Tests
In this section, we offer some additional tests in order to examine further the
robustness of our results. In particular, we examine the performance of the
factors in the presence of other predictors in the literature and question whether
our factors have stronger explanatory power over other variables. Then, we
explore potential predictable components in the short and long legs of the carry
trade and momentum strategies.
1.7.1 Conditional Predictive Regressions
We assess the predictive ability of the factors conditional on the information
provided by other predictors in the literature, such as the Bakshi and Panayotov
(2013) predictors (hereafter BP ). Bakshi and Panayotov (2013) employ three
predictors that are traditionally strong indicators of currency premia. Focusing
only on carry trades, they construct three measures that exhibit strong in-sample
and out-of-sample predictability. That is, commodity, volatility and liquidity
measures (∆CRB ,∆σfx, ∆LIQ), all estimated on a monthly basis. According
to their results commodity and volatility factors and to a lesser extend liquidity
factors can capture the time-series behavior of carry trade payoffs. Here, we
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examine whether our factors maintain their predictability conditional on the
information provided by the aforementioned factors. Appendix A.1.3 presents a
brief description of the BP predictors.
Panel A of Table 9 provides in-sample estimates of the factors in the presence
of the BP variables. In order to con serve space, we report results only for
combined subsets of domestic and global factors. For the carry trade strategy
the set of common factors are highly significant rendering an adjusted R-square
of 5% for the full sample and 9% for the Developed countries. Regarding the
dollar carry trade, the factors hˆ4, hˆ6, hˆ7 are significant and among the BP
predictors only the volatility factor explains the behavior of the dollar carry
trade. However, only the fourth common factor is statistically significant when
we consider the momentum strategy of whole sample and the factors gˆ2, hˆ8, hˆ9
with the commodity factor of the BP variables are statistically significant at
10% significance level only for the case of the developed countries.
Lustig et al. (2014) show that average forward discounts (AFD) exhibit im-
portant information for dollar carry trade returns. Thus, we examine whether the
predictability of our factors remains after including the AFD. Panel B of Table
9 displays results of the predictive regressions for all the payoffs. In all cases the
AFD is not statistically significant and our factors remain highly significant.28
1.7.2 Predictability in the Long and Short Legs
Following Bakshi and Panayotov (2013), we examine potential predictable com-
ponents in the short and long legs of the carry trade and momentum strategies.
Panel A of table 10 presents results of the in-sample estimates when projecting
the long or short components of the carry trade strategy on the optimal set of
28We obtain similar results with data obtained from Lustig et al. (2014).
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factors. We find strong evidence of predictability in the long leg with highly
significant estimates of the global factors and R-squares around 8%. However,
we find weak evidence of predictability in the short leg of the strategy. Similar
results are obtained for both samples (All countries and Developed countries).
Panel B of table 10 reports the corresponding results when considering momen-
tum returns. We find evidence of predictability both in the loser and the winner
portfolios with the global money & credit factors (gˆ2, gˆ3) to be highly significant
as well as the optimal set of domestic factors for both samples. Overall, we find
that our factors provide useful information for currency premia over and above
other predictors in the literature.
1.7.3 Other Tests
Different payoffs. We also look at more naive strategies, such as the Deutsche
Banks (DB) global and G10 carry trade. Table 11 shows that our factors provide
very strong in-sample predictive power for the excess returns of the aforemen-
tioned indices, as it can be seen from the highly significant slope coefficients and
the high R-squares (i.e. 9-14%). In addition, we investigate the variation of two
more strategies that deviate from the scope of this chapter, namely DB value
and DB momentum (trend-based). We find that domestic factors exhibit strong
predictive power. Moreover, we employ additional payoffs (table A.1) that are
available from other studies in the literature, such as the carry trade excess re-
turns of Lustig et al. (2011) and Bakshi and Panayotov (2013) (available on their
website).
Alternative subsamples. In order to assess further the robustness of our
analysis we examine the predictive power of the factors in different time periods
(1985:07-1992:12 and 1992:12-2012:03). Tables A.2-A.4 of the Appendix show
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that the results are similar for all the strategies of interest. For the out-of-
sample part we consider a different in-sample period until 2007:12 so as to see
the performance of the factors during the crises. The results verify the out-of-
sample Sharpe ratios, as they remain highly significant.
Different base currencies. We also consider the point of view of foreign
investors. To that end, we examine the predictive power of our factors when
considering different base currencies. Table A.5 shows that the results remain
statistically and economically significant.
Alternative asset classes. Next we investigate the in-sample predictive
power of the factors for similar strategies (i.e. value and momentum) that focus
on different asset classes, such as equities, commodities and fixed income.29 Table
A.9 reports results for the short and long legs of the aforementioned strategies.
We find that they are highly predictable which might indicate that an investor
could benefit from the macro factors when investing in across asset classes. We
leave this question for future research.
1.8 Conclusion
The chapter provides strong implications for the role of the domestic and global
macroeconomy on carry trade, dollar carry trade and momentum strategies. We
constructed domestic (i.e. U.S.) and global (i.e. G10) factors that are extracted
from large panels of macroeconomic and financial variables. Thus, the main focus
of the chapter is on the time-series predictability of the payoffs and the economic
value that can be earned by a U.S. investor from the use of these domestic and
global common factors.
29The data is obtained from Asness et al. (2013).
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We find very strong evidence of in-sample predictability in the carry, dollar
carry and momentum returns. In particular, the carry trade variability can be
explained by global variables that are exposed to G7 economies and are highly
correlated with the global stock market. This finding shows that carry trade ac-
tivity depends more on the global environment rather than on the domestic (i.e.
U.S.) economy. It is also shown in many studies that U.S. stock indices cannot
capture the time-series or cross-sectional variation of the returns to carry trade.
However, here we show that the movements of the global equity markets provide
very useful information in this respect. In addition, U.S. real and inflation fac-
tors also provide useful information. On the other hand, the dollar carry trade is
mainly driven by the U.S. economy and thus we find that only domestic inflation
and consumption factors have strong predictive power for the dollar carry trade
returns. U.S. inflation factors and to a lesser extend commodity measures gath-
ered from G10 countries are also strong predictors of the momentum strategy.
In addition, very strong evidence of profitability is found in the exchange rate
component of the aforementioned strategies.
Moreover, we find that our results are reinforced by out-of-sample analysis
and combination forecasts. We also find strong economic value to a U.S. investor
from the use of the common factors. In particular, we observe a significant
improvement in the Sharpe ratios and the skewness profile of the payoff when
we employ a decision rule that gathers information from our forecasts. Another
striking feature revealed from examination of rolling Sharpe ratios is associated
with very high annualized Sharpe ratios during the recent financial crisis. The
estimation of the certainty equivalent return shows that a risk-averse investor
with mean-variance preferences would be willing to pay an annual management
fee in order to have access to the forecasts in lieu of the historical mean.
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We also showed that the common factors are able to forecast the carry and
dollar carry trade returns over and above other factors in the literature, such
as the Bakshi and Panayotov (2013) predictors or average forward discounts.
Finally, there is evidence of predictability in the long leg of the carry trade and
to a smaller magnitude in the short leg of the trade. However, the returns of
the winner and loser portfolios of the momentum strategy are highly predictable
from a global money and credit factors and a U.S. inflation factor.
Table 1.1. Summary Statistics of the Payoffs
This table reports descriptive statistics of payoffs to carry trade, dollar carry trade and
momentum strategies. Panel A reports descriptive statistics for currency excess returns and
Panel B for exchange rate changes. In particular, ψHML denotes the carry trade strategy
that goes long (short) a basket of currencies with highest (lowest) forward discounts, ψUSD
is the dollar carry trade that shorts the dollar when the average interest rate is greater
than the U.S. risk free rate and ψWML represents the payoff to a momentum strategy
that invests (borrows) on a basket of currencies with the highest (lowest) last month
return. All the payoffs are estimated in the presence of transaction costs and the portfolios
are rebalanced on a monthly basis. Finally, the mean, standard deviation, Sharpe Ratio
and Sortino Ratio are annualized (the means are multiplied by 12 and the standard de-
viation by
√
12) and expressed in percentage points. The data span the period 1985:07-2012:03.
Panel A: Currency Excess Returns
ψHML ψUSD ψWML ψHML ψDOL ψWML
All Countries Developed Countries
Mean 4.24 3.93 5.17 2.79 5.86 1.57
Std.Dev. 9.19 7.18 9.57 10.47 8.48 8.74
SR 0.46 0.55 0.54 0.27 0.69 0.18
SOR 0.62 0.82 0.86 0.36 1.09 0.27
Skew -1.17 -0.39 0.07 -0.96 -0.29 0.03
Kurt 5.23 4.71 5.00 5.66 4.17 4.34
AC1 0.20 -0.04 -0.04 0.11 -0.03 0.01
Panel B : Exchange Rate Returns
Mean 7.85 4.18 2.81 1.63 5.56 -1.14
Std.Dev. 9.02 7.22 10.56 10.53 8.51 8.71
SR 0.87 0.58 0.27 0.15 0.65 -0.13
SOR 1.96 0.88 0.41 0.26 1.02 -0.18
Skew 1.23 -0.40 0.37 0.98 -0.28 -0.13
Kurt 5.43 4.80 5.74 0.13 -0.03 0.03
AC1 0.20 -0.04 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
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Table 1.2. Summary Statistics of the Common Factors (hˆit, gˆjt)
This table presents summary statistics for the common factors. Panel A reports correlations
for the U.S. data and Panel B for the global data. Both datasets span the period of
1985:07-2012:03. The domestic panel includes 127 macroeconomic and financial variables from
the U.S. economy and the global panel consists of 98 variables from all the countries that are
involved in our portfolio. The data is transformed and standardized prior to estimation. We
report the first-order and second-order autocorrelation coefficients (AR1 and AR2) for the
U.S. and global factors as well as the relative importance of the factors as it is measured by
the R2i . The R
2
i is estimated as the sum of the eigenvalues of the ith first factors divided by
the sum of the eigenvalues in the data. The data is available from Datastream.
Panel A: U.S. Data
i AR1(hˆit) AR2(hˆit)
∑
R2i
1 0.98 0.96 0.39
2 0.97 0.95 0.52
3 0.75 0.62 0.63
4 0.64 0.46 0.70
5 0.65 0.54 0.75
6 0.49 0.57 0.79
7 0.05 0.11 0.82
8 0.12 -0.01 0.85
9 0.16 0.16 0.87
Panel B : Global Data
j AR1(gˆit) AR2(gˆit)
∑
R2i
1 0.86 0.94 0.10
2 0.72 0.66 0.18
3 0.16 0.001 0.25
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Table 1.3. Correlations with the Common Factors
This table reports the variables that exhibit the highest correlation with the domestic and global factors. We report the positions of each variable
in the panel as well as a detailed description of the variables. Panel A reports correlations for the U.S. data and Panel B for the global data.
The variables are transformed according to simple unit root tests and they are standardized prior to estimation. In addition, the data span the
period 1985:07-2012:03.
Panel A: U.S. Data
hˆ1 95 0.55 USOMA002B US MONEY SUPPLY - BROAD MONEY (M2) CURA (bil, US $) $)
hˆ2 32 0.88 USNEWCONB US EXISTING HOME SALES: SINGLE-FAMILY & CONDO (AR) VOLA
hˆ3 71 0.76 USNAPMNO US ISM MANUFACTURERS SURVEY: NEW ORDERS INDEX SADJ
hˆ4 7 0.40 60611444 US PERSONAL INCOME LESS TRANSFER PAYMENTS (BCI 51) CONA
hˆ5 15 0.38 870004623 US UNEMPLOYED (16 YRS & OVER) VOLA
hˆ6 20 0.44 62244022 US PERSONAL CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURES - LESS FOOD & ENERGY CURA
hˆ7 20 0.69 62244022 US PERSONAL CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURES - LESS FOOD & ENERGY CURA
hˆ8 122 0.33 870011929 US HOURLY EARN: PRIVATE SECTOR SADJ
hˆ9 90 0.42 60200205 US 3-MONTH US $ DEPOSITS, LONDON OFFER
Panel B : Global Data
gˆ1 7 0.77 100900842 DK UNEMPLOYMENT NET (METHDOLOGY BREAK APRIL 2000) VOLA
gˆ2 83 0.60 870015830 US FOREIGN NET LONG TERM FLOWS IN SECURITIES CURN
gˆ3 97 0.60 CNSHRPRCF G7 MSCI (US$) PRICE INDEX
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Table 1.4. In-sample analysis: Carry Trades
The table reports OLS estimates for the carry trade strategy. In Panel A the dependent
variable is the currency excess return (ψHML), based on the carry trade strategy that goes
long (short) a basket of currencies with highest (lowest) forward discounts. Panel B reports
results for the exchange rate component of the strategy. NW represents Newey and West
(1987) corrected for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity t-statistics with the optimal
number of lags following Andrews (1991). B denotes the bootstrap p-values based on 10, 000
bootstrap iterations. The data span the period 1985:07-2012:03.
Panel A: Currency Excess Returns
cons gˆ2 gˆ3 hˆ2 hˆ3 hˆ4 hˆ6 R¯2 cons gˆ1 gˆ2 hˆ3 hˆ6 R¯2
All Countries Developed Countries
(a) 0.35 0.52 0.05 0.43 0.29 0.50 0.32 0.04
NW 2.16 2.84 8.08 1.34 1.17 3.34 2.18 4.60
B 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.17 0.23 0.03 0.02 0.00
(b) 0.35 0.23 0.30 -0.28 0.21 0.03 0.23 0.44 0.37 0.03
NW 2.16 1.72 1.22 -1.91 1.48 13.50 1.35 1.48 2.58 7.50
B 0.01 0.09 0.14 0.05 0.14 0.00 0.16 0.09 0.00 0.02
(c) 0.35 0.56 -0.21 0.36 0.06 0.23 0.27 0.54 0.05
NW 2.22 3.17 -1.31 2.02 15.16 1.41 1.23 2.61 11.15
B 0.01 0.00 0.20 0.03 0.00 0.10 0.24 0.02 0.01
Panel B : Exchange Rate Returns
All Countries Developed Countries
(a) 0.66 -0.48 0.03 0.14 -0.18 -0.60 0.04
NW 4.16 -2.75 9.78 0.77 -0.73 -2.81 6.88
B 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.43 0.44 0.01 0.03
(b) 0.66 -0.08 -0.33 0.25 -0.17 0.02 0.13 -0.47 -0.25 0.02
NW 4.16 -0.64 -1.61 1.70 -1.20 9.61 0.75 -1.61 -1.61 5.98
B 0.00 0.54 0.06 0.08 0.27 0.15 0.41 0.08 0.07 0.05
(c) 0.66 -0.52 0.16 -0.29 0.05 0.14 -0.16 -0.64 -0.33 0.06
NW 4.18 -2.97 1.00 -1.62 14.27 0.79 -0.74 -3.02 -2.17 12.53
B 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.09 0.00 0.41 0.48 0.01 0.03 0.01
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Table 1.5. In-sample analysis: Dollar Carry Trades
The table reports OLS estimates of the dollar carry trade strategy. In Panel A the dependent
variable is the currency excess return (ψUSD), based on the dollar carry trade strategy de-
scribed in the paper. Panel B displays the exchange rates component of the strategy. Newey
and West (1987) (NW) corrected for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity t-statistics with
the optimal number of lags following Andrews (1991) are in parenthesis. B denotes the boot-
strap p-values based on 10,000 bootstrap iterations. The data span the period 1985:07-2012:03.
Panel A: Currency Excess Returns
cons gˆ3 hˆ6 hˆ7 R¯2 cons gˆ3 hˆ4 hˆ6 hˆ7 R¯2
All Countries Developed Countries
(a) 0.33 -0.12 0.01 0.49 -0.17 0.00
NW 2.90 -0.92 0.84 3.74 -1.07 1.14
B 0.00 0.45 0.45 0.00 0.37 0.37
(b) 0.32 0.28 -0.35 0.04 0.49 0.29 -0.38 0.03
NW 3.11 2.50 -3.12 15.93 3.87 2.20 -3.06 13.89
B 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00
(c) 0.33 -0.24 0.36 -0.34 0.05 0.49 -0.29 0.17 0.39 -0.36 0.05
NW 3.13 -1.80 3.10 -3.11 19.47 3.90 -1.91 1.27 2.98 -3.05 18.71
B 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel B : Exchange Rate Returns
All Countries Developed Countries
(a) 0.35 -0.17 0.01 0.46 -0.18 0.00
NW 3.08 -1.29 1.02 3.50 -1.08 1.18
B 0.00 0.31 0.31 0.00 0.36 0.36
(b) 0.35 0.24 -0.31 0.03 0.47 0.28 -0.38 0.03
NW 3.20 2.09 -2.77 11.63 3.62 2.12 -3.11 14.25
B 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00
(c) 0.35 -0.28 0.34 -0.28 0.03 0.46 -0.30 0.39 -0.36 0.04
NW 3.21 -2.20 2.84 -2.72 16.37 3.65 -1.90 2.91 -3.11 19.41
B 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.01 0.00
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Table 1.6. In-sample analysis: Momentum
The table reports OLS estimates of the momentum strategy. Panel A reports results of the
predictive regressions for the momentum strategy (ψWML). Panel B displays the exchange
rates component of the strategy. NW represents Newey and West (1987) corrected for
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity t-statistics with the optimal number of lags following
Andrews (1991). B denotes the bootstrap p-values based on 10,000 bootstrap iterations. The
data span the period 1985:07-2012:03.
Panel A: Currency Excess Returns
cons gˆ3 hˆ1 hˆ4 R¯2 cons gˆ2 hˆ3 hˆ4 hˆ7 hˆ8 R¯2
All Countries Developed Countries
(a) 0.43 -0.16 0.01 0.13 -0.38 0.02
NW 3.08 -0.63 0.39 1.05 -2.80 4.15
B 0.00 0.38 0.76 0.34 0.04 0.04
(b) 0.43 -0.17 0.28 0.01 0.13 -0.28 -0.28 -0.22 -0.24 0.03
NW 3.19 -1.23 1.60 3.95 1.05 -2.17 -2.02 -1.54 -1.48 9.56
B 0.00 0.24 0.09 0.10 0.34 0.05 0.06 0.12 0.14 0.05
(c) 0.43 -0.14 -0.16 -0.28 0.01 0.13 -0.43 -0.18 0.30 0.04
NW 3.18 -0.55 -1.00 -1.68 3.22 1.05 -3.04 -1.31 1.81 7.62
B 0.00 0.50 0.34 0.08 0.21 0.35 0.02 0.17 0.07 0.02
Panel B : Exchange Rate Returns
All Countries Developed Countries
(a) 0.23 0.06 0.01 -0.1 0.41 0.02
NW 1.38 0.26 0.01 -0.77 2.89 4.47
B 0.3 0.75 0.75 0.48 0.03 0.03
(b) 0.23 0.12 0.45 0.02 -0.1 0.3 -0.3 0.2 -0.22 0.03
NW 1.42 0.74 2.3 5.55 -0.77 2.29 -2.14 1.46 -1.42 9.54
B 0.29 0.31 0.02 0.05 0.48 0.09 0.05 0.15 0.17 0.05
(c) 0.23 0.04 0.11 0.45 0.02 -0.1 0.45 0.17 -0.28 0.04
NW 1.41 0.19 0.69 2.26 6.87 -0.77 3.11 1.24 1.79 8.06
B 0.15 0.85 0.54 0.02 0.07 0.48 0.02 0.19 0.08 0.02
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Table 1.7. Out-of-sample analysis: Against the Mean
The table presents out-of sample R-squares (R2OOS) as described in Campbell and Thompson (2008) (R
2
OOS = 1 −
∑T−1
t=1
ψit+1−µˆt+1)2
(ψit+1−µt+1)2
), where
µˆt+1 represents the one-step ahead conditional forecast from the model of interest and µt+1 is the historical mean of the payoff. Thus, a positive
R2OOS statistic means that the competing model outperforms the benchmark model because it has a lower mean square prediction error. Panel A
reports results for currency excess returns and Panel B for exchange rate changes. The superscript mean represents the mean combined forecast
and the superscript weighted the weighted counterpart. The in-sample period spans the first 180 observations (out of 321) that correspond to the
period 1985.07-2000.05.
Panel A: Currency Excess Returns
ψHML ψUSD ψWML ψHML ψUSD ψWML
R2OOS MSPEadj R
2
OOS MSPEadj R
2
OOS MSPEadj R
2
OOS MSPEadj R
2
OOS MSPEadj R
2
OOS MSPEadj
All Countries Developed Countries
C1 = [gˆ2] 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.10
C2 = [hˆ2,3,4,6] 0.01 0.01
C
′
2 = [hˆ3,6] 0.04 0.07
C3 = [gˆ2,3hˆ5,6] 0.10 0.01 0.04 0.05
CMean2,3 0.08 0.00 0.04 0.05
CWeighted2,3 0.08 0.00 0.04 0.05
D2 = [hˆ6,7] 0.07 0.00 0.04 0.00
D3 = [gˆ3hˆ6,7] 0.07 0.00 0.05 0.00
DMean2,3 0.07 0.00 0.05 0.00
DWeighted2,3 0.07 0.00 0.05 0.00
M2 = [hˆ1,4] 0.01 0.14
M
′
2 = [hˆ3,4,7,8] 0.04 0.03
M3 = [[gˆ3hˆ4] 0.01 0.12
M
′
3 = [[gˆ2hˆ8] 0.04 0.04
MMean2,3 0.01 0.12 0.05 0.03
MWeighted2,3 0.01 0.12 0.05 0.03
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Table 1.7. Out-of-sample analysis: Against the Mean (continued)
Panel B : Exchange Rate Returns
ψHML ψUSD ψWML ψHML ψUSD ψWML
R2OOS MSPEadj R
2
OOS MSPEadj R
2
OOS MSPEadj R
2
OOS MSPEadj R
2
OOS MSPEadj R
2
OOS MSPEadj
All Countries Developed Countries
C1 = [gˆ2] 0.08 0.00 0.02 0.07
C2 = [hˆ2,3,4,6] 0.01 0.08
C
′
2 = [hˆ3,6] 0.03 0.08
C3 = [gˆ2,3hˆ5,6] 0.09 0.01
C
′
3 = [gˆ2,3hˆ6] 0.03 0.04
CMean1,3 0.10 0.01 0.03 0.05
CWeighted1,3 0.10 0.01 0.03 0.05
D2 = [hˆ6,7] 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.00
D3 = [gˆ3hˆ6,7] 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.00
DMean2,3 0.06 0.00 0.05 0.00
DWeighted2,3 0.06 0.00 0.05 0.00
M1 = [gˆ3] 0.00 0.28
M2 = [hˆ1,4] 0.00 0.21
M
′
1 = [gˆ2] 0.09 0.12
M
′
2 = [hˆ3,4,7,8] 0.04 0.03
M3 = [[gˆ3hˆ4] 0.04 0.04
M
′
3 = [[gˆ2hˆ8] 0.04 0.04
MMean2,3 0.01 0.21
MWeighted2,3 0.01 0.21
M
′Mean
2,3 0.05 0.03
M
′Weighted
2,3 0.05 0.03
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Table 1.8. Out-of-sample Sharpe Ratios and Skewness based on
Decision-Rules
The table presents out-of sample (annualized) Sharpe Ratios (Panel A) based on conditional
and unconditional payoffs of the strategies. The conditional strategies are based on the
forecasts when considering the optimal set of factors or combined forecasts. ψHML denotes
the carry trade strategy, ψUSD represents the dollar carry trade, ψWML is the momentum
strategy and ψALL displays the combination of the previous three strategies with equal
weights. Panel B displays the corresponding Skewness and Panel C the certainty equivalent
return gain (∆CER), expressed in annual percentage points. In curly brackets we report
p-values estimated based on 10,000 stationary bootstrap samples (Politis and Romano, 1994),
for the null hypothesis that the Sharpe ratios of the conditional strategy do not exceed
(statistically) the unconditional counterparts, which take a position in the FX strategy
regardless of the sign of the prediction. The in-sample period spans the first 180 observations
(out of 321) that correspond to the period 1985.07-2000.05.
Panel A: Sharpe Ratios
Multiple Predictors Combined Forecasts Multiple Predictors Combined Forecasts
All Countries Developed Countries
ψHML 1.55 1.74 1.12 1.04
B {0.01} {0.02} {0.01} {0.02}
ψUSD 0.54 0.51 0.72 0.56
B {0.40} {0.45} {0.38} {0.22}
ψWML 0.54 0.54 0.44 0.42
B {0.47} {0.46} {0.24} {0.19}
ψALL 1.06 1.12 1.06 1.12
B {0.56} {0.52} {0.57} {0.54}
Panel B : Skewness
All Countries Developed Countries
ψHML -0.52 -0.51 -0.61 -0.54
ψUSD -0.11 -0.79 0.09 -0.35
ψWML 0.34 0.34 0.02 -0.04
ψALL 0.75 0.93 0.75 0.93
Panel C : ∆CER
All Countries Developed Countries
ψHML 0.10 0.09 0.04 0.05
ψUSD 0.12 0.12 0.06 0.06
ψALL -0.07 -0.07 -0.12 -0.06
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Table 1.9. Conditional Predictive Regressions
The table reports OLS estimates of conditional predictive regressions. Panel A reports results of the predictive regressions for the carry, dollar
carry and momentum strategies (ψHML, ψUSD, ψWML) in the presence of the Bakshi and Panayotov (2013) predictors (∆CRB , ∆σfx,
∆LIQ). Panel B offers results of in-sample estimates of the common factors conditional on the information provided by the average forward
discounts (AFD). NW represents Newey and West (1987) corrected for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity t-statistics with the optimal number
of lags following Andrews (1991). B denotes the bootstrap p-values based on 10,000 bootstrap iterations. The data span the period 1985:07-2012:03.
Panel A: Bakshi and Panayotov (2013)
cons gˆ2,t gˆ3,t hˆ3,t hˆ4,t hˆ6,t hˆ7,t ∆CRBt ∆σ
fx
t ∆LIQt R¯
2 cons gˆ2,t gˆ2,t−2 gˆ3,t hˆ4 hˆ7 hˆ8 hˆ9 ∆CRBt ∆σfxt ∆LIQt R¯2
All Countries Developed Countries
ψHML 0.37 0.60 -0.35 0.39 -7.93 -1.25 2.19 0.05 0.15 0.62 -0.65 0.06 21.48 -3.09 1.83 0.09
NW 2.28 3.08 -1.62 2.07 -1.06 1.76 1.41 19.02 1.48 2.45 -3.35 0.33 2.10 -1.90 1.48 21.06
B 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.04 0.42 0.08 0.04 0.00 0.39 0.02 0.00 0.76 0.06 0.06 0.34 0.00
ψUSD 0.26 -0.29 0.21 0.23 -0.27 6.32 -2.75 0.52 0.06 0.42 -0.29 0.28 -0.28 5.60 -3.52 0.93 0.05
NW 2.42 -1.75 1.87 1.79 -2.65 1.13 -1.82 0.47 28.35 3.21 -1.38 1.97 -2.26 0.80 1.96 0.73 18.61
B 0.03 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.01 0.45 0.05 0.69 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.05 0.02 0.56 0.03 0.53 0.00
ψWML 0.44 -0.19 0.28 0.87 -1.27 -1.99 0.01 0.08 -0.59 0.20 0.28 -0.30 14.35 -1.70 -2.27 0.05
NW 3.10 -1.06 1.92 0.09 -0.85 -1.12 6.38 0.63 -3.08 1.52 1.82 -1.62 1.71 -1.19 -1.65 15.52
B 0.00 0.42 0.06 0.93 0.39 0.14 0.27 0.57 0.00 0.20 0.08 0.06 0.10 0.21 0.12 0.02
Panel B : Average Forward Discounts
cons gˆ2,t gˆ3,t gˆ3,t−3 hˆ4,t hˆ6,t hˆ7,t AFDt R¯2 cons gˆ1,t gˆ2,t gˆ3,t hˆ3 hˆ4 hˆ6 hˆ7 hˆ8 AFDt R¯2
All Countries Developed Countries
ψHML 0.50 0.46 -0.37 0.43 -1.63 0.07 0.41 0.36 0.40 0.46 -2.00 0.05
NW 2.31 2.09 -2.35 3.14 -1.19 24.62 2.01 1.62 1.91 2.93 -1.56 14.08
B 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.28 0.12 0.10 0.00 0.10 0.01
ψUSD 0.34 -0.23 0.37 -0.34 -0.18 0.05 0.55 -0.28 0.43 -0.38 -0.76 0.04
NW 2.85 -1.80 2.95 -2.91 -0.22 18.71 3.88 -1.91 3.06 -2.94 -0.80 16.34
B 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.01 0.80 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.01 0.38 0.00
ψWML 0.36 -0.18 0.28 0.85 0.01 0.01 -0.25 0.28 0.30 1.38 0.03
NW 2.40 -0.79 1.74 0.20 4.16 0.06 -1.92 2.01 1.73 1.75 8.94
B 0.03 0.34 0.08 0.36 0.24 0.95 0.24 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.07
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Table 1.10. Predictability in the Long and Short Legs of the Strategies
The table displays in-sample estimates for the long and short positions of the carry trade and momentum strategies. Panel A reports results of
the predictive regressions for the momentum strategy (ψHML). Panel B reports results of the predictive regressions for the momentum strategy
(ψWML). NW represents Newey and West (1987) corrected for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity t-statistics with the optimal number
of lags following Andrews (1991). B denotes the bootstrap p-values based on 10,000 bootstrap iterations. The data span the period 1985:07-2012:03.
Panel A: Carry Trade Portfolios
cons gˆ2,t hˆ4,t hˆ6,t hˆ7,t R¯2 cons gˆ2,t gˆ3,t−1 hˆ6 hˆ7 R¯2
All Countries Developed Countries
Long 0.40 0.47 -0.33 0.56 -0.33 0.08 0.31 0.35 0.65 -0.53 0.07
NW 2.47 2.64 -2.24 3.01 -2.35 24.85 1.81 1.64 4.05 -2.94 25.03
B 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.07 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.07
Short -0.04 0.14 0.18 -0.28 0.28 0.03 -0.06 0.17 0.62 -0.36 0.41 0.07
NW -0.34 1.07 1.43 -2.10 2.51 12.05 -0.41 1.34 4.37 -2.34 3.37 24.30
B 0.72 0.73 0.20 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.67 0.26 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00
Panel B : Momentum Portfolios
Winners 0.47 -0.50 0.25 0.30 0.04 0.10 -0.60 -0.41 0.31 -0.36 0.06
NW 3.88 -3.08 1.72 2.20 17.75 0.71 -3.10 -1.87 2.48 -2.48 20.34
B 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.68 0.00 0.05 0.14 0.03 0.00
Losers -0.04 0.27 0.28 -0.23 0.02 -0.11 0.64 0.38 -0.35 -0.33 0.29 -0.33 0.05
NW -0.27 1.85 1.97 -1.41 7.56 -0.68 3.10 2.64 -2.24 -1.29 1.93 -1.83 17.16
B 0.78 0.11 0.10 0.18 0.00 0.49 0.00 0.05 0.04 0.18 0.06 0.08 0.01
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Table 1.11. Robustness: In-sample analysis - DB Indices
The table reports OLS estimates for Deutsche Bank (DB) indices. In Panel A the dependent variable is the currency excess returns of the DB
global and G10 currency carry trade strategies. Panel B reports results for the DB value and momentum strategies. NW represents Newey and
West (1987) corrected for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity t-statistics with the optimal number of lags following Andrews (1991). B denotes
the bootstrap p-values based on 10,000 bootstrap iterations. The data span the period 2000:12-2012:03 for the Global and G10 Carry trade and
the period 1989:09-2012:03 for value and momentum.
Panel A: Currency Harvest USD
cons gˆ2,t gˆ2,t−3 hˆ2,t hˆ3,t hˆ5,t R¯2 cons gˆ1,t−1 gˆ2,t gˆ2,t−3 gˆ3,t−3 hˆ3,t hˆ5,t hˆ6,t R¯2
Global G10
(a) 0.52 0.82 -0.76 0.09 1.32 0.84 0.37 -0.84 0.40 0.14
NW 1.77 2.64 -4.31 13.79 3.46 2.90 1.36 -3.98 2.04 14.49
B 0.11 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.26 0.00 19.00 0.00
(b) 0.34 0.40 0.53 0.64 0.07 0.43 0.50 0.42 0.39 0.09
NW 0.97 1.36 1.98 2.79 7.46 2.35 1.92 1.63 2.75 9.46
B 0.46 0.31 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.10 0.22 0.03 0.02
(c) 0.27 0.37 -0.74 0.61 0.55 0.41 0.12 0.79 -0.70 0.42 0.75 0.37 0.16
NW 0.94 1.24 -4.75 2.35 1.57 2.03 20.91 3.25 -3.89 2.02 3.31 1.68 12.46
B 0.57 0.31 0.00 0.07 0.16 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.21 0.01 0.26 0.01
Panel B : Value & Momentum
cons gˆ1,t−3 gˆ3,t hˆ2,t hˆ3,t hˆ4,t R¯2 cons gˆ3,t−2 gˆ3,t−3 hˆ3,t hˆ4,t R¯2
FX PPP FX Momentum
(a) 0.20 -0.34 0.26 0.02 0.17 -0.41 -0.33 0.04
NW 1.22 -2.48 1.02 6.98 1.10 2.15 -2.21 3.90
B 0.21 0.04 0.17 0.03 0.44 0.03 0.04 0.03
(b) 0.21 0.26 -0.32 0.19 0.02 0.15 -0.25 0.38 0.03
NW 1.30 1.66 -2.33 1.46 9.30 0.94 -0.99 3.15 5.48
B 0.19 0.11 0.02 0.18 0.03 0.37 0.20 0.00 0.06
(c) 0.17 -0.40 0.26 -0.23 0.31 0.04 0.14 -0.42 -0.35 -0.13 0.44 0.07
NW 1.08 -2.77 1.14 -1.39 2.34 14.40 0.93 -2.42 -2.68 -0.58 3.33 16.98
B 0.28 0.02 0.17 0.23 0.05 0.01 0.36 0.00 0.06 0.58 0.00 0.00
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Figure 1.1. Cumulative payoffs
The figure presents cumulative payoffs for the carry trade, the dollar carry trade and the
momentum strategy for the period 1985:07 to 2012:03.
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Figure 1.2. Marginal R-squares for each U.S. factor
The figure shows the R-square from regressing the series number given on the x-axis on each
factor (hˆ2,hˆ3,hˆ4,hˆ5,hˆ6,hˆ7,hˆ8). The factors are estimated using data from 1985:07 to 2012:03.
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Figure 1.3. Marginal R-squares for each Global factor
The figure shows the R-square from regressing the series number given on the x-axis on each
factor (gˆ1,gˆ2,gˆ3). The factors are estimated using data from 1985:07 to 2012:03.
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Figure 1.4. Rolling Sharpe Ratios of Conditional and Unconditional
Strategies
The figure displays rolling Sharpe ratios (estimated over each year) of the conditional and
unconditional strategies, when using the optimal set of domestic and global factors as well
as combined forecasts. The dashed line represents the unconditional payoffs and the solid
line shows the conditional payoffs when we use the optimal set of factors (black) or combined
forecasts (blue). We consider the group of All countries. The shaded areas represent the NBER
recessions of the U.S. economy. The in-sample period spans the first 180 observations (out of
321) that correspond to the period 1985.07-2000.05.
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Chapter 2
Global Political Risk and
Currency Momentum
2.1 Introduction
One of the main concerns of policy makers and academics is the role of the
political environment on the investor’s decisions and its effect on her perspective
with regards to the current state of the economy. This situation could lead to
irrational behaviours that could potentially drive asset prices away from their
equilibrium state. In this chapter we focus on the role of political risk in the
foreign exchange market. In particular, we investigate how unexpected global
political factors enter into currency investment strategies and influence their
profitability. To that end, we employ the two most profitable strategies in the
foreign exchange market; namely currency carry trade and momentum. We give
more weight to the latter strategy as the absence of a ”tangible” fundamental
anchor (e.g., Stein, 2009; Lou and Polk, 2013) leads to more unstable profitability
and more pronounced vulnerability to the limits to arbitrage.
Currency carry trade is a currency strategy that exploits deviations from
69
2.1. INTRODUCTION 70
the Uncovered interest rate parity condition (UIP). The UIP states that under
conditions of rational expectations and risk neutrality, the exchange rate depre-
ciation must be offset by the corresponding interest rate differentials. In other
words, the forward rate must be an optimal predictor of the future spot exchange
rate. However, this condition is violated in the data (Bilson, 1981; Fama, 1984)
which implies a risk premium for currency investors that bet against the UIP.
One example of such a strategy is the carry trade strategy, which involves a long
position in a group of high interest rate currencies (investment currencies) and
a short position in a basket of low interest rate currencies (funding currencies).
The profitability of this strategy stems from the tendency of the high interest
rate currencies to appreciate rather than depreciate. However, it exhibits down-
side risk and thus leads to investors suffering huge losses during periods of stress
(e.g., Brunnermeier et al., 2008; Melvin and Taylor, 2009).
Currency momentum is a foreign exchange (FX) strategy that it is driven by
past performances of currency excess returns or exchange rate changes. In par-
ticular, an investor who follows a momentum strategy buys a basket of currencies
that performed relatively well in the past (winners) while short-selling currencies
with relatively poor past performances (losers). This naive strategy renders high
annualized Sharpe ratios and it is uncorrelated with the payoffs of other strate-
gies, such as the currency value or carry trade (Burnside et al., 2011a; Menkhoff
et al., 2012b). Its profitability could partially be explained by transaction costs,
limits to arbitrage or illiquidity. However, to the best of our knowledge there is
no successful FX asset pricing model that explains the cross-sectional dispersion
of currency momentum returns. Particularly, Menkhoff et al. (2012b) show that
momentum exhibits a significant time-variation that it is mainly driven by lim-
its to arbitrage. Thus, currency momentum is more profitable in less developed
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countries with high risk of capital controls, fragile political environment, and
other country risk characteristics that could cause sudden moves in the exchange
rate which increases volatility.
In this chapter, we question whether global political risk can price the cross-
section of currency momentum returns. Specifically, we develop a novel measure
of political risk that captures the differences between the political environment
of the U.S. economy and the rest of the world. A striking feature of this measure
is that it is sensitive to unexpected global political changes, meaning that it cap-
tures political events that are less likely to be predicted by a naive investor. We
thus examine whether global political shocks affect the momentum profitabil-
ity, helping us to understand better the determinants of currency premia. To
this end, we construct a two-factor asset pricing model that incorporates the
information contained in the our global political risk measure. More precisely,
the first factor is a level factor (i.e. DOL) as originally introduced by Lustig
et al. (2011) which is measured as the average across portfolios on each occasion.
This traded factor resembles a strategy that buys all foreign currencies and sells
the dollar. As such it is highly correlated with the first principal component of
currency excess return portfolios. The second factor is our global political risk
that it is replaced by innovations so as to account for its high persistence. We
find that global political risk is priced in the cross-section of currency returns
being that it is able to capture a significant part of currency excess returns. Our
main intuition for this finding is linked to the fact that investors require a higher
premium for taking on global political risk which is attached to the winner port-
folios. On the other hand, investors accept a lower premium from investing in
loser portfolios as they provide a hedge against adverse movements of currency
returns in bad states of the world. We mainly focus on momentum strategies that
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rebalance the portfolios every month and use a formation period of one, three
and six months. The main reason for focusing upon these particular strategies
is related to their high profitability (Menkhoff et al., 2012b). However, we show
later that our results are robust to longer formation periods.
Our results are robust both in economic as well as statistical terms. Firstly,
we show that global political risk can explain the time-series variation of cur-
rency momentum returns even after controlling for other predictors in the litera-
ture such global FX volatility, FX liquidity, FX correlation and changes in CDS
spreads. However, it captures only a small part of the time-series variability as
it is suggested by the R-squares. Thus, we question whether political risk is able
to capture the cross-sectional variation of currency premia that it is related to
currency momentum. We employ both unconditional and conditional momen-
tum returns and find that conditional momentum returns sorted into portfolios
based on exposures to political risk provide a monotonic pattern which suggests
that investors require a higher premium when currency exposure to political risk
increases. This pattern is less pronounced for unconditional returns as we ob-
serve a nonlinear pattern that could be related to differences in beliefs in the
currency market that plausibly led by the global political environment (Bakshi
et al., 2010). In any case the extreme portfolios render a positive spread that
indicates the pricing ability of global political risk.
In regard to the asset pricing tests employed in the chapter we show that
our asset pricing model exhibits a strong cross-sectional performance both in
statistical and economic terms. Firstly, we display results of Fama and MacBeth
(1973) regressions as well as GMM procedures. Here we find highly significant
risk factor prices that are related to global political risk with standard errors,
corrected for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity (HAC) following Newey and
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West (1987) methodology using the optimal number of lags as in Andrews (1991)
along with Shanken (1992) that control for potential error-in-variable issues. In
addition, our results demonstrate strong cross-sectional behaviour in term of
goodness of fit. Specifically, we show that we cannot reject the null; that is,
all the pricing errors are jointly equal to zero as it is depicted in terms of the
very large p-values of the χ2 test statistic. In addition, we cannot reject the
null that the HJ distance is equal to zero and the cross-sectional R2 range from
66% to 99% for formation period from one to six months. Our results are similar
whether we employ a mimicking portfolio or the raw measure.
In the next stage, we examine whether global political risk is priced even
after accounting for other determinants of currency premia. We start with id-
iosyncratic volatility and skewness so as to determine whether we can explain a
different measures of limits to arbitrage. Thus, we double-sort conditional ex-
cess returns into two portfolios based on their idiosyncratic volatility (skewness).
Then within each portfolio, we sort them according to their exposure to global
political risk. We find that currency excess returns are larger in high political
risk portfolios than in low political risk baskets under low or high idiosyncratic
volatility portfolios implying a statistically significant and positive spread. We
perform a similar exercise by replacing the idiosyncratic volatility with illiquidity,
volatility and correlation variable to come to the same conclusions. Therefore,
global political risk is a priced factor in the cross-section of currency returns.
Finally, we perform a few robustness checks so as to verify our results. In
order to make our analysis more realistic we apply a few filters to the data to
check for currencies that do not belong in the exchange rate regime 3 or 4 of
the IMF coarse classification, as well checking for the degree of capital account
openness (Chinn and Ito, 2006) in the market following Della Corte et al. (2013).
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We find that the results have improved in most of the cases. In addition, we show
that the implementation cost of the strategies does not affect the cross-sectional
predictive ability of global political risk. We also ask whether currency reversals
could potentially alter our findings. To this end, we estimate the conditional
weights of the mimicking portfolio by using as conditional variable the previous
month’s momentum return. Here we find that the results are similar. Finally,
we perform currency-level cross-sectional regressions for both unconditional and
conditional returns and demonstrate the pricing ability of global political risk.
Overall, our empirical evidence suggests that global political risk is able to
capture most of the dispersion of currency momentum returns. This finding sug-
gests that political risk is one of the fundamental determinants of the momentum
strategy in the foreign exchange market. Finally, we show that political risk is
present in other currency strategies, such as carry trades and currency value, but
it does not have a first order effect as the existing risk factors that explain those
strategies dominate.
In what follows, a literature review on political risk and currency momen-
tum is presented in section 2.2. We also provide the motivation for our study in
section 2.3. In section 2.4 we provide a brief description of the data as well as
the construction of the currency portfolios. Section 2.5 will discuss the empirical
results of the chapter. Section 2.6 provides a better understanding of the deter-
minants of currency premia. Section 2.7 offers some robustness checks. Finally,
section 2.8 gives our conclusion.
2.2 Related Literature
In this section we review the main studies on political risk and currency momen-
tum so as to set the grounds for our findings. Firstly, we document the most
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relevant studies linking political risk to the foreign exchange market and then to
currency momentum.
Political Risk. There is an established body of literature on the relation
between exchange rates and political risk. Aliber (1973); Dooley and Isard (1980)
consider two main channels of risk that could be linked to deviations from the
uncovered interest rate parity condition; namely, exchange rate risk and political
risk. This separation is further understood by Dooley and Isard (1980) who
focus on the role of capital controls, associated with a political risk premium. In
addition, Bailey and Chung (1995) study the role of political risk and movements
in the exchange rates in the cross-section of stock returns in Mexico, finding
evidence of risk premiums that are associated with these risks. In addition,
Blomberg and Hess (1997) find that political risk variables can beat the random
walk in an out-of-sample forecasting exercise for three currency pairs.
Political Events. One strand of the literature focuses on the political risk
premia that it is associated with political news. For example, Boutchkova et al.
(2012) investigate how industry volatility is influenced by both local and global
political uncertainty. Pastor and Veronesi (2012) study the influence of govern-
ment policies on stock prices and show that the political risk associated with
announcements of policy changes should lead to a drop in the equity prices on
average, with an analogous increase in the volatility and the correlation. In
addition, Addoum and Kumar (2013) develop a trading strategy that exploits
changes in political events, such as Presidential elections or the beginning and
end of a Presidential term, demonstrating that investors require a premium un-
der those periods because the political uncertainty is higher. Lugovskyy (2012)
employs a political risk factor that it is a dummy variable of political risk regime
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changes. Here, the main finding is that there is a political regime change risk that
varies depending on the government under control. Kelly et al. (2014) show that
political uncertainty is priced in the options market and the option with matu-
rity around political events seems to be more expensive.1 We deviate somewhat
from these studies as we do not focus on specific political events but we rather
attempt instead to capture the unexpected changes in the political environment
that drive currency premia.
Currency Momentum. Currency momentum was recently introduced in
the foreign exchange rate market by Okunev and White (2003); Burnside et al.
(2011a); Menkhoff et al. (2012b) who focus on the cross-sectional dimension of
the momentum strategy. Most of the earlier studies focus on time-series momen-
tum, often labeled as “technical analysis”.2 Our methodology is closely related
to the one employed by Menkhoff et al. (2012b). In regard to the performance of
the momentum strategy Cen and Marsh (2013) show that momentum was more
profitable in the interwar period providing in this way out-of-sample evidence of
profitability for a period that could characterized by rare events. Menkhoff et al.
(2012b) also show the disconnection between equity and currency momentum
as well as the low correlations between carry and momentum returns. Another
striking feature of currency momentum that emerges from their study is that mo-
mentum exhibits low profitability among developed economies because it seems
to be more attractive to countries that are less developed and demonstrate high
country risk. Barroso and Santa-Clara (2013) show that in the equities market
that an investor could avoid momentum crashes by hedging against momentum-
1For more example please see Gao and Qi (2012); Julio and Yook (2012); Baker et al.
(2012); Belo et al. (2013); Cao et al. (2013).
2For more details please see Menkhoff and Taylor (2007) for an excellent survey on technical
trading rules.
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specific risks rather than market risk. This evidence has a direct link to the
currency market.
2.3 Motivation
This section discusses the role of political risk in the foreign exchange market
and attempts to provide a deeper understanding of the channel through which
political risk enters into the currency market and affects investors’ decisions.
Later, we analyse our measure of political risk and its dynamics.
Political Risk. There are many different interpretations of political risk in
the literature. Here we attempt to provide a more tangible definition. There are
two main definitions of political risk. The first relates political risk to “unwanted
consequences of political activity” and the second links it to political events (Ko-
brin, 1979). This chapter focuses more on the first definition to explore the role
of unexpected political risk in the foreign exchange market.
Menkhoff et al. (2012b) show that currency momentum is mainly concen-
trated in countries that are less developed and exhibit a high risk of employ-
ing capital controls that could inflate the volatility of the exchange rate. On
the other hand developed countries exhibit very low profitability verifying this
finding. Thus, it is apparent that currency momentum is subject to limits to
arbitrage while its profitability is heavily determined by country-specific charac-
teristics. For example, they demonstrate that momentum exhibits a particular
time-variation that stems from country-specific shocks and will thus be more
pronounced in high idiosyncratic volatility portfolios.
In the same vein, political risk is the main determinant of country-specific
shocks. For example, Pa´stor and Veronesi (2013) employ a general equilibrium
2.3. MOTIVATION 78
model to show that in economies with weak economic profile, political risk uncer-
tainty requires a risk premium that should increase as the economic conditions
deteriorate. Boutchkova et al. (2012) also shows that local political risks are re-
lated to systemic volatility but global political risks are concentrated in periods
characterised by a large idiosyncratic volatility. We should recall that currency
momentum is more extreme in periods of high idiosyncratic volatility (Menkhoff
et al., 2012b) which verifies our assumption regarding the role of political risk
in the momentum strategies. Moreover, Lensink et al. (2000) show that polit-
ical risk a strong determinant of capital flight.3 Therefore, it is apparent that
political risk could serve as a candidate risk factor for currency momentum be-
ing that it is a forward looking measure that dominates all the country-specific
characteristics when the country risk is high.
Measure of Political Risk. We introduce a novel measure of political risk
that it is relative to the U.S. political conditions. The main purpose of this
measure is to capture the differences between the political uncertainty of the
U.S. economy and the rest of the world.4 We normalise it with average political
risk on a month-to-month basis so as to check against global political conditions.
This normalisation is very useful because it gives us the opportunity to capture
the simultaneous deterioration of the political conditions between countries with
similar characteristics and vice versa.5 Specifically, we define the global political
risk as:6
3For more examples please see Alesina and Tabellini (1989).
4Bekaert et al. (2014) construct a similar measure to proxy for political risk spreads.
5Our results are similar or improved in some cases if we do not apply this normalisation.
However, it is very useful as it increases the informativeness of our measure.
6We also account for the differences in globalisation across countries by creating a value-
weighted global political index where the weights are determined based on the KOF Index of
Globalization and the two measures behave similarly.
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PRt = 1
nt
nt∑
i=1
PRi,t︷ ︸︸ ︷
ln (1/pri,t)− ln (1/prUS,t)
σPRi,t
, (2.1)
where nt is the total number of available currencies at time t and pri,t (prUS,t)
represents the time t foreign (domestic) measure of political risk.7 σPRi,t is the
cross-sectional average of the time t absolute deviation of the foreign (i) political
risk from the U.S. counterpart (i.e. 1
nt
∑nt | ln (1/pri,t)− ln (1/prUS,t)|)). In or-
der to guard against the high persistence of the global political risk measure we
replace it with innovations (i.e. ∆PRt) of an autoregressive model with one lag.8
In addition, this measure serves our purpose as we aim to capture unexpected po-
litical activity. Figure 2.1 provides a graphical illustration of our global political
risk innovations along with other risk factors in the literature such as, global
FX volatility (as in Menkhoff et al. (2012a)), global FX correlation (similarly
to Mueller et al. (2013)), global FX liquidity innovations (measured as global
bid-ask spread (e.g. Menkhoff et al., 2012a, section 4)) and global CDS spreads
(measured as differences of average CDS spreads across countries (Della Corte
et al., 2013)).9 It can be seen that other risk factors in the foreign exchange
market are unrelated to our measure, indicating our attempt to capture different
dynamics of currency premia.10
7According to ICRG an increase in political risk is associated with a decrease in their
political risk variable (i.e. pri,t). Thus, we use the reciprocal of prit in order to have a measure
that increases with political risk.
8Another way to account for stationarity would be to take first differences. Our results
remain similar regardless of the method being used. In addition, we follow a similar procedure
for country level political risk measures (i.e. PRi,t).
9We will analyse these variables in a latter section.
10Apart from the relation with the NBER recessions that we illustrate in figure 2.1 we also
show that our measure is not related with any business cycle variation of any other country in
our sample. Particularly, we follow Bauer et al. (2014) and proxy the business cycle variation of
the countries in our sample with the leading indicators of OECD (OECD plus six NME). After
projecting our global political risk measure on the changes of the OECD leading indicator, we
find that there is no contemporaneous or lagged relation between the two measures, indicating
the disconnection of our variable with the business cycle.
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2.4 Data and Currency Portfolios
In this section, we provide a detailed description of the currency data used in the
paper as well as the different impositions applied to the dataset. In addition, we
describe our political risk data.
Exchange Rates Data. We begin with daily spot and one-month forward
exchange rates against the U.S. dollar spanning the period of January 1985 to
January 2014. The data are collected from Barclays and Reuters via Datastream.
Transaction costs are taken into consideration through the use of bid, ask and
mid quotes. We construct end-of-month series of daily spot and one-month for-
ward rates as in Burnside et al. (2011). The main advantage of this approach is
that the data is not averaged over each month but it represents the rates of the
last trading day every month. The sample comprises the following 48 countries:
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Euro area, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong
Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Iceland, Japan, Kuwait,
Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Por-
tugal, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, South
Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Ukraine, United King-
dom.11
We apply various filters in the data so as to make the analysis more realistic.
Those currencies that were partly or completely pegged to the U.S. dollar are
not excluded from the sample because their forward contracts were available to
investors. The euro area countries are excluded after the introduction of the
euro in January 1999. However, some countries entered the euro zone later than
11This sample is similar to the one employed by Menkhoff et al. (2012a,b).
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January 1999. In this case their exchange rates are excluded from the sample
at a later date. We also delete the observations that are associated with large
deviations from the covered interest rate parity condition. In particular, South
Africa from July 1985 to August 1985 as well as from December 2001 to May
2004; Malaysia from August 1998 to June 2005 and Indonesia from December
2000 to May 2007.
Currency Excess Returns. We denote with St and Ft the level of the time
t spot and forward exchange rates. Each currency is quoted against the U.S.
dollar such that an appreciation of the U.S. dollar reflects an increase in St. The
excess return (RXt+1) is defined as the payoff of a strategy that buys a foreign
currency in the forward market at time t and then sells it in the spot market at
maturity (i.e. at time t+ 1). The excess return can be computed as
RXt+1 =
Ft − St+1
St
=
Ft − St
St
− St+1 − St
St
. (2.2)
Thus, the excess return can be decomposed into two components; the forward
discount and the exchange rate return. Moreover, the covered interest-rate parity
(hereafter CIP) condition implies that the forward discount is a good proxy for
the interest rate differentials, i.e. (Ft − St)/St ' iˆt − it, where iˆt and it denote
the foreign and domestic riskless interest rates, respectively. Akram et al. (2008)
provide a detailed examination of CIP condition over different frequencies and
they find that it holds at daily and lower frequencies. Therefore, the excess
return could also be written as RXt+1 ' (ˆit − it)− (St+1 − St)/St. In the latter
expression, the currency excess returns can be approximated by the exchange
rate exposure subtracted by the difference in the foreign and domestic risk-free
interest rates.
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Transaction Costs. We report results with and without transaction costs
because the inclusion of bid and ask quotes inflates the volatility of the excess
returns giving more weight to less traded and illiquid currencies. The implemen-
tation cost of the currency strategy is taken into consideration though the use of
bid and ask spreads. Particularly, buying the foreign currency forward at time
t using the bid price (F bt ) and selling it at time t + 1 in the spot market at ask
price (Sat ) is given by: RX
l
t+1 = (F
b
t − Sat+1)/Sbt . Whereas the corresponding
short position in the foreign currency (or short in the dollar) will render a net
excess return of the form: RXst+1 = −(F at − Sbt+1)/Sat .
Political Risk Data. Our measure of country level political risk (i.e. pri,t) is
obtained from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG).12 ICRG calculates
political risk based on a variety of categories that capture country risk such as:
government stability, socioeconomic conditions, investment profile, internal con-
flict, external conflict, corruption, military in politics, religious tensions, ethnic
tensions, and democratic accountability. The original index measure ranges from
0-100 where a higher value of ICRGi,t reflects a decrease in political risk. As we
showed in the previous section we compute the log inverse of ICRGi,t so as to
obtain a measure that comoves with political risk.
Momentum Portfolios. At the end of each month t, we allocate currencies
into sextiles on the basis of their past performance obtained at time t− f , where
f represents the formation period and each portfolio is held for a month (h). To
this end, the first Portfolio contains the worst performing currencies (i.e. losers)
and the last basket consists of the winner currencies. The currency excess re-
turns within each portfolio are equally weighted. The cross-sectional momentum
12This measure captures only the variability of political risk per country and thus it is not
related to economic or financial risk. For more details please visit ICRG’s website.
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strategy (i.e. WMLf,h) involves a long position in the best performing curren-
cies (i.e. Portfolio 6) and a short position in the basket of currencies with the
poorest performance over a particular past time period (i.e. Portfolio 1) (e.g.,
Menkhoff et al., 2012b). We define conditional excess returns as:
CRX it = sign(RX
i
t−1)RX
i
t . (2.3)
The above equation is very similar to the one introduced by Burnside et al.
(2011b) and it resembles a currency momentum strategy as we go long the cur-
rency i when the previous month returns was positive and short otherwise. How-
ever, the dynamics of this strategy differ from the cross-sectional momentum.13
Particularly, we construct an equally weighted portfolio of all the conditional
returns and we label it as time-series momentum (i.e. TSMOM1,1t = CRX t).
2.5 Empirical Results
2.5.1 Preliminary Analysis
In this section we report summary statistics of our global political risk factor
and compare them with corresponding measures proposed in the literature. We
then evaluate the performance of the most profitable currency momentum port-
folios. Furthermore, we report the results of univariate predictive regressions of
momentum payoffs with global political risk innovations.
Descriptive Statistics. Table 2.1 reports descriptive statistics of global
political risk innovations as well as other risk factors in the literature such as in-
novations to global FX volatility, global FX correlation, global FX illiquidity and
13For a discussion on this issue we refer the reader to Menkhoff et al. (2012b).
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global CDS spreads changes. In line with figure 2.1 we find that global political
risk is uncorrelated (Corr) with other factors even when we take into considera-
tion the time-variation in the correlation structure by employing rolling correla-
tions based on a 60-month rolling window. In particular, MaxCorr (MinCorr)
represents the most extreme positive (negative) correlation of global political risk
innovations with each of the other variables. Moreover, our political risk measure
demonstrates low persistence (first-order autocorrelation of 0.09), exhibiting neg-
ative skewness and excess kurtosis. Likewise, all the remaining measures exhibit
low persistence as they are measured in a similar way.
[Table 2.1 about here.]
Figure 2.2 shows the correlation of country level political risk innovations with
respect to U.S. over the sample period. We first note that the correlations are on
average low and never exceed 25 percent. There are some exceptions in case of
those countries which have significant political ties with the U.S. such as U.K.,
Canada, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Russia. In order to understand the
source of the correlations we also report in Figure B.2 correlations of innovations
to each individual component of political risk index relative to U.S. components
of political risk. We see that the investment profile component which covers
aspects related to contract expropriation, profits repatriation14 or payment delays
dominates in terms of significant correlations. Nonetheless correlations remain
low across different components.15
[Figure 2.2 about here.]
14For example, firms tend to consider the tax jurisdiction in order to allocate their earning
abroad or repatriate them immediately (see e.g., Foley et al., 2007; Faulkender and Petersen,
2012; Bennedsen and Zeume, 2015). This practice, in principle, could affect currency flows
between countries with different tax environments.
15In Figure B.3, we show the turnover of portfolios sorted based on global political risk.
The majority of the countries appear in extreme portfolios.
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Table 2.2 displays summary statistics of the most profitable cross-sectional
momentum strategies in the foreign exchange market. More specifically, Panels
A, B and C present descriptive statistics of momentum strategies with differ-
ent formation periods (f) and a holding period (h) of one month (i.e. WML1,1,
WML3,1,WML6,1). Consistently with Menkhoff et al. (2012b) we find that cur-
rency momentum returns exhibit statistically significant high annualized mean
excess returns (before transaction costs) of 10.18 for the formation period of one
month which is the most profitable and then the profitability decreases monoton-
ically as the formation period increases.16 Transaction costs (i.e. WMLτ ) par-
tially explain momentum return as the corresponding average net excess returns
drops to 6.29. All mean returns are expressed in percentage points. In addition,
currency momentum renders high annualized sharpe ratios while exhibiting neg-
ative skewness and excess kurtosis. We also report first order autocorrelations
with the corresponding p-values.
[Table 2.2 about here.]
Panel A of Table 2.3 shows summary statistics of time-series momentum
portfolios with and without transaction costs. As expected, the time-series mo-
mentum renders an annualized excess return before (after) transaction costs of
5.32 (3.25) that it is statistically significant and smaller than the one obtained
from the cross-sectional strategy (i.e. WML1,1). Panel B reports results of
regressions of the time-series momentum strategy on the cross-sectional momen-
tum returns. We find that the two strategies are quite different as it is illustrated
by the economically and statistically significant alphas as well as the fact that
the adjusted R2 decrease with the formation period. However, the two strategies
16In Figure B.4, we show the portfolio turnover of the winner and loser portfolios. Mostly
tradable currencies appear in both portfolios.
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exhibit a common variation that it is revealed from the relatively high adjusted
R2 (i.e. 0.52) when the formation period is one month.
[Table 2.3 about here.]
Predictive Regressions. As a first step we question the predictive power of
global political risk for both cross-sectional and time-series momentum returns.
The main reason for performing this exercise is to investigate the time-series
variation of momentum returns in an attempt to understand its (dis)connection
with the macroeconomy or the financial environment. To this end, we run pre-
dictive regressions of momentum returns on different factors considered in the
literature along with global risk innovations such that:
WMLf,ht+1 = αf,h + γZt + εf,ht+1. (2.4)
TSMOM1,ht+1 = α
1,h + γZt + ε1,ht+1. (2.5)
where f represents the formation period and takes the values 1, 3 and 617 and
h is the holding period of the currency momentum strategy that is always equal
to one month. Zt includes ∆PRt or a set of other predictors in the literature,
summarized in Table 2.1.18 Table B.1 reports the slope estimates of univariate
regressions with the variables of interest. We note that only global political risk
exhibits significant slope estimates indicating that it contains important infor-
mation for both cross-sectional and time-series currency momentum. However, it
performs purely in terms of goodness of fit as it exhibits very low R2. In Panel B
of Table B.1 we analyze seperately loser and winner portfolios of cross-sectional
momentum strategies. We make an important observation; while the returns to
17To save space we report the results with longer formation periods, i.e. three and six
months, in Table B.1.
18The results remain similar when we control for reversals and they are available on demand.
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winner portfolios are mainly predicted by the changes in FX volatility, only the
innovations to global political risk explain the subsequent returns to loser port-
folios. This suggests that the main channel through which the global political
risk rationalizes momentum profitability is the short leg of the cross-sectional
momentum strategy. Next, we turn our scope to a cross-sectional perspective so
as to see whether the cross-country differences of political risk can capture the
cross-section of currency momentum portfolios.
[Table B.1 about here.]
2.5.2 Currency Momentum and Global Political Risk
This section demonstrates the role of political risk in currency investment strate-
gies with a focus on currency momentum strategies. More precisely, we question
whether political risk affects currency premia and to what extend a foreign in-
vestor could protect herself from adverse political conditions. Therefore, we
examine the pricing ability of global political risk innovations for FX momentum
portfolios.
Political Risk-Sorted Portfolios. One way to investigate the pricing abil-
ity of global political risk is to see whether currency portfolios that are sorted
based on currency exposures to global political risk render a significantly positive
spread.
Therefore, we sort currencies into five portfolios at time t based on their past
betas (i.e. t − 1) with global political risk innovations. Following Lustig et al.
(2011); Menkhoff et al. (2012a); Mueller et al. (2013) the betas are estimated
based on a 60-month rolling window and we rebalance our portfolios on a monthly
basis. We exclude the first 60 months for the calculation of the portfolio returns
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so as to avoid relying on the in-sample period.19
CRX it = α
i + βi,PR∆PRt + εit, (2.6)
where CRX it is the conditional excess return of country i at time t and ∆PRi,t
represents global political risk innovations.
The purpose of this exercise is twofold. Firstly, we ask whether political risk
is a priced factor in the currency market and then we assess the political risk
exposures of currency premia that it is associated with currency momentum.
Table 2.5 displays descriptive statistics of currency portfolios sorted on global
political risk betas. Excess returns of portfolios sorted on political risk expo-
sures increase as their exposure to political risk increases. We observe almost a
monotonic pattern verifying the pricing ability of political risk innovations for
currency momentum. Particularly, Table 2.5 shows that when sorting condi-
tional excess returns on political risk betas it renders a statistically lower excess
return for the low beta portfolios in comparison to the high beta counterparts.
Thus, the corresponding spread portfolio (i.e. H/L) provides a statistically and
economically significant excess return of 4.13% per annum. Most of the portfo-
lios exhibit positive skewness and excess kurtosis while the persistence level is
low. In addition, we report pre and post estimation betas to discover that they
increase when moving from low to high beta portfolios verifying the connection
between global political risk and momentum.20
[Table 2.5 about here.]
19Smaller window sizes provide slightly weaker results.
20In Figure B.5 we show how the rolling betas evolve over time.
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2.5.3 Factor-Mimicking Portfolio
Our global political risk measure is not a tradable factor and thus we create a
mimicking portfolio that helps us overcome this issue. Therefore, in order to
assess the pricing ability of global political risk innovations we construct a mim-
icking portfolio following Ang et al. (2006).21 The premise behind this method is
that a traded factor should have an average return that it is similar to the one of
the traded portfolio meaning that it can price itself. Particularly, we regress con-
temporaneously our global political risk measure on excess returns of currency
portfolios that are sorted based on their past performance:
∆PRt+1 = a+ b′RXt+1 + vt+1, (2.7)
where RXt+1 is vector of the six portfolio returns at time t + 1. Thus, the
mimicking portfolio22 is the projection of political risk innovations on the six
portfolios returns FPRt+1 and it is defined as FPRt+1 ≡ bˆ′RXt+1. We perform
the same exercise for different formation periods. The annualized mean excess
return of the mimicking portfolio when considering a momentum strategy with
formation and holding periods of one month is 2.81% with weights that are
formed as follows:
FPRt+1 = −0.19RX1t+1−0.06RX2t+1−0.01RX3t+1+0.05RX4t+1−0.14RX5t+1+0.33RX6t+1
(2.8)
21Please see Breeden et al. (1989); Menkhoff et al. (2012a); Mueller et al. (2013) for more
examples of this approach.
22We also control for other variables (i.e. Z) when estimating the optimal weights of the
mimicking portfolios (i.e. b′) such as, past momentum returns (reversals, see section 6.4),
volatility and liquidity. We find that the results remain unchanged (e.g. Lamont, 2001; Ferson
et al., 2006). For example, we run a regression of the form: ∆PRt+1 = a+b′RXt+1+c′Zt+ut+1.
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where the factor-mimicking portfolio loads positively on the excess return of the
last portfolio and negatively on the return of the first portfolio. This finding is in
line with the previous section where we showed that momentum returns increase
monotonically as their exposure to political risk increases. This monotonic pat-
tern is also an indication that our factor-mimicking portfolio could potentially
provide pricing information for momentum returns. Furthermore, we find that
our factor exhibits a correlation of 85% with the second principal component
(PC) of currencies that are sorted into portfolios based on their previous month
return. Thus, similarly to Lustig et al. (2011) who find that their HMLFX factor
is highly correlated with the second PC of interest-rate sorted portfolios and it
is a priced factor, we show in the next section that our slope factor involves all
the required cross-sectional information to corroborate pricing past performance-
sorted currency portfolios.
2.5.4 FX Asset Pricing Tests
This section performs cross-sectional asset pricing tests between the six currency
portfolios and the political risk model, and shows that political risk is priced in
the cross-section of currency excess returns.
Methods. Following the asset pricing methodology analyzed in Cochrane
(2005) and implemented in many studies in the FX asset pricing literature, such
as Lustig et al. (2011) and Menkhoff et al. (2012a) we examine the pricing ability
of global political risk. We denote the currency excess return of each portfolio j
at time t+1 as RXjt+1. In this paper we use discrete excess returns instead of log
forms so as to avoid the joint log-normality assumption between returns and the
pricing kernel. Under no arbitrage conditions, the risk-adjusted currency excess
returns should be zero and satisfy the Euler equation:
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E[Mt+1RX
j
t+1] = 0 (2.9)
where Mt+1 denotes a linear SDF in the risk factors φt+1.
23 In particular, the
main focus is on the SDF of the following form:
Mt+1 = [1− b′(φt+1 − µφ)] (2.10)
where b denotes the vector of factor loadings and µφ is the vector of expected
values of the pricing factors (i.e. µφ = E(φt+1)). The beta representation of the
model is obtained from the combination of above equations rendering the beta
pricing model below:
E[RXj] = λ′βj (2.11)
where λ = Σφb represents the factor risk prices with Σφ = E[(φt − µφ)(φt −
µφ)
′] denoting the variance-covariance matrix of the risk factors and b the factor
loading.24 After projecting each currency excess return (RXjt ) on the risk factors
(φt) contemporaneously, we obtain the regression coefficients β
j.
The simultaneous estimation of the factor loadings (b), factor means (µ) as
well as the individual elements of the factor covariance matrix (Σφ) is based on
the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) of Hansen (1982). Particularly, the
estimation is based on the system of the moment conditions below:
23In the robustness section, we analyze the potential effects of non-linearity.
24In order to control for the fact that the means and the covariance of the risk factors are
estimated we compute the standard errors for the factor risk prices by applying the Delta
method.
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E[g(zt, θ)] = E

[1− b′(φt − µφ)]RXt
φt − µφ
vec((φt − µφ)(φt − µφ)′)− vec(Σφ)
 = 0
where g(zt, θ) is a function of the set of parameters (i.e. θ = [b
′µ′vec(Σφ)′]′) and
the data (i.e. zt = [RXt, φt]).
The main purpose of this study is to examine the pricing ability of the model
on the cross-section of currency returns and thus we restrict our attention on
unconditional moments with no instruments apart from a constant. Thus, the
pricing errors are used as the set of moments under a prespecified weighting ma-
trix. In the first stage of the GMM (GMM1) we start with an identity weighting
matrix so as to see whether the factors can price the cross-section of the currency
excess returns equally well. Then in the second stage (GMM2) we choose the
weighting matrix optimally by minimizing the difference between the objective
functions under heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (HAC) estimates of the
long-run covariance matrix of the moment conditions. To do that, we follow the
Newey and West (1987) methodology using the optimal number of lags as in
Andrews (1991).
As a verification tool we also apply a Fama and MacBeth (1973) (hereafter
FMB) two pass regression. In the first stage, we run contemporaneous time-
series regressions of currency portfolio excess returns on the risk factors. In the
second stage, we perform cross-sectional regressions of average portfolio returns
on factor loadings, obtained from the previous step, in order to compute the
factor risk prices. In addition, we allow for common misspricing in the currency
returns by including a constant but the cross-sectional estimate of political risk
remains highly significant if we exclude it. In addition, we report both Newey
and West (1987) as well as Shanken (1992) so as to account for the potential
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error-in-variable issue that might arise due to the fact that the regressors are
estimated in the second stage of the FMB procedure.
Cross-Sectional Analysis. The SDF of each model takes the following form:
Mt+1 = 1− bDOL(DOLt+1 − µDOL)− bFPR(FPRt+1 − µFPR). (2.12)
Panel A of table 2.6 provides results for the second-pass regression based on
GMM and FMB methods. The table displays estimates for b and the implied
factor risk prices (λ) as well as standard errors that are corrected for autocor-
relation and heteroskedasticity following Newey and West (1987) based on the
optimal number of lags as in Andrews (1991). We also evaluate the cross-sectional
performance of our asset pricing model with various measures of goodness of fit
such as χ2, cross-sectional R2, HJ distance following Hansen and Jagannathan
(1997) as well as a generalized version of the cross-sectional F -test statistic of
Shanken (1985) under the null of zero pricing errors and a cross-sectional R2
of one. The χ2 test statistics - obtained from the FMB (with Newey and West
(1987) and Shanken (1992) corrections) as well as GMM1 and GMM2 procedures
- test the null hypothesis that all pricing errors in the cross-section are mutually
equal to zero. The cross-sectional pricing errors are computed as the difference
between the realized and predicted excess returns. The HJ distance is a model
diagnostic that helps us compare asset pricing models. In our context it tests
whether the distance of the SDF of our model in squared terms and a group of
acceptable SDFs is equal to zero. We report p-values in curly brackets.25 Ta-
ble 2.6 displays three panels that correspond to the three momentum strategies
25For the estimation of the p-values for the HJ distance we follow Jagannathan and Wang
(1996).
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of interest. Particularly, the left panel shows results for a momentum strategy
with one month formation (f) period and one month holding (h) period whereas
the other two panels display cross-sectional estimates for formation periods of 3
and 6 months respectively and monthly rebalancing.
Firstly, we focus on the statistical significance and the sign of the estimates
of the factor risk prices of our political risk (i.e. λFPR ) measure as well the
market factor (i.e. λDOL). We find that the our political risk prices of polit-
ical risk are always positive and significant based on Newey and West (1987)
and Shanken (1992) standard errors across our momentum strategies and they
increase with the formation period when we include a constant in the cross-
section. In addition, λDOL is not equal to one as in the case of the carry trades
(Lustig et al., 2011) but it remains insignificant. The results are also verified by
GMM1 and GMM2 estimates. In terms of goodness of fit the p-values of the χ
2
test statistic indicates that we cannot reject the null that all the pricing errors
are equal to zero. We perform the same test using Newey and West (1987) and
Shanken (1992) corrections in the FMB as well as GMM1 and GMM2. We find
very strong results for all formation periods with the exception of the formation
period of three months. These findings are in line with the CSRTSH statistic
of Shanken (1985) when we include a constant in the cross-sectional regression.
Furthermore, the cross-sectional R2 range from 66% for three month formation
period to 99% for the one month formation period. The R2 for the momentum
(6,1) is 86%. Finally, regarding HJ distance we cannot reject the null that the
HJ distance is equal to zero for all momentum strategies because they exhibit
very large p-values. Overall, we find that global political risk is priced in the
cross-section of currency momentum - both in terms of statistical significance as
well as goodness of fit.
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Time-Series Analysis. Panel B of table 2.6 also displays estimates of the
coefficients when projecting contemporaneously the time-series of currency excess
returns on a constant and the factors of interest (i.e. DOL and FPR) for each
of the six currency portfolios p (i.e. p = 1, . . . , 6),
RXpt+1 = β
p
0 + β
p
DOLDOLt+1 + β
p
FPRFPRt+1 + upt+1. (2.13)
Here we examine whether the global political risk explains the differences
across momentum portfolio excess returns once we control for the DOL factor.
Starting from the estimates of the DOL factor (βDOL) we find that it is always
very close to one indicating that it is not able to capture any of the variation
of mean excess returns across momentum portfolios. On the other hand we find
that the betas of the mimicking portfolios (βFPR) are highly significant and they
increase as we move from the loser to winner portfolios. Specifically, the betas
of the FPR for the formation period of one month increase monotonically from
−1.64 for the loser to 2.05 for the winner portfolios. This finding is consistent for
other formation periods demonstrating that the global political risk betas load
negatively in loser portfolios and positively in winner portfolios. In addition,
the times-series R2 range from 73% to 95% for momentum (1,1), from 58% to
85% for momentum (3,1) and from 79% to 92% for six months formation period.
[Table 2.6 about here.]
In Figure 2.3 we show results graphically on the fit of our model. Here, we plot
realized average excess returns on the vertical axis and the corresponding average
fitted excess returns as they are implied by our model along the horizontal axis.
We find that, for every formation period, global political risk is priced being that
it is able to replicate the spread in average momentum returns adequately.
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[Figure 2.3 about here.]
Overall, our results reveal that a currency investor requires a premium for
holding winner portfolios since they are exposed to global political risk. At the
same time, investors accept lower returns for loser portfolios which invest in
USD by shorting loser currencies exactly when the global political risk increases,
i.e. either an increase in political risk of foreign currencies or a decrease in U.S.
political risk.
Global Political Risk Innovations. We also perform the same analysis
after replacing the mimicking portfolio with our global political risk innovations.
To this end, table 2.7 reports results for asset pricing tests when the set of
the two risk factors are the market factor (i.e. DOL) and global political risk
innovations (i.e. ∆PR). Particularly, we report cross-sectional results from the
FMB regression and find that the estimates of λPR are highly significant even
with or without the inclusion of a constant in the cross-sectional regression.
We report both HAC standard errors as well as standard errors that take into
consideration the error-in-variable problem. Regarding the goodness of fit, the
χ2 test statistic indicates that we cannot reject the null that all pricing errors are
statistically different than zero. This is also verified by the large p-values. These
statistics are based on FMB and GMM1 and GMM2 methods. This is also in
line with the CSRTSH statistic when we include a constant in the cross-sectional
regression as we also find very large p-values. In addition, the cross-sectional
R2 vary from 66% for momentum (3,1) to 99% for momentum (1,1). The cross-
sectional R2 for six months formation period is 86%. Finally, the HJ distance is
not statistically different from zero as it is shown from the very large p-values.
Thus, we see that the results are similar if you use global political risk innovation
instead of the mimicking portfolio.
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[Table 2.7 about here.]
2.6 Other Determinants of Currency Premia
This section aims to provide a more comprehensive view of our results. Particu-
larly we examine the link between global political risk and other risk factors so
as to see whether political risk captures different dynamics of currency premia.
Consequently, we perform double sort of currency excess returns in order to in-
vestigate the conditional pricing ability of our measure after controlling for other
variables.
2.6.1 Limits to Arbitrage
Political risk is one of the major dimensions of limits to arbitrage in the for-
eign exchange market that affect the profitability of currency momentum (e.g.,
Menkhoff et al., 2012b). Therefore, we need to examine whether it contains in-
formation for currency premia beyond that embodied in other measures of limits
to arbitrage. Along these lines, we follow Menkhoff et al. (2012b) who show
that momentum returns are more pronounced under high idiosyncratic volatility
states and thus it would be hard for an investor to find another set of cur-
rencies that could potentially serve as hedge factors. To this end, we employ
the idiosyncratic volatility of an FX asset pricing model. Particularly, we com-
pute the idiosyncratic volatility and skewness of the Lustig et al. (2011) model.
Lustig et al. (2011) show that two risk factors are enough to price the cross-
section of currency carry trade returns. The first factor is a level factor (i.e.
DOL) that goes long all the available foreign currencies across portfolios each
time while short-selling the dollar, whereas the second factor is a slope factor
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(i.e. HMLFX) that buys a basket of investment currencies (high interest rate)
and sells an funding currency portfolio (low interest rate). The latter strategy
resembles the carry trade strategy.
We construct daily DOL and HMLFX factors obtained from daily currency
excess returns (RXt+1) sorted on forward discounts of 48 currencies. Each cur-
rency should have at least 20 observations each month in order to be considered
in the analysis. Daily currency excess returns are regressed each month on a
constant, a DOL and a HMLFX factor in order to obtain monthly error terms:
RX it,d+1 = α
i + βi1,tDOLt,d+1 + β
i
2,tHMLFXt,d+1 + ε
i
t,d+1, (2.14)
where d represents the daily observations each month, t is the number of monthly
observations and i denotes the number of currencies. We define currency i′s
idiosyncratic volatility in month t (IV FXi,t ), as the standard deviation of the daily
error terms each month and the corresponding idiosyncratic skewness (ISFXi,t ) as
the third moment of the error term divided by the cubed form of idiosyncratic
volatility.26 Thus, the two measures take the following form:
IV FXi,t =
√√√√ 1
Ti,t
Ti,t∑
d=1
ε2i,d, IS
FX
i,t =
1
Ti,t
∑Ti,t
d=1 ε
3
i,d
(IV FXi,t )
3
. (2.15)
where Ti,t denotes the number of daily observations each month t for each cur-
rency i subtracted by one for idiosyncratic volatility and by two for idiosyncratic
skewness, so as to account for the appropriate degrees of freedom.
We also compute average deviations from the CIP condition after controlling
for transaction costs as another proxy of limits to arbitrage in the currency
market (Mancini-Griffoli and Ranaldo, 2011). Figure 2.4 shows average CIP
26For examples on the construction of the idiosyncratic volatility and skewness please see
Goyal and Santa-Clara (2003); Fu (2009); Boyer et al. (2009); Chen and Petkova (2012).
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deviations along with global political risk betas for conditional excess returns.
We find that countries with high political risk exhibit more pronounced CIP
deviations reflected in the upward slopping regression line in the figure supporting
our hypothesis regarding the role of global political risk in currency momentum
strategies. This visual evidence is also verified by the significant cross-sectional
beta (β = 1.34, tstat = 2.55) and R2 of 11%.
[Figure 2.4 about here.]
2.6.2 Global FX Volatility and Liquidity
Here we examine the behaviour of political risk in currency momentum when
we control for volatility or liquidity in the foreign exchange market. We follow
Menkhoff et al. (2012a) and measure FX volatility and liquidity based on the
cross-sectional average of individual daily absolute exchange rate returns that
are averages each month. Particularly, we measure global FX volatility (σFXt )
and FX liquidity (ξFXt ) as:
σFXt =
1
Tt
∑
d∈Tt
[∑
k∈Kd
( |∆sd|
Kd
)]
, ξFXt =
1
Tt
∑
d∈Tt
[∑
k∈Kd
(
BASkd
Kd
)]
. (2.16)
where |∆sd| represents the absolute change in the log spot exchange rate of
currency k on day d. In the same vein, BASkd is the bid-ask spread in percentage
points of currency k on day d. Tt is the total number of days in month t and
Kd is the total number of currencies on day d. Thus, an increase of this measure
is associated with higher levels of illiquidity. In order to control for the high
persistence of these measures we replace them with innovations of an AR(1)
models as we did for the political risk measure and we denote them as ∆RVFXt
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and ∆LFXt respectively.
2.6.3 Global FX Correlation
We also examine the pricing ability of global political risk for currency momen-
tum in the presence of global correlation risk. Mueller et al. (2013) show that
global FX correlation is priced in the cross-section of carry trade portfolios and
it is a good proxy for global risk aversion. Therefore, it is very important to see
the performance of political risk under different states of correlation risk. To this
end, we use a similar measure with the one introduced by Mueller et al. (2013)
and compute global FX correlation risk as:
γFXt =
1
N combt
nt∑
i=1
[∑
j>i
(
RCijt
)]
, (2.17)
where RCijt is the realised correlation between currencies i and j at time t. N
comb
t
is the total number of combinations of currencies (i, j) at time t and nt is the
total number of currencies in our sample at time t. As before, we replace the
correlation variable with its innovations from an autoregressive model with one
lag and denote it as ∆RCFXt .
2.6.4 Double Sorts
Now that we have defined our variables of interest, we turn out attention to the
cross-sectional predictive ability of political risk conditional on the information
encompassed in these variables. We compute the exposure of conditional excess
returns to political risk based on a 60-month rolling window and then we sort
conditional currency excess returns (i.e. momentum returns) firstly into two
portfolios based on the variable of interest and then within each portfolio we
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sort them in three bins based on global political risk exposures. Each portfolio is
rebalanced on a monthly basis. Note that we sort currencies into portfolios based
on the currency exposures to our variables with the exception of idiosyncratic
volatility where we use the raw measure instead of its betas.27
Starting with idiosyncratic volatility and skewness Panels A and B of Ta-
ble 2.8 show double sorts on IV and IS respectively along with global political
risk exposures. Consistently with Menkhoff et al. (2012b) we find that momen-
tum returns increase as we move from low to high IV portfolios and also that the
momentum returns are more extreme in the high idiosyncratic volatility basket
making it more difficult for an investor to hedge this risk away. A reverse pattern
is observed for IS portfolios. We thus attempt to determine whether this pat-
tern influences our results. We find that in both in low and high IV portfolios,
currencies with high political risk exhibit higher mean excess returns than the
low political risk counterpart, but the diffrence is more pronounced in high IV
portfolios. The results are similar for idiosyncratic skewness, except that the
difference across political risk portfolios is greater in low IS portfolios.
Another determinant of currency momentum is illiquidity. Menkhoff et al.
(2012b) show that currency momentum is more concentrated among countries
with less liquid currencies and a fragile political environment. We would therefore
question the pricing ability of political risk after controlling for illiquidity. Panel
C of Table 2.8 shows that momentum returns increase as we move from low to
high political risk portfolios both in high and low illiquidity states.
Another feature of exchange rates that are mainly involved in momentum
portfolios is the high levels of volatility. Thus, in Panel D we ask whether
political risk is priced even after controlling for global FX volatility. We find that
27We do not provide double sorts for CDS spreads because of data availability, i.e. short
time-series and limited cross-section.
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momentum profitability is larger in high political risk portfolios in comparison to
low political risk baskets. This pattern is more striking in high volatility states.
Finally, we control for global FX correlation in Panel D of Table 2.8 so as
to examine the momentum profitability under high and low levels of global risk
aversion. Here, we show that the increasing pattern remains unchanged even
after controlling for global FX correlation. However, the difference across global
political risk portfolios is particularly significant in low correlation portfolios.
Overall, we find that global political risk is priced in the cross-section of currency
momentum returns even after controlling for other determinants of currency
premia.28
[Table 2.8 about here.]
2.7 Robustness and other Specification Tests
In this section we apply several robustness checks to examine further the role of
political risk. Particularly, we impose various filters in the data so as to focus
on more tradable currencies. We check the implications of transaction costs,
reversals and non-linearity in our asset pricing model. We consider different
currency portfolio strategies such as carry and value. Finally, we explore the
link with other uncertainty, macro and financial variables and we examine the
robustness of our asset pricing results to alternative specifications of global and
country-level political risk.
28It is also indicative that the differences between the high and low spread portfolios (i.e.,
HMLHigh − HMLlow) of the different determinants of currency premia are not statistically
significant.
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2.7.1 Tradability
One of the main concerns regarding the validity of our results is related to po-
tential impediments in the foreign exchange market that could refrain an in-
vestor from trading particular currencies. For example, some currencies cannot
be traded in large volumes and they exhibit high illiquidity. To alleviate this
issue, we follow Della Corte et al. (2013) and allow for currency-time combina-
tions that meet particular conditions. More precisely, we include country-time
pairs for countries that exhibit a non-negative value on the Chinn and Ito (2006)
capital account openness index and their currencies belong in the exchange rate
regime 3 or 4 of the IMF coarse classification. The latter filter eliminates curren-
cies that are inside a pre-announced crawling band of +/−2%, outside a de facto
crawling band of +/− 5%, outside a moving band of +/− 2%, or those that are
not in a free float. The filtered data comprise the following 33 countries: Aus-
tralia, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Korea, South, Kuwait, Malaysia,
Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Slo-
vakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, United
Kingdom. We name this group of currencies Filtered Data.
In order to increase the robustness of our analysis we consider a larger sample
of currencies. Particularly, we add 12 more currencies (60 countries in total) that
we excluded from the initial sample as they exhibit very small tradability and
thus high illiquidity. Those countries are Argentina, Chile, China, Colombia,
Estonia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey, Venezuala.
Then we apply the filters that we described above and end up with 39 curren-
cies.29
29Specifically, the new sample contains the following countries: Argentina, Australia, Bul-
garia, Canada, China, Cyprus, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
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Table 2.9 reports results of asset pricing tests after accounting for the filters.
Particularly, we employ a dollar factor along with the mimicking portfolio as
we did in section 2.5.4. The results remain unchanged or they are improved in
some cases. Overall, we find that our asset pricing model performs well in terms
of statistical and economic significance as we find statistically significant slope
risk factor prices and we cannot reject the null that all pricing errors are equal
to zero based on χ2 test statistics obtained from FMB and GMM1 and GMM2
procedures. In addition, we cannot reject the null that HJ distance is equal to
zero for any formation period as it is indicated by the large p-values. Finally, the
cross-sectional R2 range from 0.89% for the momentum of one month formation
period to 92% for the currency momentum with three months formation period.
Panel A (Panel B) reports results for the Filtered Data that contain 33 countries
(39 countries).
[Table 2.9 about here.]
2.7.2 Currency-level Asset Pricing Tests
The use of portfolios in our analysis could raise concerns because the inclusion of
currencies into portfolios might destroy information by shrinking the dispersion
of betas (e.g., Ang et al., 2010). We therefore perform cross-sectional tests on
individual currencies using conditional excess returns. Figure 2.5 depicts realized
average excess returns in the vertical axis and the corresponding average fitted
excess returns as they are implied by our model along the horizontal axis of
individual currencies. We find that most of the currencies line up or they are
quite close to the 45 degree line indicating that political risk is priced even after
Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Korea South, Kuwait, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mex-
ico, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South
Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Venezuala, United Kingdom.
2.7. ROBUSTNESS AND OTHER SPECIFICATION TESTS 105
considering each currency in isolation.
[Figure 2.5 about here.]
Next, we ask what is the contribution of country-level political risk in our
results. In Figure 2.6 we show cross-sectional t-statistics when considering only
country-level political risk factors and a constant. In particular, we estimate a
similar asset pricing model as in section 4.4 using the six momentum portfolios as
test assets, but excluding the DOL factor and replacing the global political risk
measure with country-level political risk vis-a`-vis United States. As the figure
shows while only few countries are the source of mispricing (i.e., not statistically
significant zero-beta rates in most of the cases), many countries contribute sig-
nificantly to the risk pricing of momentum returns. Our t-statistics take into
consideration the error-in-variable problem following Jagannathan and Wang
(1998). The blue horizontal line corresponds to the 1.96 significance bound.
[Figure 2.6 about here.]
2.7.3 Transaction Costs
We also examine the pricing ability of political risk for currency momentum when
considering net excess returns. The inclusion of transaction costs is very impor-
tant as they partially explain the profitability of this strategy (Menkhoff et al.,
2012b). Table 2.10 displays results for FMB regressions after considering the
implementation cost of the strategy. Specifically, the λFPR is highly significant
across formation periods based on HAC standard errors as well as Shanken (1992)
standard errors and t-statistics that account for the error-in-variable problem. In
addition, we were unable to reject the null of zero pricing errors for any forma-
tion period (with the exception of the nine months formation period), something
2.7. ROBUSTNESS AND OTHER SPECIFICATION TESTS 106
that it is verified by the CSRTSH statistic when we include a constant in the
cross-sectional regression. Moreover, we cannot reject the null that HJ distance
is equal to zero and the cross-sectional R2 are slightly lower ranging from 45%
for the 6-month formation period to 90% when we evaluate the previous month
performance. Figure B.6 shows the corresponding pricing error plots. Panel A
of Table B.2 offers results for longer formation periods. Overall, the global po-
litical risk is priced in cross-section of momentum returns even after controlling
for transaction costs.
[Table 2.10 about here.]
2.7.4 Reversals
Here we consider a mimicking portfolio that incorporates conditional information
on past returns. Particularly, we control for past month excess returns to see
whether our results are driven by short-run reversals. This is important as in the
equities literature the short-run reversals affect the momentum profitability and
they are also related to idiosyncratic volatility which is one of the determinants
of momentum profitability.30 Thus, we run a regression of the form: ∆PRt+1 =
a + b′RXt+1 + c′Zt + ut+1, where Zt is the previous month momentum excess
return and b′ are the weights of the conditional mimicking portfolio (i.e. CFPR).
Table 2.11 shows results for FMB regressions after replacing our political
risk factor with the conditional mimicking portfolio. A visual illustration of the
pricing errors is offered in Figure B.7. We also consider longer horizons of 9
and 12 months in Panel B of Table B.2. We find that the results are similar in
terms of statistical significance of the λCFPR but for some formation period we
reject the null that all the pricing errors are jointly equal to zero based on the χ2
30See for example Huang et al. (2009); Chen and Petkova (2012).
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test statistic. However, for the cases of momentum (1,1) and (12,1) the results
remain unchanged. In addition, we cannot reject the null of zero HJ distance for
any formation period and the cross-sectional R2s vary from 55% for momentum
(9,1) to 98% when considering the previous month’s performance. Therefore, we
find that short-run reversals might affect medium horizon momentum strategies
but they do not have any effects on the short or long-run formation periods.
[Table 2.11 about here.]
2.7.5 Non-linearity
In the asset pricing model, we proposed a linear SDF to price the momentum
returns. However, based on the double-sort evidence we provided before, one can
argue that there might be a non-linear relation between momentum returns and
global political risk innovations. Following this conjecture, we test whether the
price of political risk depends on the sign of global political risk innovations. In
Table 2.12 we report the results of cross-sectional asset pricing tests including
positive and negative political risk innovations seperately. We note that the price
of political risk is very significant in case of positive innovations regardless of the
methods used to compute the standard errors, while in case of negative shocks
the Shanken correction of the Fama and MacBeth procedure suggests that the
risk price is not significant. In other words, the pricing implication is stronger
when there is an unexpected increase in global political risk either through an
increase of political risk in foreign countries or a decrease in U.S. political risk.
However, we think that the linear model is still a good approximation to the true
risk pricing relation.
[Table 2.12 about here.]
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2.7.6 Long-short Strategies
The mechanism we proposed in the asset pricing model may also be relevant
for other long-short currency strategies. In order to understand better the role
of political risk for currency long-short strategies, we display the relationship
between currency portfolio returns and global political risk. Particularly, we
sort our global political risk measure into four bins (i.e. quartiles) so that we
get 25% months with the lowest political risk in the first quartile and 25% of
months with the highest political risk in the last basket. Then we compute the
average excess currency returns of going long the winner portfolio and short the
loser portfolio for the each bin. In this way, we assess the role of global political
risk in the profitability of currency portfolio strategies. Figure A8 provides a
visual illustration of annualized mean momentum returns conditional on global
political risk innovations for different formation periods (i.e. f = 1, 3, 6) and
a holding period (h) of one month. The figure shows specifically that average
momentum returns increase when we move from low to high political states.
This pattern is less pronounced as we increase the months of the formation
period. In any case, currency momentum returns are higher in periods of extreme
political conditions and perform poorly under low political states indicating the
significant role played by political risk in the currency market. This finding
will be tested more carefully in the next section. On top of the momentum
strategy, we also consider value and carry trade strategies.31 Figure B.9 provides
a visual illustration of the corresponding annualized mean returns of the value
and carry trade strategy, conditional on global political risk innovations. As we
can see, the increasing pattern of the average value and carry trade profitability
is consistent the our intuition regarding the presence of political risk in any long-
31Our currency value strategy is in the same vein with other studies such as Barroso and
Santa-Clara (2012); Asness et al. (2013); Menkhoff et al. (2014).
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short FX strategy. However, other risk factors that price FX value/carry returns
dominate the pricing ability of global political risk in case of value and carry
trade strategies.32
2.7.7 Other Measures
We explore how the global political risk measure relates to other measures. Ta-
ble B.3 presents summary statistics of uncertainty measures as well as macroe-
conomic and financial variables. Global political risk exhibits low correlations
with the aforementioned measures with the exception of the Consumer Senti-
ment Index and the return on the US MSCI index where we observe an overall
correlation of about 20%.
Our analysis also incorporates an alternative data of political risk. Particu-
larly, we employ political risk data based on the IFO World Economic Survey
where the participants are asked to assess how the political stability of a par-
ticular country influences foreign investors’ decisions to invest in that country.
The IFO is only available on a quarterly frequency starting from 1992:Q1 until
the end of our sample. Figure B.10 shows that global political risk is present in
currency momentum strategies with the IFO data.
Before we conclude, we finally consider alternative definitions of global po-
litical risk measure. First we include the political risk measure for all the 145
countries available in ICRG data regardless of the tradability of the currencies.
Next we omit the normalization factor σPRi,t in the original definition in equation
2.1. Finally we construct a measure which takes into account only the inno-
vations to U.S. political risk ignoring the global political risk originating from
foreign countries.
32Figure B.8 provides the corresponding results for currency momentum.
2.8. CONCLUSIONS 110
We repeat the cross-section asset pricing tests using these alternative mea-
sures and report in Figure B.4 the t-statistics of the risk price and the constant
(omitting the DOL factor) and the cross-sectional R2. As a benchmark, we
compare the results with the original measure and see that the original model
performs better in terms of significance of pricing errors, risk price and the cross-
sectional explanatory power.
[Figure B.4 about here.]
2.8 Conclusions
This paper examines the role of global political risk in the currency market.
We find that a novel factor capturing unexpected global political conditions is
priced in the cross-section of currency momentum strategies. This factor demon-
strates strong cross-sectional predictability beyond other factors in the literature
or existing measures of limits to arbitrage.
Currency momentum is a strategy where an investor forms expectations with
regards to future excess returns based on the performance of currency premia in
previous periods. Specifically, the investor buys currencies that performed well
over a particular past period while short-selling currencies that exhibited poor
past profitability. Current asset pricing models perform poorly in explaining the
cross-section of momentum returns and sheding light on economic forces that
drive the currency premia that is associated with the currency momentum. This
paper provides an asset pricing model that incorporates information on unantic-
ipated movements of political risk relative to the U.S. economy, showing that it
is capable of capturing a significant part of currency momentum excess returns.
Intuitively, investors will demand a premium for investing on high political risk
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currencies, while our empirical analysis suggests that currency trader tend to
take on global political risk when investing in such strategies.
Currency momentum is likely to be driven by limits to arbitrage and it is
more attractive to currencies that exhibit high illiquidity, volatility, correlation
and idiosyncratic volatility. We show that political risk is a natural limit to
arbitrage in the FX market, and thus determines the momentum profitability
even after accounting for the aforementioned variables. Therefore, it captures a
unique dimension of currency premia. The results are robust after controlling
for transaction costs, short-run reversals and alternative specifications.
Finally, our findings suggest that global political risk is a main driver of
momentum profitability, while future research is necessary to understand how
political risk affects long-short strategies in other markets.
Table 2.1. Summary Statistics of Global Political Risk
This table presents descriptive statistics of global political risk innovations (∆PRt) along
with other risk factors such as innovations of global FX volatility (∆RVFXt ), global FX
correlation (∆RCFXt ), global FX illiquidity (∆LFXt ) and changes in global CDS spreads
(∆CDSt). Moreover, the table shows mean, median, standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis,
minimum and maximum values. We also report first order autocorrelations (i.e. AC(1)
), Corr is the overall correlation of global political risk with all the other variables and
MaxCorr (MaxCorr) represent the corresponding maximum (minimum) correlation based
on a 60-month rolling window. Figures in parenthesis display p-values. Currency data is
collected from Datastream via Barclays and Reuters. We also obtain CDS spreads from
Datastream and Bloomberg. The data contain monthly series from January 1985 to January
2014 with the exception of the CDS data that spans the period October 2000 to January 2014.
Panel A: All Countries
∆PRt ∆RVFXt ∆RCFXt ∆LFXt ∆CDSt
Mean 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01
Median 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.01
Std 0.07 0.10 0.10 0.02 0.37
Skew -0.43 2.24 0.11 1.57 0.19
Kurt 10.32 14.20 3.05 11.97 8.28
Min -0.46 -0.31 -0.27 -0.07 -1.74
Max 0.35 0.75 0.33 0.10 1.73
AC(1) 0.09 -0.11 -0.13 -0.03 -0.01
(0.10) (0.04) (0.01) (0.56) (0.14)
Corr 1.00 -0.04 -0.07 0.03 -0.01
– (0.49) (0.21) (0.52) (0.87)
MaxCorr – 0.31 0.12 0.30 0.42
MinCorr – -0.38 -0.26 -0.35 -0.22
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Table 2.2. Descriptive Statistics of Cross-Sectional Momentum Port-
folios
This table presents descriptive statistics of currency portfolios sorted based on cumulative
excess returns over a particular formation period (f). The first (last) portfolio PL (PH)
comprise the basket of all currencies with the lowest (highest) expected return. WML is a
long-short strategy that buys PH and sells PL. Moreover, the table presents annualized mean,
standard deviation and Sharpe ratios, all in percentage points. We also report skewness and
kurtosis. Figures in squared brackets represent Newey and West (1987) t-statistics corrected
for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (HAC) using the optimal number of lags as in
Andrews (1991) and numbers in parenthesis are p-values. More specifically, Panels A, B and
C presents descriptive statistics of momentum strategies with different formation periods (f)
and a holding period (h) of one month (i.e. WML1,1, WML3,1, WML6,1). The superscript
τ represents the consideration of transaction costs. The data is collected from Datastream via
Barclays and Reuters. The data contain monthly series from January 1985 to January 2014.
Panel A: Currency Momentum (f = 1, h = 1)
PL P2 P3 P4 P5 PH DOL WML WMLτ
Currency Excess Returns
Mean -1.78 0.32 2.90 4.08 3.44 8.40 2.89 10.18 6.29
[-1.00] [0.18] [1.57] [2.39] [2.14] [3.93] [1.85] [5.30] [3.37]
Std 9.35 8.96 8.39 8.30 8.58 8.83 7.35 9.63 9.58
SR -0.19 0.04 0.35 0.49 0.40 0.95 0.39 1.06 0.66
Skew -0.66 -1.22 -0.59 -0.50 -0.47 0.03 -0.63 0.08 0.05
Kurt 5.97 7.85 6.03 4.06 5.53 3.50 4.52 4.89 4.95
AC(1) 0.00 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.02 0.15 0.08 0.02 0.03
(0.99) (0.30) (0.15) (0.12) (0.67) (0.01) (0.13) (0.68) (0.64)
Panel B : Currency Momentum (f = 3, h = 1)
Mean -0.79 0.85 2.09 2.97 4.51 8.05 2.94 8.84 5.20
[-0.42] [0.45] [1.31] [1.74] [2.83] [3.54] [1.87] [4.60] [2.73]
Std 9.19 8.74 8.17 8.46 8.47 9.08 7.25 9.75 9.76
SR -0.09 0.10 0.26 0.35 0.53 0.89 0.41 0.91 0.53
Skew -0.51 -1.20 -0.66 -0.33 -0.52 -0.14 -0.65 -0.08 -0.11
Kurt 5.96 8.10 6.01 4.31 4.77 4.46 4.65 3.93 3.91
AC(1) 0.10 0.08 0.00 0.08 0.10 0.19 0.12 0.04 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Panel C : Currency Momentum (f = 6, h = 1)
Mean 0.10 0.76 1.77 2.21 3.21 5.77 2.30 5.67 2.39
[0.06] [0.47] [1.06] [1.33] [1.85] [2.91] [1.55] [3.09] [1.29]
Std 9.04 8.02 8.28 8.35 8.69 8.84 7.16 9.90 9.94
SR 0.01 0.09 0.21 0.26 0.37 0.65 0.32 0.57 0.24
Skew -0.17 -0.63 -0.45 -0.45 -0.64 -0.96 -0.69 -0.43 -0.44
Kurt 5.91 6.00 4.56 4.65 5.50 7.41 4.60 3.98 3.99
AC(1) 0.09 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.12 0.19 0.10 0.02 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
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Table 2.3. Descriptive Statistics of Time-Series Momentum Portfolios
This table presents descriptive statistics of equally-weighted time-series momentum portfolios
(i.e. TSMOM1,1 = CRX) of one month formation and holding period. Panel A presents
annualized mean, standard deviation and Sharpe ratios, all in percentage points. We also
report skewness and kurtosis of time-series momentum portfolios where τ represents payoffs
that incorporate transactions costs. Panel B reports results of contemporaneous regressions
of time-series momentum portfolio (i.e. TSMOM1,1) on cross-sectional momentum portfolios
with different formation periods (f) from one month to twelve months. Figures in squared
brackets represent Newey and West (1987) t-statistics corrected for heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation (HAC) using the optimal number of lags as in Andrews (1991) and numbers
in parenthesis are p-values. The data is collected from Datastream via Barclays and Reuters.
The data contain monthly series from January 1985 to January 2014.
Panel A: Time-Series Momentum (f = 1, h = 1)
TSMOM1,1 TSMOM1,1τ
Mean 5.32 3.25
[5.25] [3.26]
Std 5.66 5.70
SR 0.94 0.57
Skew 0.25 0.27
Kurt 5.37 5.53
Min -0.05 -0.06
Max 0.08 0.08
AC(1) 0.04 0.03
(0.50) (0.59)
Panel B : TSMOM1,1t = α+ βWMLf,ht + εt for f = 1, 3, 6, 9, 12 and h = 1
WML1,1 WML3,1 WML6,1 WML9,1 WML12,1
Without TC
α 0.30 0.33 0.33 0.50 0.34
[2.27] [2.45] [2.44] [3.74] [2.63]
β 1.22 0.90 0.62 0.44 0.30
[14.96] [10.68] [5.19] [3.68] [2.42]
R¯2 0.52 0.26 0.11 0.05 0.02
With TC
α 0.20 0.19 0.14 0.30 0.12
[1.57] [1.39] [1.06] [2.12] [0.92]
β 1.21 0.90 0.59 0.42 0.29
[15.08] [10.45] [4.79] [3.52] [2.20]
R¯2 0.52 0.26 0.10 0.05 0.02
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Table 2.4. Univariate Predictive Regressions
This table reports univariate predictive regressions of currency momentum returns with global political risk (∆PRt), volatility (∆RVFXt ),
correlation (∆RCFXt ) and liquidity (∆LFXt ) innovations as well as CDS spreads (∆CDSt). NW represents Newey and West (1987) t-statistics
corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (HAC) using the optimal number of lags as in Andrews (1991). We also present R2 for each
regression and below the R2 we present χ2 in squared brackets. Panel A shows results for WML1,1t , Panel B for WML3,1t and Panel C for
WML6,1t . The data is collected from Datastream via Barclays and Reuters. The data contain monthly series from January 1985 to January 2014
with the exception of the CDS data that spans the period October 2000 to January 2014.
Panel A: Currency Momentum
cons ∆PRt ∆RVFXt ∆RCFXt ∆LFXt ∆CDSt R2 cons ∆PRt ∆RVFXt ∆RCFXt ∆LFXt ∆CDSt R2
Cross-sectional Momentum Time-series Momentum
(a) 0.84 -4.63 0.01 0.43 -2.97 0.02
NW [5.21] [-2.26] [5.13] [5.12] [-2.50] [6.26]
(b) 0.84 1.56 0.00 0.43 0.20 0.00
NW [5.30] [0.66] [0.44] [5.04] [0.13] [0.02]
(c) 0.84 0.98 0.00 0.43 -0.01 0.00
NW [5.27] [0.59] [0.35] [5.04] [-0.01] [0.00]
(d) 0.84 5.97 0.00 0.43 0.14 0.00
NW [5.28] [0.55] [0.31] [5.04] [0.02] [0.00]
(e) 0.92 -0.33 0.00 0.51 -0.15 0.00
NW [3.62] [-0.40] [0.16] [3.87] [-0.43] [0.19]
Panel B : Loser and Winner Portfolios
Losers Winners
(a) -0.14 4.98 0.02 0.71 0.35 0.00
NW [-0.91] [2.52] [6.34] [3.95] [0.21] 0.04
(b) -0.14 -2.49 0.01 0.71 -0.93 0.00
NW [-0.93] [-0.84] [0.70] [3.96] [-0.56] [0.31]
(c) -0.14 2.06 0.00 0.71 3.04 0.01
NW [-0.94] [1.69] [2.85] [4.04] [2.06] [4.26]
(d) -0.14 -9.53 0.00 0.71 -3.56 0.00
NW [-0.92] [-1.05] [1.09] [3.95] [-0.33] [0.11]
(e) 0.02 -0.31 0.00 0.94 -0.64 0.00
NW [0.08] [-0.38] [0.15] [3.31] [-0.99] [0.97]
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Table 2.5. Portfolios sorted on Political Risk-Betas
This table presents descriptive statistics of currency portfolios sorted on betas with global
political risk innovations. The first (last) portfolio PL (PH) comprise the basket of all
currencies with the lowest (highest) political-risk betas. H/L is the a long-short strategy
that buys PH and sells PL and Avg is the average across portfolios each time. Moreover,
the table presents annualized mean, standard deviation and Sharpe ratios, all in percentage
points. We also report skewness and kurtosis. Figures in squared brackets represent Newey
and West (1987) t-statistics corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (HAC) using
the optimal number of lags as in Andrews (1991) and numbers in brackets are p-values. All
currency excess returns incorporate transaction costs by taking a short position in the first
portfolio and long positions in the remaining baskets of currencies. The data is collected from
Datastream via Barclays and Reuters. The data contain monthly series from January 1985 to
January 2014.
Panel A: Conditional Excess Returns
Portfolios PL P2 P3 P4 P5 PH Avg H/L
Global Political Risk Innovations
Mean 2.75 2.36 4.02 4.16 4.82 6.88 4.17 4.13
[2.20] [1.82] [3.57] [3.66] [3.11] [3.87] [4.29] [2.33]
Std 6.68 6.23 5.55 6.74 7.19 8.07 4.97 8.00
SR 0.41 0.38 0.72 0.62 0.67 0.85 0.84 0.52
Skew 0.64 0.95 1.24 0.56 1.37 0.33 0.78 0.71
Kurt 5.79 8.01 9.78 7.05 10.08 4.38 6.48 7.17
AC(1) -0.06 0.18 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.08 0.10 -0.06
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
pre-β -0.05 -0.01 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.11
post-β -0.05 -0.01 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.11
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Table 2.6. FX Asset Pricing Tests: Factor-Mimicking Portfolio
This table reports asset pricing results for the two-factor model that comprises the DOL and FPR risk factors. We use as test assets six currency
portfolios sorted based on past performances of currency returns. Particularly, we employ formation periods of 1, 3 and 6 months. We rebalance our
portfolios on a monthly basis. Panel A reports GMM1, GMM2 as well as Fama and MacBeth (1973) estimates of the factor loadings (b) and factor prices
of risk (λ). We also display Newey and West (1987) standard errors (in parenthesis) or t-statistics (in squared brackets) corrected for autocorrelation
and heteroskedasticity with Andrews (1991) optimal lag selection and Sh are the corresponding values of Shanken (1992). The table also shows χ2,
cross-sectional R2, HJ distance following Hansen and Jagannathan (1997) as well as a generalized version of the cross-sectional F -test statistic of
Shanken (1985) (CSRTSH). We report p-values in curly brackets. Panel B reports OLS estimates of contemporaneous time-series regression with HAC
standard errors in parenthesis. We do not control for transaction costs and excess returns are expressed in percentage points. The data are collected from
Datastream via Barclays and Reuters. The data contain monthly series from January 1985 to January 2014.
Panel A: Factor Prices
bDOL bFPR λDOL λFPR R2 χ2 HJ dist bDOL bFPR λDOL λFPR R2 χ2 HJ dist bDOL bFPR λDOL λFPR R2 χ2 HJ dist
Momentum (f = 1, h = 1) Momentum (f = 3, h = 1) Momentum (f = 6, h = 1)
GMM1 0.07 0.44 0.24 0.22 0.99 2.91 0.03 0.07 0.20 0.25 0.35 0.66 10.12 0.05 0.06 0.25 0.23 0.09 0.86 7.61 0.04
s.e. (0.09) (0.17) (0.13) (0.05) {0.57} {0.94} (0.10) (0.13) (0.13) (0.09) {0.04} {0.73} (0.10) (0.21) (0.13) (0.03) {0.11} {0.77}
GMM2 0.07 0.45 0.26 0.23 3.25 0.07 0.15 0.24 0.26 11.09 0.06 0.25 0.23 0.09 7.85
s.e. (0.11) (0.19) (0.13) (0.05) {0.52} (0.03) (0.03) (0.12) (0.08 ) {0.03} (0.16) (0.14) (0.13) (0.03) {0.10}
cons λDOL λFPR χ2NW χ
2
SH cons λDOL λFPR χ
2
NW χ
2
SH cons λDOL λFPR χ
2
NW χ
2
SH
FMB 0.24 0.22 3.17 2.85 0.25 0.35 18.69 17.26 0.23 0.09 14.48 13.97
(Sh) (0.11) (0.04) (0.67) {0.72} (0.11) (0.08) (0.00) {0.00} (0.11) (0.03) (0.01) {0.02}
(NW ) (0.11) (0.04) (0.11) (0.08) (0.11) (0.03)
FMBc 0.02 2.11 0.18 CSRTSH 0.18 -0.01 1.47 0.27 CSRTSH 2.54 0.04 -3.48 0.29 CSRTSH 0.20
[Sh] [-0.68] [0.76] [2.35] [0.89] [-0.76] [0.91] [2.66] [0.04] [1.70] [-1.59] [2.37] [0.87]
[NW ] [-0.99] [1.11] [3.01] [-0.95] [1.13] [2.94] [1.50] [-1.40] [2.02]
Panel B : Factor Betas
α βDOL βFPR R2 α βDOL βFPR R2 α βDOL βFPR R2
PL -0.15 0.94 -1.64 0.81 -0.07 0.96 -0.16 0.58 0.02 0.88 -2.45 0.92
(0.07) (0.04) (0.14) (0.09) (0.08) (0.11) (0.05) (0.03) (0.12)
P2 0.03 0.99 -0.97 0.78 0.07 0.96 -0.79 0.85 0.12 0.91 -1.08 0.81
(0.06) (0.05) (0.14) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06) (0.03) (0.14)
P3 0.24 1.01 -0.33 0.82 0.17 0.98 -0.46 0.85 0.19 0.97 -0.29 0.79
(0.06) (0.04) (0.09) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.11)
P4 0.34 1.02 0.28 0.80 0.25 1.06 0.10 0.81 0.20 1.06 0.77 0.82
(0.06) (0.04) (0.10) (0.07) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.10)
P5 0.29 1.00 0.54 0.73 0.38 1.03 0.60 0.83 0.21 1.09 1.21 0.85
(0.07) (0.04) (0.14) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.03) (0.10)
PH 0.70 1.03 2.05 0.95 0.67 1.03 0.72 0.75 0.63 1.06 1.87 0.81
(0.04) (0.02) (0.06) (0.09) (0.04) (0.07) (0.08) (0.04) (0.14)
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Table 2.7. FX Asset Pricing Tests: Global Political Risk Innovations
This table reports asset pricing results for the two-factor model that comprises the DOL
and ∆PR risk factors. We use as test assets six currency portfolios sorted based on past
performances of currency returns. Particularly, we employ formation periods of 1, 3 and 6
months. We rebalance our portfolios on a monthly basis. Panel A reports Fama and MacBeth
(1973) estimates of the factor loadings (b) and factor prices of risk (λ). We also display Newey
and West (1987) standard errors (in parenthesis) or t-statistics (in squared brackets) corrected
for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity with Andrews (1991) optimal lag selection and Sh
are the corresponding values of Shanken (1992). The table also shows χ2, cross-sectional
R2, HJ distance following Hansen and Jagannathan (1997) as well as a generalized version
of the cross-sectional F -test statistic of Shanken (1985) (CSRTSH). We report p-values in
curly brackets. We do not control for transaction costs and excess returns are expressed in
percentage points.The data are collected from Datastream via Barclays and Reuters. The
data contain monthly series from January 1985 to January 2014.
Panel A: Factor Prices
cons λDOL λ∆PR χ2NW χ
2
SH χ
2
GMM1 χ
2
GMM2 R
2 HJ dist
Momentum (f = 1, h = 1)
FMB 0.23 0.25 3.17 0.27 0.33 0.35 0.99 0.03
(NW ) (0.11) (0.05) {0.67} {0.99} {0.98} {0.99} {0.94}
(Sh) (0.11) (0.14)
FMBc -0.02 2.10 0.29 CSRTSH 0.06 0.97
[NW ] [−0.99] [1.11] [4.67]
Momentum (f = 3, h = 1)
FMB 0.24 0.11 8.69 5.69 5.04 5.38 0.66 0.05
(NW ) (0.11) (0.05) {0.28} {0.34} {0.28} {0.25} {0.74}
(Sh) (0.11) (0.04)
FMBc -0.01 1.47 0.11 CSRTSH 0.14 {0.20}
[NW ] [−0.95] [1.13] [4.30]
Momentum (f = 6, h = 1)
FMB 0.21 0.14 4.48 3.27 1.59 1.80 0.86 0.04
(NW ) (0.11) (0.05) {0.63} {0.66} {0.81} {0.77} {0.91}
(Sh) (0.11) (0.10)
FMBc 0.04 -3.52 0.26 CSRTSH 0.12 {0.94}
[NW ] [3.33] [−3.13] [4.27]
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Table 2.8. Double Sorts
This table reports annualized average conditional excess returns for double-sorted portfolios.
All currencies are first sorted on lagged idiosyncratic volatility (Panel A) or idiosyncratic
skewness (Panel B) or exposures to global FX illiquidity (Panel C ) or global FX volatility
(Panel D) or global FX correlation (Panel E ) into two portfolios based on their median.
Then, currencies within each of the two portfolios are sorted into three portfolios based on
their previous month exposure to global political risk. Thus, Low and High denote the 33%
(50%) of all the currencies with lowest and highest lagged returns (lagged IV , or IS, or
Illiq, or V ol, or Corr) and Med represents the 33% of all the currencies with intermediate
lagged returns. HML is a spread portfolio that is equal to the return difference between
High and Low portfolios. We also display Newey and West (1987) t-statistics (in squared
brackets) corrected for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity with Andrews (1991) optimal
lag selection. The data are collected from Datastream via Barclays and Reuters and contain
monthly series from January 1985 to January 2014.
Panel A: Idiosyncratic Volatility (LRV model)
Low PR Med PR High PR HML
Low IV 0.84 3.18 3.89 3.05
[0.85] [4.87] [2.18] [2.17]
High IV 2.81 7.06 7.00 4.19
[1.20] [3.58] [3.73] [1.22]
HML 1.97 3.88 3.11 1.14
[0.36] [2.45] [0.53] [0.45]
Panel B : Idiosyncratic Skewness (LRV model)
Low PR Med PR High PR HML
Low IS 0.56 5.38 5.89 5.33
[0.36] [4.32] [3.44] [2.63]
High IS 2.99 4.52 5.03 2.03
[2.51] [3.88] [2.69] [1.53]
HML 2.43 -0.86 -0.86 -3.29
[1.71] [-0.72] [-0.04] [-1.23]
Panel C : FX Illiquidity Innovations
Low PR Med PR High PR HML
Low Illiq 1.05 4.65 5.79 4.74
[0.84] [4.38] [3.85] [2.59]
High Illiq 1.70 4.97 4.57 2.87
[1.11] [3.14] [2.34] [1.45]
HML 0.64 0.32 -1.22 -1.86
[0.63] [0.24] [-0.85] [-0.90]
Panel D : FX Volatility Innovations
Low PR Med PR High PR HML
Low V ol 0.15 4.24 3.94 3.79
[0.15] [3.48] [2.87] [2.11]
High V ol 3.46 5.84 8.15 4.69
[2.16] [3.31] [3.05] [1.78]
HML 3.30 1.61 4.20 0.90
[1.82] [0.96] [1.64] [0.80]
Panel E : FX Correlation Innovations
Low PR Med PR High PR HML
Low Corr 2.65 5.40 4.64 1.99
[1.31] [3.28] [2.70] [0.60]
High Corr 0.05 4.23 6.52 6.48
[0.04] [3.80] [2.90] [2.05]
HML -2.60 -1.17 1.89 4.49
[0.49] [0.29] [0.85] [0.33]
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Table 2.9. Robustness: Asset Pricing Tests - Filtered Data
This table reports asset pricing results for the two-factor model that comprises the DOL
and FPR risk factors. We use as test assets six currency portfolios sorted based on past
performances of currency returns. We rebalance our portfolios on a monthly basis. Panel A
reports Fama and MacBeth (1973) estimates of the factor loadings (b) and factor prices of risk
(λ). We also display Newey and West (1987) standard errors (in parenthesis) or t-statistics (in
squared brackets) corrected for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity with Andrews (1991)
optimal lag selection and Sh are the corresponding values of Shanken (1992). The table also
shows χ2, cross-sectional R2, HJ distance following Hansen and Jagannathan (1997) as well as
a generalized version of the cross-sectional F -test statistic of Shanken (1985) (CSRTSH). We
report p-values in curly brackets. We do not control for transaction costs and excess returns
are expressed in percentage points. The data are collected from Datastream via Barclays and
Reuters. The data contain monthly series from January 1985 to January 2014.
Panel A: Factor Prices (33 countries)
cons λDOL λFPR χ2NW χ
2
SH χ
2
GMM1 χ
2
GMM2 R
2 HJ dist
Momentum (f = 1, h = 1)
FMB 0.15 0.23 7.59 7.23 6.52 6.61 0.89 0.06
(NW ) (0.11) (0.07) {0.18} {0.20} {0.16} {0.16} {0.60}
(Sh) (0.11) (0.07)
FMBc -0.01 0.93 0.19 CSRTSH 1.32 {0.20}
[NW ] [−0.87] [1.03] [2.28]
Momentum (f = 3, h = 1)
FMB 0.12 0.16 14.46 14.03 10.11 10.06 0.92 0.10
(NW ) (0.11) (0.07) {0.01} {0.02} {0.04} {0.04} {0.14}
(Sh) (0.11) (0.07)
FMBc 0.02 -1.50 0.36 CSRTSH 0.59 {0.57}
[NW ] [3.10] [−2.77] [3.32]
Panel B : Factor Prices (39 countries)
cons λDOL λFPR χ2NW χ
2
SH χ
2
GMM1 χ
2
GMM2 R
2 HJ dist
Momentum (f = 1, h = 1)
FMB 0.12 0.23 7.98 7.62 4.96 5.01 0.79 0.10
(NW ) (0.11) (0.07) {0.16} {0.18} {0.29} {0.24} {0.28}
(Sh) (0.11) (0.07)
FMBc 0.00 -0.02 0.24 CSRTSH 1.57 {0.15}
[NW ] [0.26] [−0.03] [3.24]
Momentum (f = 3, h = 1)
FMB 0.11 0.15 9.32 9.00 7.52 7.75 0.92 0.06
(NW ) (0.11) (0.05) {0.10} {0.11} {0.11} {0.10} {0.66}
(Sh) (0.11) (0.05)
FMBc 0.02 -2.18 0.33 CSRTSH 0.34 {0.76}
[NW ] [2.43] [−2.28] [3.53]
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Table 2.10. Robustness: Asset Pricing Tests - Transaction Costs
This table reports asset pricing results for the two-factor model that comprises the DOL
and FPR risk factors. We use as test assets six currency portfolios sorted based on past
performances of currency returns. Particularly, we employ formation periods of 1, 3, 9 and 12
months. We rebalance our portfolios on a monthly basis. Panel A reports Fama and MacBeth
(1973) estimates of the factor loadings (b) and factor prices of risk (λ). We also display Newey
and West (1987) standard errors (in parenthesis) or t-statistics (in squared brackets) corrected
for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity with Andrews (1991) optimal lag selection and Sh
are the corresponding values of Shanken (1992). The table also shows χ2, cross-sectional R2,
HJ distance following Hansen and Jagannathan (1997) as well as a generalized version of the
cross-sectional F -test statistic of Shanken (1985) (CSRTSH). We control for transaction costs
and excess returns are expressed in percentage points. We report p-values in curly brackets.
The data are collected from Datastream via Barclays and Reuters. The data contain monthly
series from January 1985 to January 2014.
Panel A: Factor Prices
cons λDOL λFPR χ2NW χ
2
SH χ
2
GMM1 χ
2
GMM2 R
2 HJ dist
Momentum (f = 1, h = 1)
FMB 0.15 0.14 6.31 5.97 5.59 6.03 0.90 0.03
(NW ) (0.11) (0.04) {0.28} {0.31} {0.23} {0.20} {0.96}
(Sh) (0.11) (0.04)
FMBc 0.02 -1.53 0.18 CSRTSH 0.87 {0.39}
[NW ] [0.93] [−0.84] [2.87]
Momentum (f = 3, h = 1)
FMB 0.15 0.28 7.34 6.95 4.16 4.28 0.81 0.05
(NW ) (0.11) (0.08) {0.20} {0.22} {0.38} {0.37} {0.80}
(Sh) (0.11) (0.08)
FMBc 0.01 -0.76 0.34 CSRTSH 0.82 {0.42}
[NW ] [0.71] [−0.58] [3.34]
Momentum (f = 6, h = 1)
FMB 0.14 0.04 14.60 14.46 7.11 7.37 0.45 0.04
(NW ) (0.11) (0.03) {0.01} {0.01} {0.13} {0.12} {0.80}
(Sh) (0.11) (0.03)
FMBc 0.03 -2.68 0.18 CSRTSH 0.61 {0.55}
[NW ] [2.28] [−2.16] [2.45]
121
Table 2.11. Robustness: Asset Pricing Tests - Reversals
This table reports asset pricing results for the two-factor model that comprises the DOL
and CFPR risk factors. We use as test assets six currency portfolios sorted based on past
performances of currency returns. Particularly, we employ formation periods of 1, 3, 6, 9
and 12 months. We rebalance our portfolios on a monthly basis. Panel A reports Fama and
MacBeth (1973) estimates of the factor loadings (b) and factor prices of risk (λ). We also
display Newey and West (1987) standard errors (in parenthesis) or t-statistics (in squared
brackets) corrected for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity with Andrews (1991) optimal
lag selection and Sh are the corresponding values of Shanken (1992). The table also shows
χ2, cross-sectional R2, HJ distance following Hansen and Jagannathan (1997) as well as a
generalized version of the cross-sectional F -test statistic of Shanken (1985) (CSRTSH). We
report p-values in curly brackets. We do not control for transaction costs and excess returns
are expressed in percentage points. The data are collected from Datastream via Barclays and
Reuters. The data contain monthly series from January 1985 to January 2014.
Panel A: Factor Prices
cons λDOL λCFPR χ2NW χ
2
SH χ
2
GMM1 χ
2
GMM2 R
2 HJ dist
Momentum (f = 1, h = 1)
FMB 0.24 0.21 3.40 3.05 3.08 3.58 0.98 0.03
(NW ) (0.11) (0.04) {0.64} {0.69} {0.54} {0.47} {0.94}
(Sh) (0.11) (0.04)
FMBc −0.02 2.01 0.18 CSRTSH 0.22 {0.86}
[NW ] [-0.94] [1.06] [3.27]
Momentum (f = 3, h = 1)
FMB 0.25 0.34 19.00 17.55 10.24 11.58 0.65 0.05
(NW ) (0.11) (0.08) {0.00} {0.00} {0.04} {0.02} {0.74}
(Sh) (0.11) (0.08)
FMBc -0.01 1.52 0.27 CSRTSH 2.53 {0.04}
[NW ] [−0.98] [1.16] [2.94]
Momentum (f = 6, h = 1)
FMB 0.23 0.10 14.64 14.13 7.57 7.77 0.86 0.04
(NW ) (0.11) (0.04) {0.01} {0.01} {0.11} {0.10} {0.79}
(Sh) (0.11) (0.04)
FMBc 0.04 -3.64 0.25 CSRTSH 0.18 {0.89}
[NW ] [3.42] [−3.20] [4.33]
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Table 2.12. Robustness: Asset Pricing Tests - Non-linearity
This table reports asset pricing results for the two-factor model that comprises the DOL and
positive or negative values of global political risk (i.e. ∆PR+, ∆PR−) as risk factors. We use
as test assets six currency portfolios sorted based on past month’s performances of currency
returns (i.e. f = 1). Panel A reports Fama and MacBeth (1973) estimates of the factor
loadings (b) and factor prices of risk (λ). We also display Newey and West (1987) standard
errors (in parenthesis) or t-statistics (in squared brackets) corrected for autocorrelation and
heteroskedasticity with Andrews (1991) optimal lag selection and Sh are the corresponding
values of Shanken (1992). The table also shows χ2, cross-sectional R2, HJ distance following
Hansen and Jagannathan (1997) as well as a generalized version of the cross-sectional F -test
statistic of Shanken (1985) (CSRTSH). We report p-values in curly brackets. We also report
results without the DOL factor. We do not control for transaction costs and excess returns
are expressed in percentage points.The data are collected from Datastream via Barclays and
Reuters. The data contain monthly series from January 1985 to January 2014.
Panel A: Factor Prices - ∆PR+
cons λDOL λCFPR χ2NW χ
2
SH χ
2
GMM1 χ
2
GMM2 R
2 HJ dist
Momentum (f = 1, h = 1)
FMB 0.25 9.87 20.96 3.62 3.01 2.43 0.79 0.03
(NW ) (0.11) (1.98) {0.00} {0.61} {0.56} {0.66} {0.94}
(Sh) (0.11) (4.74)
FMBc 0.35 9.46 CSRTSH 1.36 {0.33}
[Sh] [1.34] [2.10]
Panel B : Factor Prices - ∆PR−
cons λDOL λCFPR χ2NW χ
2
SH χ
2
GMM1 χ
2
GMM2 R
2 HJ dist
Momentum (f = 1, h = 1)
FMB 0.21 24.61 19.56 0.75 1.55 1.96 0.54 0.03
(NW ) (0.11) (4.37) {0.00} {0.98} {0.82} {0.74} {0.95}
(Sh) (0.12) (22.28)
FMBc 0.19 24.34 CSRTSH 0.41 {0.84}
[Sh] [0.33] [1.11]
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Figure 2.1. Global Political Risk
The figure presents global political risk, global FX volatility, global FX liquidity, global FX
liquidity innovations as well as global CDS spreads. All measures are estimated in a similar
fashion for consistency and they are standardised. The political risk data is collected from
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), the CDS spreads are obtained from Datastream
and Bloomberg and exchange rates are collected from Datastream via Barclays and Reuters.
The data contain monthly series from January 1985 to January 2014.
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Correlations between Local and US Innovations
Figure 2.2. Correlations of US and Foreign Political Risk Innovations
The figure shows correlations between US and foreign country political risk innovations
(∆pri,t). Bars in red represent statistically significant correlations at 0.05 significance level.
The data contain monthly series from January 1985 to January 2014.
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Figure 2.3. Pricing Error Plots - Portfolio Level
The figure displays pricing error plots for the asset pricing models with the DOL as well as
the mimicking portfolio of global political risk innovations as the risk factor. We report result
for thee currency momentum strategy (i.e. f = 1, 3, 6). The data contain monthly series from
January 1985 to January 2014.
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Exposures to Global Political Risk
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Figure 2.4. CIP deviations and Global Political Risk Betas
The figure displays CIP deviations along with global political risk exposures for each country in the sample. The data contain monthly series from
January 1985 to January 2014.
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Figure 2.5. Pricing Error Plots - Currency Level
The figure displays pricing error plots for the asset pricing models with the DOL as well as the mimicking
portfolio of global political risk innovations as the risk factor. We report result for tfor individual
unconditional and conditional currency excess returns. The data contain monthly series from January
1985 to January 2014.
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Figure 2.6. Cross-sectional t-statistics - Country Level
The figure displays t-statistics of zero-beta rates and risk premia. The test assets are currency portfolios
sorted on previous months performance (i.e. momentum (f = 1, h = 1)) and the risk factors is innovations
of country-level political risk against the US. All t-stats take into consideration the error-in-variable
problem following Jagannathan and Wang (1998). The blue horizontal line corresponds to the 1.96
significance bound. The data contain monthly series from January 1985 to January 2014.
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Figure 2.7. Cross-sectional t-statistics - Alternative Definitions of Political
Risk
The figure reports t-stats of zero-beta rates, risk premia and the corresponding R2. Test assets are cur-
rency portfolios sorted on previous months performance. As risk factors we employ different definitions
of political risk. Particularly, ∆PR is the main measure used in the paper, ∆PR145 considers all the
145 countries of the ICRG dataset, ∆PRwithoutσ excludes the denominator of the original measure and
∆PRUS reports US political risk innovations. All t-stats take into consideration the error-in-variable
problem following Jagannathan and Wang (1998). The blue horizontal line corresponds to 1.96 signifi-
cance bound. The data contain monthly series from January 1985 to January 2014.
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Chapter 3
Technology Diffusion and
Currency Carry Trades
3.1 Introduction
We study the role of technology diffusion in carry trade strategies. Carry trade is
a foreign exchange strategy that exploits deviations from the Uncovered interest
rate parity (UIP). According to the UIP under conditions of risk neutrality and
rational expectations the differences in the yields of foreign and domestic risk-free
securities (i.e. government bonds) must be offset by an analogous depreciation of
the high interest rate currency so that the aforementioned equilibrium condition
is not violated. However, many studies have documented the empirical rejection
of the UIP (see e.g. Bilson, 1981; Fama, 1984). Deviations from the UIP are
associated with a time-varying risk premium that can be exploited in real-time
by investors in the foreign exchange rate market via a naive strategy that exploits
the persistent differences of the interest rates across countries the so-called
currency carry trade. The currency carry trade strategy involves a long position
in a basket of high interest rate currencies (i.e. funding currencies) while short-
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selling low interest rate currency portfolios (i.e. investment currencies).
Recent advances in the literature, along these lines, suggest that the carry
trade profitability is related to a risk premium acquired by foreign exchange
investors who seek to compensate themselves for adverse movements of the ex-
change rate under bad states of the world. Therefore, Lustig and Verdelhan
(2007) as well as Lustig et al. (2011) are the first who follow this approach and
develop the first asset-pricing model in the foreign exchange literature. Partic-
ularly, they show that two tradable risk factors that are highly correlated with
the first two principal components of currency portfolios, sorted on interest rate
differentials, are enough to price the cross-section of currency returns. The first
risk factor resembles a strategy that invests in a basket of all available currencies
each time and liquidates its position by borrowing the dollar. This strategy is
mainly driven by the U.S. business cycle (Lustig et al., 2014) thus it is labeled as
a dollar factor (i.e. DOL). This factor is highly correlated with the first principal
component of the currency portfolios of interest and it represents a level factor.
The second risk factor mirrors the traditional version of the carry trade strategy
and thus it invests in a basket of high interest rate currencies and borrows from
the bottom portfolio. This factor is highly correlated with the second principal
component (i.e. slope factor) and it is named as carry factor (i.e. HMLFX).
A concern that one might raise regarding this asset-pricing model is related
to the unobserved dynamics of the carry factor (i.e. financial or macroeconomic
exposures). More precisely, how is the HML factor related to volatility, liquidity,
political risk, foreign exchange risk, external imbalances, business cycle, output,
degree of risk aversion, sentiment etc.? What other country- level or global
features of this factor should be linked to its cross-sectional success in pricing
currency returns? Many researchers have attempted to answer some of these
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questions and provide more insights about the carry trade strategy. For example,
Menkhoff et al. (2012a) show that a global volatility factor along with a dollar
factor demonstrates strong pricing ability for interest rate sorted portfolios. To
this end, they show that high interest rate currencies load positively on the global
volatility factor and the reverse holds for the investment currencies, meaning that
they provide a hedge (insurance) against downside movements of the strategy.
Along these lines other studies provide an economic intuition behind theHMLFX
factor and thus the carry trade profitability. More specifically, Mueller et al.
(2013) find that global FX correlation risk is priced in the cross-section of carry
trade returns and they show that it is a good proxy for global risk aversion.
Other studies provide different explanations of the carry trade activity that are
related to skewness (Rafferty, 2012), illiquidity (Mancini et al., 2013), external
imbalances (Della Corte et al., 2013), commodity trading (Ready et al., 2013)
and country size (Hassan, 2013).
Thus, it is apparent that the carry trade profitability emerges from differences
among countries with particular characteristics. In this chapter we attempt to
identify a different dimension of carry trade profitability. Particularly, we exam-
ine the role of technology diffusion in the foreign exchange market. Technology
diffusion is the ’dynamic consequence of adoption’. In other words how long does
it take for a particular country to adopt to a new technology and how intensively
is this technology used per capita? Recent studies have show that the technology
diffusion heavily depends on the characteristics of the country that adopts the
new technology. Particularly, technology adoption leaders (i.e. high technology
diffusion) tend to be rich and large economies (Comin and Hobijn, 2010), high
income countries (Parente and Prescott, 1994), low country risk (Comin and
Hobijn, 2004; Comin and Mestieri, 2014). Thus, we question whether technology
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diffusion is linked to carry trade profitability. There are two main channels of
technology diffusion; the International Trade and the Foreign direct investment
(Keller, 2004). Ready et al. (2013) show that commodity trading can explain
the carry trade profitability. Particularly, we show that we capture a different
dynamic of International trade that enters into the carry trade activity. That
is, technology diffusion followers tend to have high interest rates on average and
provide a risk premium to carry trades who might be willing to finance risky in-
novation. Our work is more related to Gavazzoni and Santacreu (2014) who show
theoretically that technology diffusion through trade in varieties is a significant
determinant of asset prices. Specifically, countries with more pronounced R&D
spillovers exhibit stock return comovement and less volatile exchange rates. We
deviate from this study as we examine empirically the role of technology diffusion
for currency carry trades.
To this end, we employ the Cross-country Historical Adoption of Technology
(CHAT) dataset as a proxy of technology diffusion and create a country-specific
technology diffusion factor that is constructed as the average across technologies
each per country/time pair. Then we construct an asset pricing model, in the
same spirit with Lustig et al. (2011). Specifically, we employ two factors, a dollar
factor (i.e. DOL) and a technology diffusion factor (i.e. LMHT D). The dollar
factor is defined as the average across portfolios each time and the technology
diffusion is a zero-investment portfolio that goes long low technology diffusion
baskets and sells high technology diffusion portfolios. We show that technology
diffusion is priced in the cross-section of carry trade returns as it is able to capture
most of the carry trade variability.
Our results are robust to different specification tests. Particularly, we show
asset pricing tests for individual currencies and show that our model performs
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well in capturing the carry trade profitability. The pricing ability is also verified
by beta-sorted portfolios, where a positive and statistically significant spread is
obtained. The results are also robust after taking into account transaction costs.
Finally, technology diffusion is able to price conditional excess returns.
Overall, we find that technology diffusion is a priced factor in the cross-section
of currency returns. High interest rate currencies load positively on the technol-
ogy diffusion factor and low interest rate currencies load negatively. Intuitively,
carry trades require a risk premium for holding low technology diffusion curren-
cies as a compensation for financing risky innovation. On the other hand, they
invest on high technology diffusion currencies, despite the low profitability that
they offer because it provides a hedge against downside movements of carry trade
profitability.
In what follows, we provide the motivation for our study in section 3.2. In
section 3.3 we provide a brief description of the data as well as the construction
of the currency portfolios. Section 3.4 will discuss the empirical results of the
chapter. Section 3.5 offers some robustness checks. Finally, section 3.6 gives our
conclusion.
3.2 Technology Diffusion and Carry Trades
Firstly, we need to test our hypothesis that technology leaders (i.e. countries
with high levels of technology diffusion) tend to have low interest rates on average
and vise versa. As a first attempt to answer this question, we plot annualized
mean forward discounts in percentage points against mean values of technology
diffusion for each currency in our sample. Figure 3.1 visualizes this relationship.
The top panel contains 48 countries and the bottom panel reports results for 15
developed countries. As we can see currencies with high forward discounts (i.e.
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JPY, CHF and DEM/EUR) exhibit low technology diffusion while low forward
discounts (i.e. NZD, AUD and DKK) tend to have high technology diffusion
on average. This finding suggests that technology diffusion might capture the
dynamics of carry trades and thus provide a partial explanation of the carry
trade profitability. In addition, Hassan (2013) shows that country size might
be a potential explanation for the carry trade profitability. However, figure 3.1
suggests that it is not the case here as we control for countries with similar size.
3.3 Data and Currency Portfolios
In this section, we provide a detailed description of the currency data used in the
chapter as well as the different impositions applied to the dataset. In addition,
we describe our technology diffusion data.
Exchange Rates Data. We begin with daily spot and one-month forward
exchange rates against the U.S. dollar spanning the period of November 1983 to
December 2013. The data are collected from Barclays and Reuters via Datas-
tream. Transaction costs are taken into consideration through the use of bid, ask
and mid quotes1. We also collect the corresponding spot and forward rates of
16 currencies quoted against the British pound from Reuters.2 Following Burn-
side et al. (2011), we merge the two datasets by multiplying the latter series
by mid USD/GBP quotes. After merging the data, we construct end- of-month
series of daily spot and one-month forward rates as in Burnside et al. (2011).
The main advantage of this approach is that the data is not averaged over each
month but it represents the rates of the last trading day every month. Thus,
the empirical analysis focuses on monthly data from January 1976 to Decem-
1The mid quotes are defined as the mean of the bid and ask quotes for each currency.
2These additional ”dead” series are available from January 1976.
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ber 2013. The sample comprises the following 48 countries: Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Egypt, Euro area, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary,
India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Iceland, Japan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Mex-
ico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia,
Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Ukraine, United Kingdom.
We apply various filters in the data so as to make the analysis more realistic.
Those currencies that were partly or completely pegged to the U.S. dollar are
not excluded from the samples because their forward contracts were available
to investors. The euro area countries are excluded after the introduction of the
euro in January 1999. However, some countries entered the euro zone later than
January 1999. In this case their exchange rates are excluded from the samples
at a later date. We also delete the observations that are associated with large
deviations from the covered interest rate parity condition. In particular, South
Africa from July 1985 to August 1985; Malaysia from August 1998 to June 2005
and Indonesia from December 2000 to May 2007.
Currency Excess Returns. We denote with St and Ft the level of the time
t spot and forward exchange rates. Each currency is quoted against the U.S.
dollar such that an appreciation of the U.S. dollar reflects an increase in St. The
excess return (RXt+1) is defined as the payoff of a strategy that buys a foreign
currency in the forward market at time t and then sells it in the spot market at
maturity (i.e. at time t+ 1). The excess return can be computed as
rxt+1 = ft − st+1 = (ft − st)− (st+1 − st). (3.1)
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where lower case variables are in logs. Thus, the excess return can be decom-
posed into two components; the forward discount and the exchange rate re-
turn. Moreover, the covered interest-rate parity (hereafter CIP) condition im-
plies that the forward discount is a good proxy for the interest rate differentials,
i.e. (ft − st ' iˆt − it, where iˆt and it denote the foreign and domestic riskless
interest rates, respectively. Akram et al. (2008) provide a detailed examina-
tion of CIP condition over different frequencies and they find that it holds at
daily and lower frequencies. Therefore, the excess return could also be written
as rxt+1 ' (ˆit − it) − (st+1 − st). In the latter expression, the currency excess
returns can be approximated by the exchange rate exposure subtracted by the
change in the foreign and domestic risk-free interest rates.
Transaction Costs. We report results with and without transaction costs
because the inclusion of bid and ask quotes inflates the volatility of the excess
returns giving more weight to less traded and illiquid currencies. The implemen-
tation cost of the currency strategy is taken into consideration though the use of
bid and ask spreads. Particularly, buying the foreign currency forward at time
t using the bid price (f bt ) and selling it at time t + 1 in the spot market at ask
price (sat ) is given by: rx
l
t+1 = (f
b
t − sat+1)/sbt . Whereas the corresponding short
position in the foreign currency (or short in the dollar) will render a net excess
return of the form: rxst+1 = −(fat − sbt+1)/sat .
Technology Diffusion Data. We employ the Cross-country Historical Adop-
tion of Technology (CHAT) dataset as a proxy for technology diffusion.3 This
dataset is an unbalanced panel of 111 technologies for 150 countries that spans
the period 1750 to 2008. The data is annual and we focus on 48 countries over
3The data is available from NBER’s website.
3.3. DATA AND CURRENCY PORTFOLIOS 139
a period that start from January 1976 until the end of the sample, so as to
be consistent with the currency data. The CHAT dataset covers a broad set
of technologies that are related to: transportation, telecommunication, informa-
tion technology, health care, steel production, and electricity. Thus, we measure
technology diffusion as the average across technologies per year/country. We con-
struct monthly observations by keeping the previous year’s value constant until
a new observation is realized. In addition, we keep the observations constant
until the end of the currency data period.4
The main advantage of this dataset is its ability to capture the intensity of
technology adoption. According to the traditional approach, technology diffusion
is defined as the number of producers that decide to adopt the new technology
and thus incur the additional cost over the total number (constant) of potential
adopters. In addition, this measure of diffusion can adequately be approximated
by a logistic regression as it exhibits an S-shape behaviour. Comin and Hobijn
(2010) provide a more sensitive measure to technology adoption. Firstly, they
collect three datasets on technology adoption for a large number of countries and
construct the CHAT dataset based on three criteria. Particularly, a technology
enters in the CHAT dataset if it is a “state of the art technology”, it contributes
to the GDP of the country and it is present in a broad set of countries. Then,
technology diffusion (T D) is defined as:
T Dt = Intensity of the technology usaget
Size of the economyt
, (3.2)
where the size of the economy is approximated by the GDP or the population of
the country. Therefore, this measure captures the number of people that use a
4A similar approach has been followed in other studies such as Della Corte et al. (2013).
In addition, the extension of the data until the end of the currency sample does not affect the
results and increases the robustness of our analysis.
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particular technology (extent of diffusion) as well as the points of services that
a particular technology offers per capita (intensity).
Carry Trade Portfolios. At the end of each month t, we allocate currencies
into quintiles on the basis of their forward discounts (ft − st) obtained at time
t−1, given that the CIP holds. To this end, the first Portfolio contains the lowest
yielding or funding currencies and the last basket consists of the highest yielding
or investment currencies. The currency excess returns within each portfolio are
equally weighted. The carry trade strategy involves a long position in high
yielding currencies (i.e. Portfolio 6) and a short position in low yielding currencies
(i.e. Portfolio 1). Lustig et al. (2011) (hereafter LRV ) construct a two-factor
model with a HMLFX factor and a DOL factor. The former factor is a slope
factor which goes long to Portfolio 6 and short to Portfolio 1. The DOL factor
denotes the average across portfolios each month.
3.4 Empirical Results
3.4.1 Preliminary Analysis
This section presents the empirical results of our analysis. Firstly, we provide
descriptive statistics of currency portfolios that are sorted on previous month’s
forward discounts (i.e. carry trade portfolios) and then we analyses the behaviour
of currency portfolios that are sorted based on technology diffusion.
Descriptive Statistics. Table 3.1 reports summary statistics for carry trade
portfolios. Particularly, currency excess returns are sorted into quintiles every
month on the basis of their forward discount. Panel A reports results for the sam-
ple of All countries and Panel B displays summary statistics for the Developed
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countries. Consistently with other studies (e.g., Burnside et al., 2011a; Lustig
et al., 2011; Menkhoff et al., 2012a) we find that the profitability of interest rate
sorted portfolios increases monotonically when we move from low to high inter-
est rate baskets. This behaviour renders a positive and statistically significant
spread (i.e. HMLFX) of 10.71 per annum when we consider the whole sample
and 6.50 per annum for the Developed countries. This spread resembles a carry
trade strategy as it goes long high interest rate currencies (i.e. PH) and short low
interest rate currencies (i.e. PL). The carry trade profitability remains high even
after controlling for transaction costs (i.e. HMLFXτ ) providing an annualized
mean return of 5.03 (4.11) for the sample of All countries (Developed countries).
In addition, carry trades exhibit negative skewness and excess kurtosis with sig-
nificantly high sharpe ratios. They also display low persistence as it can be seen
from the very small first order autocorrelation.
Table 3.2 provides summary statistics of currency portfolios that are sorted
based on technology diffusion of the previous period. We observe an almost
monotonic pattern from high to low technology diffusion portfolios that renders a
statistically significant spread of 3.27 per annum for the whole sample and 2.29 for
the Developed countries. This strategy buys each month the currency portfolios
of technology diffusion followers (low T D) while short-selling currency baskets
of technology diffusion leaders (high T D). We find that technology diffusion
portfolios exhibit similar characteristics with carry trade portfolios such as left
negative skewness, excess kurtosis and low persistence. In addition, it renders
a highly significant sharpe ratio of 0.66 (0.39) per annum for the sample of All
countries (Developed countries).
Currency Carry Trades and Technology Diffusion. As a first attempt
to understand better the relationship between currency carry trades and tech-
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nology diffusion we provide a visual illustration of the carry trade profitability
conditional on technology diffusion. To this end figure 3.2 visualizes such pay-
offs. In particular, we divide the time-series of technology diffusion factor (i.e.
LMHT D) into quartiles so that the first quartile represents the basket with the
lowest realizations of our factor and the the last basket 25% of months with
the highest realisations of its sample distribution. Then we calculate annualized
mean excess returns of the return difference between extreme quintiles of interest
rate sorted portfolios. Particularly, each bar in figure 3.2 shows annualized mean
carry trade returns under specific states of technology diffusion. The top panel
presents results for all countries and the bottom panel for Developed countries.
We observe a monotonic pattern which suggests that carry trade portfolio in-
crease monotonically, on average, as the technology diffusion from technology
leaders to technology followers increases.
3.4.2 FX Asset Pricing Tests
This section performs cross-sectional asset pricing tests between the five cur-
rency portfolios and the global technology diffusion, and shows that technology
diffusion is priced in the cross-section of currency excess returns.
Methods. Following the asset pricing methodology analyzed in Cochrane
(2005) and implemented in many studies in the FX asset pricing literature, such
as Lustig et al. (2011) and Menkhoff et al. (2012a) we examine the pricing ability
of global technology diffusion. We denote the currency excess return of each
portfolio j at time t+ 1 as RXjt+1. In this section we use discrete excess returns
instead of log forms so as to avoid the joint log-normality assumption between
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returns and the pricing kernel.5 Under no arbitrage conditions, the risk-adjusted
currency excess returns should be zero and satisfy the Euler equation:
E[Mt+1RX
j
t+1] = 0 (3.3)
where Mt+1 denotes a linear SDF in the risk factors ft+1. In particular, the main
focus is on the SDF of the following form:
Mt+1 = [1− b′(ft+1 − µf )] (3.4)
where b denotes the vector of factor loadings and µf is the vector of expected
values of the pricing factors (i.e. µf = E(ft+1)). The beta representation of the
model is obtained from the combination of above equations rendering the beta
pricing model below:
E[RXj] = λ′βj (3.5)
where λ = Σfb represents the factor risk prices with Σf = E[(ft − µf )(ft −
µf )
′] denoting the variance-covariance matrix of the risk factors and b the factor
loading.6 After projecting each currency excess return (RXjt ) on the risk factors
(ft) contemporaneously, we obtain the regression coefficients β
j.
The simultaneous estimation of the factor loadings (b), factor means (µ) as
well as the individual elements of the factor covariance matrix (Σf ) is based on
the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) of Hansen (1982). Particularly, the
5We follow Lustig et al. (2011); Menkhoff et al. (2012a) and replace log returns with their
discrete counterparts so as to satisfy the Euler equation that requires levels instead of log
returns. Particularly, discrete returns are expresses as RXt+1 =
Ft−St+1
St
= Ft−StSt −
St+1−St
St
,
where the forward (F ) and spot (S) rates are in levels.
6In order to control for the fact that the means and the covariance of the risk factors are
estimated we compute the standard errors for the factor risk prices by applying the Delta
method.
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estimation is based on the system of the moment conditions below:
E[g(zt, θ)] = E

[1− b′(ft − µf )]RXt
ft − µf
vec((ft − µf )(ft − µf )′)− vec(Σf )
 = 0
where g(zt, θ) is a function of the set of parameters (i.e. θ = [b
′µ′vec(Σf )′]′) and
the data (i.e. zt = [RXt, ft]).
The main purpose of this study is to examine the pricing ability of the model
on the cross-section of currency returns and thus we restrict my attention on
unconditional moments with no instruments apart from a constant. Thus, the
pricing errors are used as the set of moments under a prespecified weighting ma-
trix. In the first stage of the GMM (GMM1) we start with an identity weighting
matrix so as to see whether the factors can price the cross-section of the currency
excess returns equally well. Then in the second stage (GMM2) we choose the
weighting matrix optimally by minimizing the difference between the objective
functions under heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (HAC) estimates of the
long-run covariance matrix of the moment conditions. To do that, we follow the
Newey and West (1987) methodology using the optimal number of lags as in
Andrews (1991).
In order to increase the robustness of our analysis, we also apply a Fama
and MacBeth (1973) (hereafter FMB) two pass regression. In the first stage, we
run contemporaneous time-series regressions of currency portfolio excess returns
on the risk factors. In the second stage, we perform cross-sectional regressions
of average portfolio returns on factor loadings, obtained from the previous step,
in order to compute the factor risk prices. In addition, we do not allow for
common miss-pricing in the currency returns by excluding the intercept in the
cross-sectional regressions but the results are similar if we replace the DOL factor
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with a constant. In addition, we report both Newey and West (1987) as well as
Shanken (1992) so as to account for the potential error-in-variable issue that
might arise due to the fact that the regressors are estimated in the second stage
of the FMB procedure.
Cross-Sectional Analysis. The SDF of each model takes the following form:
Mt+1 = 1− bDOL(DOLt+1 − µDOL)− bLMHT D(LMHT Dt+1 − µLMHT D). (3.6)
Panel A of table 3.3 shows results for second-pass cross-sectional regressions
following GMM and FMB approaches. We report the factor risk prices (i.e. λ)
as well as estimates for b. Standard errors that are corrected for autocorrelation
and heteroskedasticity following Newey and West (1987) based on the optimal
number of lags as in Andrews (1991) are in parenthesis. We also control for the
fact the the betas are estimated in the second-pass regression (error-in-variable
problem) by computing Shanken (1992) standard errors. Regarding the economic
significance of the model we also employ a variety of goodness of fit so as to obtain
a better understanding of the cross-sectional performance of our risk factors.
In particular we present χ2, cross-sectional R2 and the HJ distance following
Hansen and Jagannathan (1997). The χ2 test statistics - obtained from the
FMB (with Newey and West (1987) and Shanken (1992) corrections) as well
as GMM1 and GMM2 procedures - test the null hypothesis that all pricing
errors in the cross-section are mutually equal to zero. The cross-sectional pricing
errors are computed as the difference between the realized and predicted excess
returns. The HJ distance is a model diagnostic that helps us compare asset
pricing models. In our context it test whether the distance of the SDF of our
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model in squared terms and a group of acceptable SDFs is equal to zero. We
report p-values in curly brackets.7
Table 3.3 displays two panels that correspond to the two samples of interest.
Particularly, the left panel shows results for the whole sample and the right panel
results for the Developed countries. Starting from the statistical significance
of our model we focus on the sign and the degree of statistical significance of
λLMHT D . We find that the estimates of the factor risk prices of technology
diffusion is always positive and highly significant based on HAC and Shanken
(1992) standard errors. In addition, the factor risk price of the DOL factor is
not economically or statistically significant consistently with Lustig et al. (2011)
who find that the DOL factor does provide any cross-sectional information for
carry portfolios. We verify our results by implementing GMM1 and GMM2
procedures. Regarding the goodness of fit of the model we find a cross-sectional
R2 of 93% and 90% for All countries and Developed countries respectively. In
addition, the χ2 obtained from FMB, GMM1 and GMM1 methods suggest that
we cannot reject the null that all pricing errors are jointly equal to zero indicating
the cross-sectional success of the model for currency excess returns. In addition,
the large p-value of the HJ distance means that we cannot reject the null that
the HJ distance is equal to zero. These findings are robust for both samples.
Time-Series Analysis. Panel B of table 3.3 also displays estimates of time-
series regressions of currency excess returns on a constant and the factors of
interest (i.e. DOL and LMHT D) for each of the five currency portfolios p (i.e.
p = 1, . . . , 5),
7For the estimation of the p-values for the HJ distance we follow Jagannathan and Wang
(1996).
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RXpt+1 = β
p
0 + β
p
DOLDOLt+1 + β
p
LMHT DLMH
T D
t+1 + u
p
t+1. (3.7)
Panel B of table 3.3 shows first-pass time series regressions of currency excess
returns on DOL and LMHT D. We find that the betas of the DOL factor (i.e.
βDOL) are very close to one and the betas of the technology diffusion factor (i.e.
βLMHT D) increase monotonically from -0.13 to 0.32 as moving from low to high
interest rate currency portfolios. In addition, the slope coefficients are highly
significant as indicated by the HAC standard errors. Moreover, the time-series
R2 range from 76 − 88% for All countries and from 73% − 86% for Developed
countries.
Figure 3.4 demonstrates graphically the fit of our model. Particularly, in the
vertical (horizontal) axis we illustrate the actual (fitted) mean excess returns.
The fitted excess returns are implied by the model. We find that implied-returns
that are based on our model lies closely to the 45 degree line, indicating that
technology diffusion risk is priced as it is able to reproduce the spread of carry
trade returns reasonably well. This finding is for the sample of All countries (top
panel) as well as the sample of the Developed countries (bottom panel).
3.4.3 Portfolios Based on Technology Diffusion Betas
Here, we examine the predictive power of technology diffusion in the cross-section
of currency excess returns. The fact that technology diffusion is priced might
indicate that portfolios that are sorted based on exposures to technology diffusion
will render a positive and statistically significant spread. To this end, we sort
currency excess returns into portfolios based on 36-month rolling betas up to
t − 1.8 Summary statistics of such portfolios are reported in table 3.4, where
8A similar procedure has been followed by Lustig et al. (2011); Menkhoff et al. (2012a).
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Panel A shows results for the whole sample and Panel B display descriptive
statistics for the Developed countries.
As we can see the exposure to technology diffusion generate a monotonic pat-
tern from low to high technology diffusion betas, verifying our previous results.
This patterns renders a positive and statistically significant spread (i.e. H/L)
of 3.88 in percentage points. In addition, the portfolios exhibit negative skew-
ness and excess kurtosis with high annualized sharpe ratios. We also report pre
and post formation betas and forward discounts and find that both behave in a
similar way being that they increase monotonically. This finding suggests that
sorting on technology diffusion betas creates portfolios related to carry trade
portfolios. Of course they are not identical as we observe a few differences in the
summary statistics of the beta sorted portfolios such as the inflated skewness.
3.5 Robustness
This section provides some additional tests so as to examine further the robust-
ness of our finding. In particular, we examine the case of conditional excess
returns, we perform asset pricing tests for individual currencies and control for
transaction costs.
Conditional Returns. We also investigate the role of technology diffusion
when employing conditional returns. Particularly we define conditional carry
returns as:
RXct+1 =

Ft−St+1
St
if Ft − St > 0,
St+1−Ft
St
if Ft − St ≤ 0.
(3.8)
Table 3.5 reports descriptive statistics of portfolios of conditional excess re-
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turns that are sorted on technology diffusion betas, based on a 36-month rolling
window and up to time t − 1. Panel A (Panel B) reports results for All coun-
tries (Developed countries). We find that the annualized mean excess returns
increase in an almost monotonic fashion and thus offering a positive and statisti-
cally significant spread (i.e. H/L) of 5.95 for All countries and 0.33 for Developed
countries. We also find that the pre- and post- formation betas increase mono-
tonically as we move from the low to high beta portfolios. This strategy offers
very high sharpe ration with higher skewness and kurtosis than the traditional
carry trade portfolios.
Individual Currencies. Many studies argue that portfolio-level approaches
might cancel out important information embedded in asset prices (e.g., Ang et al.,
2010). Therefore, we question the pricing ability of our factors for individual
currencies when employing the same set of risk factors. Particularly, we run FMB
regressions in order to estimate the first-pass and second-pass estimates that we
analyzed in the previous section. One concern that arises from this methodology,
however, is associated with the role of outliers in this study (for example less
tradable currencies) that might cause biased estimators. To guard against this
issue we follow Della Corte et al. (2013) and employ the least absolute deviation
(LAD) estimator which controls for heavy-tailed errors (Bassett Jr and Koenker,
1978; Koenker and Bassett Jr, 1982). Figure 3.4 reports pricing error plot for
unconditional excess returns and figure 3.5 displays results for conditional excess
returns. The top panel shows results for All countries and the bottom panel for
Developed countries. Particularly, in the vertical (horizontal) axis we illustrate
the actual (fitted) mean excess returns. The fitted excess returns are implied by
the model. In any case we find that most of the currencies lie closely to the 45
degree line indicating the pricing ability of the model for currency excess returns.
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Transaction Costs. Here we ask whether the model is able to capture the
cross-sectional variability of currency excess returns even after controlling for
the implementation cost of the strategy. Table 3.6 displays asset pricing test
when test assets are net excess returns of portfolios that are sorted on forward
discounts. We find that the results are overall improved as it can be seen from
the highly significant estimates of the factor risk price of technology diffusion.
In addition, the χ2 obtain via FMB, GMM1 and GMM2 approaches suggest
that we cannot reject the null of zero pricing errors at any significance level.
In the same vein, we cannot reject the null that the HJ distance is equal to
zero. Finally, we obtain cross-sectional R2s of 98% and 99% for All countries
and Developed country respectively.
3.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we study the role of technology diffusion in the foreign exchange
market. Particularly, we link technology diffusion with the carry trade activity.
Carry trade is a foreign exchange strategy that goes long high interest rate cur-
rencies and short low interest rate currencies. Its profitability is driven by the
persistent differences in interest rate differentials. On the other hand the tech-
nology diffusion is heavily determined by the income inequality across countries.
In this chapter, we show that technology diffusion can partially explain the carry
trade profitability.
Particularly, we develop a linear two-factor asset pricing model that incorpo-
rates information of global technology diffusion. The first factor is a dollar factor
that is measured as the average across portfolios each time. The second factor
is the technology diffusion factor that goes long low technology diffusion baskets
while short-selling high technology diffusion portfolios. We show that technology
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diffusion is priced as it is able to capture the cross-section of currency premia.
The pricing ability of the model is also verified by rolling betas as well as
currency level asset pricing tests. We also show that technology diffusion contains
important information for conditional returns. Finally, our results are similar
even after controlling for transaction costs.
Table 3.1. Summary Statistics of Carry Trade Portfolios
This table presents descriptive statistics of quintile currency portfolios sorted on monthly forward discounts
at time t − 1. The first (last) portfolio PL (PH) comprise the top 20% of all currencies with the lowest
(highest) expected return. HML is the a long-short strategy that buys PH and sells PL. Moreover, the table
presents annualized mean, standard deviation and Sharpe ratios, all in percentage points. We also report
skewness and kurtosis. Figures in squared brackets represent Newey and West (1987) t-statistics corrected
for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (HAC) using the optimal number of lags as in Andrews (1991) and
numbers in parenthesis are p-values. All currency excess returns incorporate transaction costs by taking a
short position in the first portfolio and long positions in the remaining baskets of currencies. Panel A (Panel
B) reports results for the All Countries (Developed Countries) and τ represents the inclusion of transaction
costs. The data is collected from Datastream via Barclays and Reuters. The data contain monthly series from
January 1976 to December 2013.
Panel A: All Countries
PL P2 P3 P4 PH DOL HML
FX DOLFXτ HMLFXτ
Mean -2.86 0.25 1.80 2.74 7.85 1.96 10.71 0.46 5.03
[-1.74] [0.16] [1.14] [1.75] [3.71] [1.28] [5.72] [0.30] [2.52]
Sdev 8.70 8.23 8.33 8.74 9.51 7.87 8.12 7.88 8.33
SR -0.33 0.03 0.22 0.31 0.83 0.25 1.32 0.06 0.60
Skew -0.26 -0.54 -0.30 -0.52 -0.67 -0.44 -0.43 -0.45 -0.55
Kurt 4.67 4.68 4.88 4.44 4.69 4.25 4.39 4.26 4.36
AC(1) 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.04 0.22 0.07 0.28 0.07 0.31
(0.25) (0.51) (0.11) (0.45) (0.00) (0.14) (0.00) (0.15) (0.00)
Panel B : Developed Countries
Mean -1.87 0.38 0.92 2.42 4.63 1.30 6.50 0.61 4.11
[-1.00] [0.21] [0.52] [1.46] [2.31] [0.79] [3.79] [0.37] [2.41]
Sdev 10.14 9.59 9.31 9.47 10.77 8.77 9.73 8.77 9.72
SR -0.18 0.04 0.10 0.26 0.43 0.15 0.67 0.07 0.42
Skew -0.16 -0.21 -0.15 -0.51 -0.34 -0.27 -0.82 -0.27 -0.81
Kurt 4.32 3.70 4.26 5.23 4.48 3.81 5.43 3.81 5.41
AC(1) 0.02 0.06 0.09 0.02 0.10 0.05 0.11 0.05 0.11
(0.73) (0.19) (0.07) (0.74) (0.03) (0.26) (0.02) (0.26) (0.02)
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Table 3.2. Summary Statistics of Technology Diffusion (T D)
This table presents descriptive statistics of quintile currency portfolios sorted on technology
diffusion at time t−1. The first (last) portfolio PL (PH) comprise the top 20% of all currencies
with the lowest (highest) expected return. LMHT D is the a long-short strategy that buys PL
and sells PH . Moreover, the table presents annualized mean, standard deviation and Sharpe
ratios, all in percentage points. We also report skewness and kurtosis. Figures in squared
brackets represent Newey and West (1987) t-statistics corrected for heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation (HAC) using the optimal number of lags as in Andrews (1991) and numbers
in parenthesis are p-values. All currency excess returns incorporate transaction costs by
taking a short position in the first portfolio and long positions in the remaining baskets of
currencies. Panel A (Panel B) reports results for the All Countries (Developed Countries)
and τ represents the inclusion of transaction costs. The data is collected from Datastream via
Barclays and Reuters. The data contain monthly series from January 1976 to December 2013.
Panel A: All Countries
PH P2 P3 P4 PL DOL LMH
T D
Mean 0.31 3.54 1.18 1.21 3.58 1.97 3.27
0.24 1.86 0.69 0.69 2.29 1.29 3.29
Sdev 7.61 8.84 9.26 9.26 7.61 7.87 4.93
SR 0.04 0.40 0.13 0.13 0.47 0.25 0.66
Skew -0.39 -0.43 -0.28 -0.54 -0.36 -0.42 -0.05
Kurt 4.18 4.52 4.01 4.38 4.35 4.21 3.45
AC(1) 0.04 0.12 0.08 0.05 0.12 0.07 0.07
(0.41) (0.01) (0.08) (0.32) (0.01) (0.13) (0.13)
Panel B : Developed Countries
Mean 0.11 1.54 1.51 1.38 2.39 1.39 2.29
0.07 0.98 0.80 0.67 1.30 0.84 2.21
Sdev 9.16 8.15 10.10 10.89 9.84 8.74 5.91
SR 0.01 0.19 0.15 0.13 0.24 0.16 0.39
Skew -0.34 0.09 -0.26 -0.43 -0.22 -0.27 -0.09
Kurt 4.22 3.79 3.75 4.47 4.38 3.82 3.77
AC(1) 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.05 -0.01
(0.73) (0.36) (0.29) (0.17) (0.42) (0.30) (0.78)
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Table 3.3. FX Asset Pricing Tests: Technology Diffusion
This table reports asset pricing results for the two-factor model that comprises that DOL and LMHT D risk factors. We use as test assets five
currency portfolios sorted based on past forward discounts. We rebalance our portfolios on a monthly basis. Panel A reports GMM1, GMM2
as well as Fama and MacBeth (1973) estimates of the factor loadings (b) and factor prices of risk (λ). We also display Newey and West (1987)
standard errors (in parenthesis) or t-statistics (in squared brackets) corrected for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity with Andrews (1991)
optimal lag selection and Sh are the corresponding values of Shanken (1992). The table also shows χ2, cross-sectional R2 and the HJ distance
following Hansen and Jagannathan (1997). Panel B reports OLS estimates of contemporaneous time-series regression with HAC standard
errors in parenthesis. We do not control for transaction costs and excess returns are expressed in percentage points.The data are collected from
Datastream via Barclays and Reuters. The data contain monthly series from January 1985 to January 2014.
Panel A: Factor Prices
λDOL λLMHTD bDOL bLMHTD R
2 HJ dist λDOL λLMHTD bDOL bLMHTD R
2 HJ dist
All Countries Developed Countries
GMM1 0.12 1.55 0.00 0.74 0.93 0.04 0.06 0.60 0.09 0.20 0.90 0.03
s.e. (0.13) (0.45) (0.08) (0.37) {0.74} (0.14) (0.19) (0.40) (0.03) {0.78}
GMM2 0.17 2.01 0.00 0.75 0.05 0.56 0.09 0.21
s.e. (0.13) (0.55) (0.09) (0.37) (0.14) (0.18) (0.40) (0.04)
λDOL λLMHTD χ
2
NW χ
2
Sh χ
2
GMM1 χ
2
GMM2 λDOL λLMHTD χ
2
NW χ
2
Sh χ
2
GMM1 χ
2
GMM2
FMB 0.12 1.55 4.26 8.59 4.22 4.31 0.06 0.60 3.83 3.41 3.08 2.64
(NW ) (0.11) (0.22) {0.21} {0.07} {0.24} {0.23} (0.12) (0.15) {0.43} {0.49} {0.38} {0.45}
(Sh) (0.11) (0.31) (0.12) (0.16)
Panel B : Factor Betas
α βDOL βLMHTD R
2 α βDOL βLMHTD R
2
PL -0.27 0.95 -0.13 0.77 -0.21 1.00 -0.27 0.73
(0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06)
P2 -0.02 0.97 -0.12 0.87 -0.01 1.02 -0.23 0.86
(0.07) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05)
P3 0.11 0.99 -0.07 0.88 0.03 0.99 -0.10 0.86
(0.07) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04)
P4 0.18 1.04 -0.01 0.87 0.16 0.98 0.13 0.84
(0.07) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04)
PH 0.60 1.05 0.32 0.76 0.33 1.01 0.49 0.80
(0.07) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.04) (0.06)
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Table 3.4. Portofolios sorted on Technology Diffusion-Betas
This table presents descriptive statistics of currency portfolios sorted on betas with global
technology diffusion (LMHT D). The first (last) portfolio PL (PH) comprise the basket of
all currencies with the lowest (highest) technology diffusion betas. H/L is the a long-short
strategy that buys PH and sells PL and Avg is the average across portfolios each time.
Moreover, the table presents annualized mean, standard deviation and Sharpe ratios, all in
percentage points. We also report skewness and kurtosis. Figures in squared brackets repre-
sent Newey and West (1987) t-statistics corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation
(HAC) using the optimal number of lags as in Andrews (1991) and numbers in brackets are
p-values. pre-f − s (post-f − s) is the pre-(post-) formation forward discount pre-β (post-β)
is the pre-(post-) formation beta. Panel A (Panel B) reports results for the sample of All
countries (Developed countries) without transaction costs. The data contain monthly series
from January 1976 to December 2013.
Panel A: All Countries
PL P2 P3 P4 PH Avg H/L
Mean -0.43 -0.33 0.54 1.38 3.44 0.92 3.88
[-0.28] [-0.19] [0.32] [0.81] [1.44] [0.56] [2.20]
Sdev 7.74 8.40 8.92 9.22 9.79 7.91 7.81
SR -0.06 -0.04 0.06 0.15 0.35 0.12 0.50
Skew -0.73 -0.67 -0.35 -0.45 -0.46 -0.53 -0.18
Kurt 4.79 4.91 3.69 4.74 4.32 4.02 3.84
AC(1) 0.13 0.12 0.06 0.04 0.20 0.12 0.16
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
pre-f − s -0.26 -0.02 0.13 0.32 0.96
post-f − s -0.28 -0.02 0.13 0.32 0.99
pre-β -0.27 -0.01 0.12 0.22 0.47
post-β -0.32 -0.01 0.11 0.23 0.48
Panel B : Developed Countries
Mean 0.01 -0.60 -0.39 0.59 1.36 0.19 1.35
[0.01] [-0.31] [-0.19] [0.31] [0.68] [0.11] [0.83]
Sdev 8.65 10.06 10.40 10.20 10.30 8.86 9.09
SR 0.00 -0.06 -0.04 0.06 0.13 0.02 0.15
Skew -0.50 -0.31 -0.33 -0.33 -0.32 -0.32 -0.04
Kurt 5.06 4.83 3.55 3.88 3.94 3.63 4.14
AC(1) 0.07 0.04 0.08 0.03 0.12 0.08 0.06
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
pre-f − s -0.23 -0.04 0.07 0.19 0.40
post-f − s -0.24 -0.04 0.07 0.19 0.41
pre-β -0.12 0.06 0.13 0.21 0.33
post-β -0.13 0.05 0.13 0.21 0.34
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Table 3.5. Conditional Returns sorted on Technology Diffusion-Betas
This table presents descriptive statistics of conditional excess returns sorted on betas with
global technology diffusion (LMHT D). The first (last) portfolio PL (PH) comprise the
basket of all currencies with the lowest (highest) technology diffusion betas. H/L is the
a long-short strategy that buys PH and sells PL and Avg is the average across portfolios
each time. Moreover, the table presents annualized mean, standard deviation and Sharpe
ratios, all in percentage points. We also report skewness and kurtosis. Figures in squared
brackets represent Newey and West (1987) t-statistics corrected for heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation (HAC) using the optimal number of lags as in Andrews (1991) and numbers
in brackets are p-values. pre-f − s (post-f − s) is the pre-(post-) formation forward discount
pre-β (post-β) is the pre-(post-) formation beta. Panel A (Panel B) reports results for the
sample of All countries (Developed countries) without transaction costs. The data contain
monthly series from January 1976 to December 2013.
Panel A: All Countries
PL P2 P3 P4 PH Avg H/L
Mean 2.55 3.40 3.50 3.53 8.50 4.30 5.95
[2.07] [3.27] [3.45] [2.72] [4.22] [4.75] [2.67]
Sdev 7.26 6.17 5.48 7.29 8.41 4.53 10.67
SR 0.35 0.55 0.64 0.48 1.01 0.95 0.56
Skew -0.29 0.05 -0.79 -0.44 -0.34 -0.79 -0.35
Kurt 4.45 7.56 7.03 5.08 5.27 7.47 5.63
AC(1) 0.17 0.03 0.16 0.07 0.23 0.24 0.16
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
pre-f − s -0.26 -0.02 0.13 0.32 0.96
post-f − s -0.28 -0.02 0.13 0.32 0.99
pre-β -0.38 -0.11 0.05 0.23 0.56
post-β -0.39 -0.11 0.06 0.24 0.61
Panel B : Developed Countries
Mean 4.72 4.42 3.45 5.16 5.05 4.56 0.33
[4.10] [3.41] [2.27] [3.84] [3.33] [4.73] [0.20]
Sdev 6.71 7.96 8.47 8.15 8.52 5.16 10.18
SR 0.70 0.56 0.41 0.63 0.59 0.88 0.03
Skew -0.62 -0.33 -0.19 0.02 -0.31 -0.57 -0.24
Kurt 5.17 4.97 4.24 6.20 4.92 5.53 3.72
AC(1) 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.03 0.08 0.17 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
pre-f − s -0.23 -0.04 0.07 0.19 0.40
post-f − s -0.24 -0.04 0.07 0.19 0.41
pre-β -0.12 0.06 0.13 0.21 0.33
post-β -0.13 0.05 0.13 0.21 0.34
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Table 3.6. Robustness: FX Asset Pricing Tests: Transaction Costs
This table reports asset pricing results for the two-factor model that comprises that DOL and LMHT D risk factors. We use as test assets five
currency portfolios sorted based on past forward discounts. We rebalance our portfolios on a monthly basis. Panel A reports Fama and MacBeth
(1973) estimates of the factor loadings (b) and factor prices of risk (λ). We also display Newey and West (1987) standard errors (in parenthesis)
or t-statistics (in squared brackets) corrected for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity with Andrews (1991) optimal lag selection and Sh are
the corresponding values of Shanken (1992). The table also shows χ2, cross-sectional R2 and the HJ distance following Hansen and Jagannathan
(1997). Panel B reports OLS estimates of contemporaneous time-series regression with HAC standard errors in parenthesis. We not control for
transaction costs and excess returns are expressed in percentage points.The data are collected from Datastream via Barclays and Reuters. The
data contain monthly series from January 1985 to January 2014.
Panel A: Factor Prices
λDOL λLMHTD χ
2
NW χ
2
Sh χ
2
GMM1 χ
2
GMM2 λDOL λLMHTD χ
2
NW χ
2
Sh χ
2
GMM1 χ
2
GMM2
All Countries Developed Countries
FMB -0.01 0.80 2.20 1.68 0.81 1.29 0.00 0.45 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04
(NW ) (0.10) (0.22) {0.70} {0.79} {0.85} {0.73} (0.12) (0.15) {0.99} {0.99} {0.99} {0.99}
(Sh) (0.11) (0.25) (0.12) (0.15)
R2 0.98 0.99
HJ dist 0.04 {0.72} 0.03 {0.79}
Panel B : Factor Betas
α βDOL βLMHTD R
2 α βDOL βLMHTD R
2
PL -0.16 0.95 -0.13 0.77 -0.12 1.00 -0.27 0.73
(0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06)
P2 -0.12 0.97 -0.12 0.87 -0.11 1.02 -0.23 0.86
(0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05)
P3 -0.02 0.99 -0.06 0.86 -0.05 0.99 -0.10 0.86
(0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04)
P4 0.04 1.04 0.00 0.86 0.06 0.98 0.13 0.84
(0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.03) (0.04)
PH 0.23 1.05 0.32 0.74 0.22 1.01 0.49 0.80
(0.10) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.04) (0.06)
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Figure 3.1. Average Forward Discounts and Technology Diffusion
The figure displays annualized mean forward discounts from 1976 to 2013 against the corresponding average of technology diffusion. The top
panel report results for the sample of All countries and the bottom panel shows results for Developed countries. The data contain monthly series
from January 1976 to December 2013.
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Figure 3.2. Currency Trades and Technology Diffusion
The figure visualizes the relationship between technology diffusion and currency carry trades. Particularly,
we show annualized average excess returns for currency carry trade portfolios conditional on technology
diffusion in the top and bottom quartiles of each sample distribution. Each bar represents annualized
mean returns of going long the high interest rate portfolio and short the low interest rate portfolio. The
top panel report results for the sample of All countries and the bottom panel shows results for Developed
countries. The data contain monthly series from December 1976 to December 2013.
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Figure 3.3. Pricing Error Plots - Portfolio-Level
The figure displays pricing error plots for the asset pricing models with the DOL as well as LMHT D
as risk factor. The top panel report results for the sample of All countries and the bottom panel shows
results for Developed countries. The data contain monthly series from January 1976 to December 2013.
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Figure 3.4. Pricing Error Plots - Currency-Level
The figure displays pricing error plots for the asset pricing models with the DOL as well as LMHT D as risk factor for individual unconditional
currency excess returns. The top panel report results for the sample of All countries and the bottom panel shows results for Developed countries.
The data contain monthly series from January 1976 to December 2013.
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Figure 3.5. Pricing Error Plots - Conditional Returns
The figure displays pricing error plots for the asset pricing models with the DOL as well as LMHT D as
risk factor for individual conditional currency excess returns. The top panel report results for the sample
of All countries and the bottom panel shows results for Developed countries. The data contain monthly
series from January 1976 to December 2013.
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Chapter 4
Concluding Remarks
In the first chapter we demonstrate strong implications for the role of the domes-
tic and global macroeconomy on carry trade, dollar carry trade and momentum
strategies. We constructed domestic (i.e. U.S.) and global (i.e. G10) factors that
are extracted from large panels of macroeconomic and financial variables. Thus,
the main focus of the chapter is on the time-series predictability of the payoffs
and the economic value that can be earned by a U.S. investor from the use of
these domestic and global common factors.
We find very strong evidence of in-sample predictability in the carry, dollar
carry and momentum returns. In particular, the carry trade variability can be
explained by global variables that are exposed to G7 economies and are highly
correlated with the global stock market. This finding shows that carry trade ac-
tivity depends more on the global environment rather than on the domestic (i.e.
U.S.) economy. It is also shown in many studies that U.S. stock indices cannot
capture the time-series or cross-sectional variation of the returns to carry trade.
However, here we show that the movements of the global equity markets provide
very useful information in this respect. In addition, U.S. real and inflation fac-
tors also provide useful information. On the other hand, the dollar carry trade is
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mainly driven by the U.S. economy and thus we find that only domestic inflation
and consumption factors have strong predictive power for the dollar carry trade
returns. U.S. inflation factors and to a lesser extend commodity measures gath-
ered from G10 countries are also strong predictors of the momentum strategy.
In addition, very strong evidence of profitability is found in the exchange rate
component of the aforementioned strategies.
In addition, we find that our results are reinforced by out-of-sample analysis
and combination forecasts. We also find strong economic value to a U.S. investor
from the use of the common factors. In particular, we observe a significant
improvement in the Sharpe ratios and the skewness profile of the payoff when
we employ a decision rule that gathers information from our forecasts. Another
striking feature revealed from examination of rolling Sharpe ratios is associated
with very high annualized Sharpe ratios during the recent financial crisis. The
estimation of the certainty equivalent return shows that a risk-averse investor
with mean-variance preferences would be willing to pay an annual management
fee in order to have access to the forecasts in lieu of the historical mean.
We also showed that the common factors are able to forecast the carry and
dollar carry trade returns over and above other factors in the literature, such
as the Bakshi and Panayotov (2013) predictors or average forward discounts.
Finally, there is evidence of predictability in the long leg of the carry trade and
to a smaller magnitude in the short leg of the trade. However, the returns of
the winner and loser portfolios of the momentum strategy are highly predictable
from a global money and credit factors and a U.S. inflation factor.
The second chapter examines the role of global political risk in the currency
market. We find that a novel factor capturing unexpected political events is
priced in the cross-section of currency momentum strategies. This factor demon-
164
strates strong cross-sectional predictability beyond other factors mentioned in
the literature or existing measures of limits to arbitrage. Therefore, it could
“serve” as a fundamental anchor that partially drives its profitability.
Currency momentum is a strategy where an investor forms expectations with
regards to future excess returns based on the performance of currency premia in
previous periods. Specifically, the investor buys currencies that performed well
over a particular past period while short-selling currencies that exhibited poor
past profitability. Current asset pricing models perform poorly in explaining
the cross-section of momentum returns and shed light on economic forces that
drive the currency premia that is associated with the currency momentum. This
chapter provides an asset pricing model that incorporates information on unex-
pected movements of political risk relative to the U.S. economy, showing that it
is capable of capturing a significant bulk of currency excess returns. Intuitively,
investors will demand a premium for investing on high political risk currencies,
while our empirical analysis suggests that currency trader tend to take on global
political risk when investing in currency momentum strategies.
In addition, currency momentum is driven by limits to arbitrage and it is
more attractive to currencies that exhibit high illiquidity, volatility, correlation
and idiosyncratic volatility. We show that political risk is a natural limit to
arbitrage in the FX market, so determining the momentum profitability even
after checking for the aforementioned variables. Therefore, it captures a unique
dimension of currency premia. The results are less pronounced for currency
carry trades because the interest rate differentials which are less affected by
political risk are, in turn, quite persistent and dominate the carry trade portfolio
movements. The results are robust after controlling for transaction costs or on
the occasions when we employed short-run reversals as a conditional variable
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in the mimicking portfolio. When we apply filter that make our analysis more
realistic, the results prove to be similar or improved in some cases.
In the final chapter, we study the role of technology diffusion in the foreign
exchange market. Particularly, we link technology diffusion with the carry trade
activity. Carry trade is a foreign exchange strategy that goes long high interest
rate currencies and short low interest rate currencies. Its profitability is driven
by the persistent differences in interest rate differentials. On the other hand
the technology diffusion is heavily determined by the income inequality across
countries. In this chapter, we show that technology diffusion can partially explain
the carry trade profitability.
Particularly, we develop a linear two-factor asset pricing model that incorpo-
rates information of global technology diffusion. The first factor is a dollar factor
that is measured as the average across portfolios each time. The second factor
is the technology diffusion factor that goes long low technology diffusion baskets
while short-selling high technology diffusion portfolios. We show that technology
diffusion is priced as it is able to capture the cross-section of currency premia.
The pricing ability of the model is also verified by rolling betas as well as
currency level asset pricing tests. We also show that technology diffusion contains
important information for conditional returns. Finally, our results are similar
even after controlling for transaction costs.
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Appendix A
Supporting Documentation:
Chapter 1
A.1 Tables
A.1.1 Robustness Checks
In this section we provide addition robustness checks for our domestic and com-
mon factors. Particularly, Table A1 shows that our factors are performing well
even when we consider payoffs from other studies in the literature such as the
Lustig et al. (2011) payoffs or Bakshi and Panayotov (2013) carry positions.
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Table A.1. Robustness: In-sample analysis - Other payoffs
The table reports OLS estimates for carry and momentum excess returns obtained from other studies. In Panel A the dependent variable is the
currency excess returns of the carry trade strategy (net excess returns) from Lustig et al. (2011). Panel B reports results for currency excess
returns of the carry trade strategy (equation 2 for K=1,2) of Bakshi and Panayotov (2013). NW represents Newey and West (1987) corrected for
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity t-statistics with the optimal number of lags following Andrews (1991). B denotes the bootstrap p-values
based on 10,000 bootstrap iterations. The data span the period 1985:07-2012:03.
Panel A: Carry Trades (Lustig et al., 2011)
cons gˆ2,t gˆ2,t−3 hˆ3,t hˆ7,t R¯2 cons gˆ2,t gˆ2,t−3 hˆ4,t hˆ5,t hˆ6,t hˆ7,t R¯2
All Countries Developed Countries
(a) 0.38 0.67 -0.53 0.04 0.26 0.93 -0.79 0.07
NW 2.70 3.84 -3.74 15.84 1.69 3.24 -2.94 15.94
B 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00
(b) 0.37 0.33 0.01 0.27 0.42 0.12 0.28 -0.16 0.02
NW 2.41 1.88 3.72 1.60 1.53 0.72 1.96 -1.07 7.66
B 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.10 0.51 0.05 0.29 0.10
(c) 0.38 0.62 -0.52 0.09 -0.01 0.04 0.27 0.86 -0.72 0.10 0.06 0.22 -0.19 0.07
NW 2.70 3.19 -3.90 0.47 -0.10 15.42 1.74 3.61 -2.56 0.40 0.43 1.45 -1.24 22.51
B 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.64 0.92 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.72 0.13 0.22 0.00
Panel B : Carry Trades (Bakshi and Panayotov, 2013)
Carry 1 Carry 2
(a) 0.18 0.64 -0.45 0.04 0.15 0.53 -0.40 0.08
NW 1.26 2.69 -3.28 12.48 1.48 3.47 -2.77 16.23
B 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00
(b) 0.18 0.40 -0.25 0.03 0.14 -0.20 0.06 0.12 0.01
NW 1.27 1.81 -1.93 7.31 1.28 -1.76 0.60 1.38 4.39
B 0.21 0.02 0.07 0.03 0.16 0.10 0.60 0.13 0.22
(c) 0.16 0.51 -0.44 0.22 -0.27 0.05 0.15 0.49 -0.35 -0.08 0.04 0.10 0.08
NW 1.21 1.96 -3.62 0.86 -2.06 15.45 1.43 3.25 -2.33 -0.75 0.35 1.06 20.06
B 0.25 0.05 0.01 0.33 0.05 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.02 0.50 0.78 0.25 0.00
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Table A.2. Robustness: Different subsamples - Carry Trades
The table reports OLS estimates for the carry trade strategy of different subsamples. The dependent variable is the currency excess return
(ψHML), based on the carry trade strategy that goes long (short) a basket of currencies with highest (lowest) forward discounts or the exchange
rate component (∆sHML) of the strategy. NW represents Newey and West (1987) corrected for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity t-statistics
with the optimal number of lags following Andrews (1991). B denotes the bootstrap p-values based on 10,000 bootstrap iterations. The data
span the period 1985:07-2012:03.
Panel A: 1987:07-1992:12
cons gˆ2,t hˆ5,t hˆ6,t R¯2 cons gˆ2,t hˆ5,t hˆ6,t R¯2
All Countries Developed Countries
ψHML 1.3 1.67 0.05 1.31 1.46 0.03
NW 3.43 2.63 5.86 3.06 1.97 3.69
B 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.05
ψHML 1.33 1.82 0.06 0.24 0.04 1.45 1.75 0.22 0.33 0.02
NW 4.03 2.95 0.25 1.05 5.86 3.64 2.51 0.79 1.33 5.67
B 0.02 0.01 0.86 0.31 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.58 0.25 0.06
∆sHML -0.42 -1.64 0.05 -0.74 -1.54 -0.27 0.04
NW -1.15 -2.44 5.37 -1.72 -1.97 -1.12 3.91
B 0.44 0.02 0.02 0.18 0.05 0.34 0.05
∆sHML -0.52 -1.85 -0.17 -0.2 0.04 -0.92 -1.84 -0.28 0.03
NW -1.62 -2.87 -0.65 -0.87 6.76 -2.31 -2.53 -1.02 5.35
B 0.38 0.02 0.66 0.48 0.08 0.13 0.03 0.47 0.14
Panel B : 1992:12-2012:03
All Countries Developed Countries
0.31 0.48 0.04 0.04 0.58 0.04
NW 1.4 2.08 5.29 0.17 1.89 0.38 3.28
B 0.1 0.02 0.02 0.85 0.07 2.66 0.07
0.33 0.51 0.25 0.33 0.06 0.07 0.61 0.3 0.03 0.06
NW 1.82 3.2 1.45 2.01 12.59 0.29 2.05 1.14 9.49
B 0.07 0.02 0.12 0.03 0.01 0.78 0.06 0.31 0.02
0.75 -0.48 0.04 0.23 -0.62 -0.38 0.04
NW 3.72 -2.4 7.42 0.86 -2.04 -2.61 4.14
B 0 0.01 0.01 0.32 0.04 0.03 0.04
0.72 -0.49 -0.12 -0.26 0.04 0.2 -0.65 -0.28 0.06
NW 4.09 -2.63 -0.77 -1.93 9.46 0.8 -2.19 -1.07 10.17
B 0 0.01 0.43 0.1 0.02 0.41 0.05 0.35 0.02
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Table A.3. Robustness: Different subsamples - Dollar Carry Trades
The table reports OLS estimates for the dollar carry trade strategy of different subsamples. The dependent variable is the currency excess return
(ψUSD), based on the carry trade strategy that goes long (short) a basket of currencies with highest (lowest) forward discounts or the exchange
rate component (∆sHML) of the strategy. NW represents Newey and West (1987) corrected for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity t-statistics
with the optimal number of lags following Andrews (1991). B denotes the bootstrap p-values based on 10,000 bootstrap iterations. The data
span the period 1985:07-2012:03.
Panel A: 1987:07-1992:12
cons gˆ3,t hˆ6,t hˆ7,t R¯2 cons gˆ3,t hˆ4,t hˆ6,t hˆ7,t R¯2
All Countries Developed Countries
ψUSD 0.07 -0.53 0.75 -0.50 0.04 -0.05 -0.48 -0.41 0.96 -0.69 0.04
NW 0.22 -1.49 2.15 -1.92 5.31 -0.12 -1.27 -0.87 2.15 -2.06 5.38
B 0.83 0.11 0.05 0.09 0.15 0.90 0.20 0.35 0.04 0.05 0.25
∆sHML 0.07 -0.55 0.74 -0.48 0.04 -0.11 -0.50 -0.47 0.94 -0.68 0.05
NW 0.21 -1.46 2.10 -1.84 4.98 -0.25 -1.29 -1.01 2.12 -2.02 5.35
B 0.21 0.12 0.06 0.09 0.17 0.81 0.18 0.30 0.04 0.06 0.25
Panel B : 1992:12-2012:03
All Countries Developed Countries
ψUSD 0.34 -0.16 0.31 -0.32 0.05 0.50 -0.22 0.25 0.34 -0.34 0.05
NW 3.10 -1.30 2.13 -2.32 15.47 3.58 -1.37 1.73 2.13 -2.28 14.69
B 0.01 0.37 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.29 0.12 0.03 0.04 0.01
∆sHML 0.36 -0.22 0.29 -0.26 0.04 0.49 -0.21 0.23 0.34 -0.35 0.06
NW 3.29 -1.94 1.94 -1.97 11.25 3.45 -1.34 1.61 2.11 -2.34 15.24
B 0.00 0.25 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.32 0.15 0.04 0.03 0.00
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Table A.4. Robustness: Different subsamples - Momentum
The table reports OLS estimates for the dollar carry trade strategy of different subsamples. The dependent variable is the currency excess return
(ψWML), ), based on the momentum strategy that goes long (short) a basket of currencies with highest (lowest) past returns or the exchange
rate component (∆sHML) of the strategy. NW represents Newey and West (1987) corrected for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity t-statistics
with the optimal number of lags following Andrews (1991). B denotes the bootstrap p-values based on 10,000 bootstrap iterations. The data
span the period 1985:07-2012:03.
Panel A: 1987:07-1992:12
cons gˆ1,t hˆ1,t hˆ4,t R¯2 cons gˆ2,t hˆ7,t hˆ8,t R¯2
All Countries Developed Countries
ψWML 2.91 -2.70 -0.06 -0.64 0.04 -1.01 -1.63 -0.17 0.21 0.05
NW 2.61 -2.25 -0.13 -1.19 5.95 -2.12 -3.28 -0.88 0.61 6.17
B 0.01 0.01 0.92 0.29 0.11 0.08 0.03 0.41 0.53 0.10
∆sHML 3.16 -2.44 -0.06 0.72 0.04 1.16 1.77 0.10 -0.21 0.06
NW 3.83 -2.81 -0.09 1.21 9.96 2.40 3.43 0.55 -0.66 7.61
B 0.00 0.03 0.93 0.22 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.64 0.52 0.05
Panel B : 1992:12-2012:03
All Countries Developed Countries
ψWML 0.44 -0.05 -0.25 0.26 0.01 0.23 -0.43 -0.19 0.32 0.04
NW 2.98 -0.22 -1.66 1.16 5.40 1.62 -2.40 -1.06 1.64 5.88
B 0.02 0.85 0.10 0.21 0.14 0.19 0.08 0.30 0.10 0.12
∆sHML 0.38 0.44 0.12 -0.66 0.02 -0.22 0.45 0.20 -0.30 0.04
NW 1.67 1.52 0.88 -2.46 7.10 -1.53 2.52 1.16 -1.61 6.89
B 0.10 0.13 0.43 0.02 0.07 0.22 0.07 0.26 0.12 0.07
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Table A.5. Robustness: Foreign Investors - Carry Trades
The table reports OLS estimates for the carry trade strategy of different subsamples. The dependent variable is the currency excess return
(ψHML), based on the carry trade strategy that goes long (short) a basket of currencies with highest (lowest) forward discounts or the exchange
rate component (∆sHML) of the strategy. NW represents Newey and West (1987) corrected for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity t-statistics
with the optimal number of lags following Andrews (1991). B denotes the bootstrap p-values based on 10,000 bootstrap iterations. The data
span the period 1985:07-2012:03.
Panel A: Excess Returns & Exchange Rate Changes
cons gˆ2,t gˆ2,t−3 gˆ3,t−3 hˆ2,t hˆ6,t R¯2 cons gˆ2,t gˆ2,t−3 gˆ3,t−3 hˆ2,t hˆ6,t R¯2
GBP CHF
ψHML 1.23 0.72 -0.49 -0.37 0.21 0.29 0.07 0.95 0.60 -0.37 -0.34 0.33 0.31 0.08
NW 7.85 2.87 -2.55 -2.54 1.48 2.08 27.53 6.10 2.48 -1.91 -2.22 2.27 2.22 32.80
B 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.16 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.00
∆sHML -0.01 -0.71 0.36 0.32 0.08 -0.24 0.06 0.22 -0.62 0.28 0.31 -0.03 -0.25 0.05
NW -0.08 -3.30 2.10 2.22 0.65 -1.85 23.21 1.55 -2.95 1.56 2.15 -0.25 -1.81 19.91
B 0.93 0.00 0.09 0.01 0.65 0.09 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.24 0.01 0.75 0.07 0.00
CAD SEK
ψHML 0.95 0.75 -0.50 -0.39 0.28 0.28 0.09 0.83 0.69 -0.49 -0.39 0.29 0.26 0.08
NW 6.02 2.93 -2.49 -2.67 1.91 1.91 32.87 5.43 2.59 -2.45 -2.59 1.91 1.81 32.76
B 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.07 0.00
∆sHML 0.23 -0.73 0.37 0.33 0.00 -0.22 0.06 0.30 -0.67 0.36 0.34 0.00 -0.21 0.05
NW 1.57 -3.45 2.08 2.20 0.00 -1.61 23.15 2.16 -3.02 2.04 2.23 0.01 -1.53 21.03
B 0.11 0.00 0.08 0.01 0.92 0.10 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.10 0.01 0.92 0.13 0.00
JPY AUD
ψHML 0.91 0.63 -0.39 -0.34 0.33 0.30 0.08 0.88 0.74 -0.51 -0.34 0.30 0.23 0.09
NW 5.65 3.04 -2.44 -2.45 2.56 2.36 36.46 5.97 2.92 -2.62 -2.67 2.11 1.73 38.82
B 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.09 0.00
∆sHML 0.24 -0.66 0.29 0.32 -0.04 -0.23 0.05 0.28 -0.71 0.35 0.29 0.02 -0.20 0.06
NW 1.64 -3.57 1.93 2.33 -0.30 -1.80 21.95 2.06 -3.38 2.04 2.22 0.14 -1.53 24.44
B 0.09 0.00 0.17 0.01 0.72 0.09 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.08 0.02 0.98 0.13 0.00
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Table A.6. Robustness: Longer Horizons
The table reports OLS estimates of long-horizon predictive regressions. In Panel A the dependent variable is the average log excess returns of
different horizons (using forward contracts with maturities that are equal to the length of the horizon) obtained from Lustig et al. (2014). Panel
B reports results for the cumulative payoffs of the corresponding dollar carry trade returns. NW represents Newey and West (1987) corrected for
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity t-statistics with the optimal number of lags following Andrews (1991). B denotes the bootstrap p-values
based on 10,000 bootstrap iterations. The data span the period 1985:07-2012:03.
Panel A: Average log Excess Returns (Lustig et al., 2014)
cons hˆ1,t hˆ6,t hˆ7,t R¯2 cons hˆ1,t hˆ6,t hˆ7,t R¯2
All Countries Developed Countries
1−month 0.17 -0.36 0.42 -0.36 0.06 0.14 -0.43 0.47 -0.46 0.06
NW 1.18 -2.01 3.57 -2.89 21.26 0.82 -2.09 3.46 -3.52 22.97
B 0.75 0.96 0.00 0.54 0.00 0.76 0.97 0.00 0.52 0.00
2−month 0.16 -0.35 0.36 -0.32 0.08 0.13 -0.42 0.42 -0.40 0.09
NW 1.39 -2.02 4.21 -2.97 26.53 1.11 -2.23 4.43 -3.61 27.28
B 0.88 0.98 0.00 0.52 0.00 0.92 0.99 0.00 0.54 0.00
3−month 0.16 -0.32 0.39 -0.29 0.12 0.14 -0.39 0.45 -0.35 0.13
NW 1.41 -2.15 4.54 -2.14 30.41 1.21 -2.29 4.82 -2.67 29.36
B 0.97 0.96 0.00 0.54 0.00 0.97 0.98 0.00 0.56 0.00
6−month 0.17 -0.24 0.37 -0.16 0.15 0.15 -0.28 0.40 -0.18 0.15
NW 1.30 -1.91 3.69 -2.38 21.12 1.30 -1.77 3.97 -2.71 18.99
B 0.94 0.87 0.00 0.58 0.01 0.95 0.80 0.00 0.98 0.01
12−month 0.19 -0.13 0.30 -0.16 0.18 0.17 -0.13 0.33 -0.20 0.19
NW 1.01 -3.25 1.72 -2.30 19.58 0.91 -2.81 2.06 -2.60 19.12
B 0.99 0.79 0.00 0.59 0.01 0.98 0.74 0.00 0.96 0.01
Panel A: Dollar Carry Trade (Lustig et al., 2014)
All Countries Developed Countries
1−month 0.23 -0.43 0.36 -0.41 0.06 0.47 -0.40 0.41 -0.41 0.05
NW 1.68 -2.32 3.39 -3.30 22.83 3.42 -2.09 3.47 -3.66 21.76
B 0.82 0.99 0.00 0.53 0.00 0.70 0.95 0.00 0.54 0.00
2−month 0.24 -0.42 0.34 -0.33 0.09 0.46 -0.40 0.34 -0.27 0.06
NW 2.16 -2.41 4.24 -3.46 30.58 4.10 -1.96 3.88 -2.64 17.56
B 0.93 0.97 0.00 0.54 0.00 0.87 0.98 0.01 0.52 0.00
3−month 0.22 -0.33 0.37 -0.28 0.11 0.37 -0.38 0.38 -0.23 0.09
NW 1.88 -1.97 4.17 -2.21 28.50 3.35 -2.57 4.53 -3.66 22.88
B 0.96 0.94 0.00 0.64 0.01 0.93 0.99 0.00 0.56 0.00
6−month 0.22 -0.24 0.35 -0.14 0.14 0.32 -0.30 0.35 -0.13 0.12
NW 1.81 -1.86 3.46 -2.57 19.69 2.69 -2.35 4.10 -2.98 16.75
B 0.96 0.89 0.00 0.96 0.00 0.94 0.92 0.00 0.95 0.01
12−month 0.22 -0.08 0.30 -0.16 0.17 0.35 -0.12 0.26 -0.14 0.14
NW 1.42 -2.65 1.87 -2.29 24.91 2.23 -3.23 2.30 -2.34 13.32
B 0.96 0.32 0.00 0.94 0.00 0.99 0.75 0.00 0.99 0.03
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Table A.7. Robustness: Longer Horizons
The table reports OLS estimates of long-horizon predictive regressions. In Panel A the
dependent variable is the cumulative payoff (ψHML) of a carry trade strategy over 3 to 36
months that goes long (short) a basket of currencies with highest (lowest) forward discounts.
Panel B reports results for the cumulative returns of the momentum strategy for the
corresponding horizons. NW represents Newey and West (1987) corrected for autocorrelation
and heteroskedasticity t-statistics with the optimal number of lags following Andrews (1991).
B denotes the bootstrap p-values based on 10,000 bootstrap iterations. The data span the
period 1985:07-2012:03.
Panel A: Carry Trades
cons gˆ2,t gˆ3,t hˆ1,t hˆ6,t hˆ7,t R¯2
All Countries
3−months 1.06 1.22 -0.41 0.87 0.87 0.07
NW 2.30 2.97 -1.22 1.85 1.85 13.46
B 0.89 0.00 0.88 0.04 0.04 0.03
12−months 4.29 2.04 -0.41 14.80 1.82 0.04
NW 2.26 1.25 -1.22 2.39 1.87 10.99
B 0.88 0.14 0.88 1.00 0.05 0.11
24−months 4.29 2.04 -1.34 1.26 1.82 0.07
NW 2.26 1.25 -1.07 0.43 1.87 4.63
B 0.89 0.14 0.85 0.36 0.05 0.64
36−months 14.80 6.05 -3.16 0.86 5.03 0.08
NW 2.39 1.13 -1.65 0.19 1.99 9.19
B 0.95 0.18 0.93 0.43 0.03 0.39
Panel A: Momentum
cons hˆ1,t hˆ4,t R¯2
All Countries
3−months 1.29 -0.49 0.29 0.01
NW 3.42 -1.20 1.00 2.20
B 0.58 0.87 0.20 0.39
12−months 4.98 -2.23 1.06 0.06
NW 3.73 -1.34 1.08 4.63
B 1.00 0.90 0.15 0.19
24−months 9.98 -2.53 2.88 0.08
NW 3.98 -0.64 2.46 6.69
B 1.00 0.70 0.03 0.17
36−months 16.33 -0.11 -0.11 0.12
NW 4.88 -0.02 -0.02 24.24
B 1.00 0.51 0.51 0.00
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Table A.8. Out-of-sample analysis: Against the Mean
The table presents out-of sample R-squares (R2OOS) as described in Campbell and Thompson (2008) (R
2
OOS = 1 −
∑T−1
t=1
ψit+1−µˆt+1)2
(ψit+1−µt+1)2
), where
µˆt+1 represents the one-step ahead conditional forecast from the model of interest and µt+1 is the historical mean of the payoff. Thus, a positive
R2OOS statistic means that the competing model outperforms the benchmark model because it has a lower mean square prediction error. Panel A
reports results for currency excess returns and Panel B for exchange rate changes. The superscript mean represents the mean combined forecast
and the superscript weighted the weighted counterpart. The in-sample period spans the first 271 observations (out of 321) that correspond to the
period 1985.07-2007.12.
Panel A: Currency Excess Returns
ψHML ψUSD ψWML ψHML ψUSD ψWML
R2OOS MSPEadj R
2
OOS MSPEadj R
2
OOS MSPEadj R
2
OOS MSPEadj R
2
OOS MSPEadj R
2
OOS MSPEadj
All Countries Developed Countries
C1 = [gˆ2] 0.12 0.08
C′1 = [gˆ1,2] 0.05 0.10
C2 = [hˆ3,6] 0.06 0.07
C
′
3 = [gˆ2,3hˆ5,6] 0.17 0.05 0.07 0.05
CMean2,3 0.16 0.06 0.08 0.06
CWeighted2,3 0.16 0.06 0.08 0.06
D2 = [hˆ6,7] 0.04 0.05
D3 = [gˆ3hˆ6,7] 0.06 0.02 0.05 0.02
DMean2,3 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.02
DWeighted2,3 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.01
M2 = [hˆ1,4] 0.06 0.01 0.06 0.01
M
′
2 = [hˆ3,4,7,8] 0.00 0.14
M
′
2 = [hˆ3,4,7,8] 0.06 0.07
M3 = [gˆ3hˆ4] 0.00 0.22
MMean2,3 0.05 0.14
MWeighted2,3 0.00 0.22 0.06 0.10
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Table A.8. Out-of-sample analysis: Against the Mean (continued)
Panel B : Exchange Rate Returns
ψHML ψUSD ψWML ψHML ψUSD ψWML
R2OOS MSPEadj R
2
OOS MSPEadj R
2
OOS MSPEadj R
2
OOS MSPEadj R
2
OOS MSPEadj R
2
OOS MSPEadj
All Countries Developed Countries
C1 = [gˆ2] 0.14 0.03 0.04 0.09
C′1 = [gˆ1,2]
C2 = [hˆ2,3,4,6] 0.03 0.17
C
′
2 = [hˆ3,6] 0.06 0.08
C3 = [gˆ2,3hˆ5,6] 0.18 0.03
C
′
3 = [gˆ2,3hˆ6] 0.07 0.05
CMean1,3 0.17 0.03 0.08 0.06
CWeighted1,3 0.17 0.03 0.08 0.06
D2 = [hˆ6,7] 0.07 0.02 0.05 0.02
D3 = [gˆ3hˆ6,7] 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.02
DMean2,3 0.06 0.01 0.06 0.01
DWeighted2,3 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.01
M1 = [gˆ3] 0.00 0.28
M2 = [hˆ1,4] 0.00 0.21
M3 = [[gˆ3hˆ4] 0.00 0.12
M
′
1 = [gˆ2] 0.04 0.12
M
′
2 = [hˆ3,4,7,8] 0.07 0.06
M
′
3 = [[gˆ2hˆ8] 0.06 0.12
MMean2,3 0.00 0.21
MWeighted2,3 0.00 0.21
M
′Mean
2,3 0.07 0.09
M
′Weighted
2,3 0.07 0.09
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Table A.9. Robustness: Alternative Asset Classes
The table reports OLS estimates for value and momentum strategies of alternative asset classes. In Panel A the dependent variable is the
long or short leg of a momentum strategy of equities (EQ), foreign exchange (FX), fixed income (FI) and commodities (CM). Panel B reports
the corresponding results for the value strategy. NW represents Newey and West (1987) corrected for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity
t-statistics with the optimal number of lags following Andrews (1991). B denotes the bootstrap p-values based on 10,000 bootstrap iterations.
The data span the period 1985:07-2012:03.
Panel A: Value Portfolios
cons gˆ1,t gˆ2,t gˆ3,t gˆ3,t−1 hˆ4,t hˆ8,t R¯2 cons gˆ1,t gˆ2,t gˆ3,t−2 hˆ3,t hˆ4,t hˆ6,t hˆ7,t R¯2
EQ FX
Long 0.60 0.77 0.55 0.81 0.06 0.40 -0.28 0.13 0.39 -0.28 0.05
NW 2.24 2.21 2.28 3.32 11.84 3.45 -2.45 1.06 3.72 -2.06 18.78
B 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.39 0.00 0.03 0.00
Short 0.27 0.30 0.60 0.74 0.03 0.12 -0.56 0.33 0.49 -0.38 0.07
NW 0.96 0.93 2.26 3.71 11.70 0.77 -3.54 1.64 3.06 -3.15 23.16
B 0.32 0.34 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.43 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.01 0.00
FI CM
Long 0.33 -0.15 -0.21 -0.14 0.17 -0.14 0.07 0.49 0.30 0.55 0.44 0.09 0.23 0.02
NW 4.20 -2.01 -2.84 -2.04 1.87 -2.14 25.29 2.11 1.32 2.55 1.93 0.36 1.03 7.06
B 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.09 0.04 0.12 0.00 0.04 0.29 0.04 0.08 0.73 0.36 0.22
Short 0.22 -0.23 -0.38 -0.18 0.07 0.37 0.58 1.46 0.50 -0.72 0.53 0.12
NW 1.93 -1.80 -4.14 -1.75 34.90 1.41 1.79 4.79 1.95 -3.03 1.94 28.28
B 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.20 0.13 0.00 0.09 0.02 0.06 0.00
Panel B : Momentum Portfolios
EQ FX
Long 0.81 0.65 0.46 0.82 0.05 0.36 -0.43 -0.08 0.41 -0.36 0.05
NW 3.01 2.00 1.93 3.73 11.34 2.85 -2.92 -0.64 2.87 -2.46 17.95
B 0.00 0.04 0.10 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.54 0.01 0.03 0.00
Short 0.18 0.49 0.80 0.03 0.11 -0.31 -0.32 0.38 0.04
NW 0.65 1.41 3.05 8.38 0.79 -2.00 -2.72 3.09 17.59
B 0.50 0.13 0.01 0.02 0.41 0.08 0.05 0.00 0.00
FI CM
Long 0.29 -0.20 -0.23 -0.16 0.19 0.05 0.97 0.16 1.07 -0.69 0.30 0.05
NW 2.69 -1.70 -2.09 -1.99 1.49 16.07 3.55 0.66 2.94 -2.44 0.97 10.19
B 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.08 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.59 0.01 0.06 0.29 0.04
Short 0.34 -0.21 -0.26 -0.16 -0.16 0.09 0.06 0.64 0.53 -0.56 0.36 0.05
NW 3.67 -2.20 -3.24 -2.37 -2.37 36.07 0.28 2.51 2.10 -3.14 1.66 13.30
B 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.82 0.02 0.12 0.04 0.19 0.01
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A.1.2 Data
This table provides a detailed description of the U.S. and Global monthly (start
of month) data as well as the transformations applied to the series based on sta-
tionarity tests, detailed in Stock and Watson (2002a, b): lv = no transformation;
lv = first difference; ln = logarithm; ∆ln = first difference of logarithm. The
data is available from Datastream and span the period 1985:7-2012:03.
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Table A.10. U.S. Data
Series Number Mnemonics Tranf Description
Real Output
1 870010061 ∆ ln US PROD OF TOTAL INDUSTRY VOLA
2 870010074 ∆ ln US PROD IN TOTAL MFG VOLA
3 870010065 ∆ ln US PROD OF TOTAL MFC CONSUMER GOODS VOLA
4 870010070 ∆ ln US PROD OF TOTAL MFC INTERMEDIATE GOODS VOLA
5 870010058 ∆ ln US PROD OF DWELLINGS CURN
6 60624012 ln US PERSONAL INCOME (MONTHLY SERIES) (AR) CURA
7 60611444 ∆ ln US PERSONAL INCOME LESS TRANSFER PAYMENTS (BCI 51) CONA
Employment
8 870012315 ∆ ln US EMPLOYEES: TOTAL (BUSINESS SURVEY)(DISC.) VOLA
9 870004508 ∆ ln US CIVILIAN EMPLOYMENT: ALL PERSONS(DISC.) VOLA
10 870011929 ∆ ln US CIVILIAN LABOUR FORCE: ALL PERSONS(DISC.) VOLA
11 870004623 ∆ ln US UNEMPLOYMENT RATE: SURVEY-BASED (ALL PERSONS)(DISC.) SADJ
12 870004581 ∆lv US WEEKLY HOURS WORKED: MFG VOLA
13 870004585 ∆lv US WEEKLY OVERTIME HOURS: MFG VOLA
14 60200425 ∆ ln US UNEMPLOYMENT RATE SADJ
15 64554480 ∆ ln US UNEMPLOYED (16 YRS & OVER) VOLA
16 60200205 ∆lv US TOTAL CIVILIAN EMPLOYMENT VOLA
Consumption
17 64110309 ∆ ln US CHAIN-TYPE PRICE INDEX FOR PERSONAL CONSMPTN.EXPENDITURE SADJ
18 60624032 ∆ ln US PERSONAL CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURES (AR) CURA
19 62244012 ∆ ln US PERSONAL CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURES - DURABLES (AR) CURA
20 64110362 ∆ ln US PERSONAL CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURES - LESS FOOD & ENERGY CURA
21 62244032 ∆ ln US PERSONAL CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURES - SERVICES (AR) CURA
22 62244022 ∆ ln US PERSONAL CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURES - NONDURABLES (AR) CURA
Housing Start
23 64101515 ln US HOUSING STARTED VOLN
24 64101504 ln US HOUSING STARTED - MIDWEST (AR) VOLA
25 64101503 ln US HOUSING STARTED - NORTHEAST (AR) VOLA
26 64101505 ln US HOUSING STARTED - SOUTH (AR) VOLA
27 64101506 ln US HOUSING STARTED - WEST (AR) VOLA
28 64101525 ln US HOUSING AUTHORIZED VOLN
29 61110105 ln US NEW PRIVATE HOUSING UNITS STARTED (AR) VOLA
30 61110405 ln US NEW PRIVATE HOUSING UNITS AUTHORIZED BY BLDG.PERMIT (AR) VOLA
31 61105002 ln US CONSTRUCTION EXPENDITURES - TOTAL (AR) CURA
32 64121950 ln US EXISTING HOME SALES: SINGLE-FAMILY & CONDO (AR) VOLA
33 64101560 ln US HOUSING COMPLETED - 1 UNIT VOLN
34 64101544 ln US HOUSING COMPLETED - 1 UNIT (AR) VOLA
35 64110960 ln US HOUSING COMPLETED - 2 TO 4 UNITS VOLN
36 64101564 ln US HOUSING COMPLETED - 5 UNITS OR MORE VOLN
37 64101546 ln US HOUSING COMPLETED - 5 UNITS OR MORE (AR) VOLA
38 64101566 ln US HOUSING COMPLETED - MIDWEST VOLN
39 64101548 ln US HOUSING COMPLETED - MIDWEST (AR) VOLA
40 64101565 ln US HOUSING COMPLETED - NORTHEAST VOLN
41 64101547 ln US HOUSING COMPLETED - NORTHEAST (AR) VOLA
42 64101567 ln US HOUSING COMPLETED - SOUTH VOLN
43 64101549 ln US HOUSING COMPLETED - SOUTH (AR) VOLA
44 64101568 ln US HOUSING COMPLETED - WEST VOLN
45 64101550 ln US HOUSING COMPLETED - WEST (AR) VOLA
46 64101516 ln US HOUSING STARTED - 1 UNIT VOLN
47 64112140 ln US HOUSING STARTED - 2 TO 4 UNITS VOLN
48 64101520 ln US HOUSING STARTED - 5 UNITS OR MORE VOLN
49 64101502 ln US HOUSING STARTED - 5 UNITS OR MORE (AR) VOLA
50 64101522 ln US HOUSING STARTED - MIDWEST VOLN
51 64101521 ln US HOUSING STARTED - NORTHEAST VOLN
52 64101523 ln US HOUSING STARTED - SOUTH VOLN
53 64101524 ln US HOUSING STARTED - WEST VOLN
54 64101552 ln US HOUSING UNDER CONSTRUCTION - 1 UNIT (AR) VOLA
55 64101570 ln US HOUSING UNDER CONSTRUCTION - 1 UNIT (EP) VOLN
56 64110944 ln US HOUSING UNDER CONSTRUCTION - 2 TO 4 UNITS (EP) VOLN
57 64101554 ln US HOUSING UNDER CONSTRUCTION - 5 UNITS OR MORE (AR) VOLA
58 64101574 ln US HOUSING UNDER CONSTRUCTION - 5 UNITS OR MORE (EP) VOLN
59 64101556 ln US HOUSING UNDER CONSTRUCTION - MIDWEST (AR) VOLA
60 64101576 ln US HOUSING UNDER CONSTRUCTION - MIDWEST (EP) VOLN
61 64101555 ln US HOUSING UNDER CONSTRUCTION - NORTHEAST (AR) VOLA
62 64101575 ln US HOUSING UNDER CONSTRUCTION - NORTHEAST (EP) VOLN
63 64101557 ln US HOUSING UNDER CONSTRUCTION - SOUTH (AR) VOLA
64 64101577 ln US HOUSING UNDER CONSTRUCTION - SOUTH (EP) VOLN
65 64101558 ln US HOUSING UNDER CONSTRUCTION - WEST (AR) VOLA
66 64101578 ln US HOUSING UNDER CONSTRUCTION - WEST (EP) VOLN
67 64101569 ln US HOUSING UNDER CONSTRUCTION AT END OF PERIOD (EP) VOLN
68 68233445 ln US NEW PRIVATE HOUSING UNITS STARTED - 1 UNIT(AR) VOLA
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Table A.10. U.S. Data (continued)
Series Number Mnemonics Tranf Description
69 61105225 ln US NEW PRIVATELY OWNED HOUSING UNITS COMPLETED (AR) VOLA
70 61105235 ln US NEW PRIVATELY OWNED HOUSING UNITS UNDER CONSTRUCTION (AR) VOLA
Orders
71 60201252 ln US ISM MANUFACTURERS SURVEY: NEW ORDERS INDEX SADJ
72 61518004 ∆ ln US NEW ORDERS OF CONSUMER GOODS & MATERIALS (BCI 8) CONA
Stock Prices
73 DUS(PI) ∆ ln DOW JONES INDUSTRIALS - PRICE INDEX
74 870004617 ∆ ln US SHARE PRICES: NYSE COMPOSITE NADJ
75 61401000 ∆ ln US DOW JONES INDUSTRIALS SHARE PRICE INDEX (EP) NADJ
76 DJUTILS(PI) ∆ ln DOW JONES UTIILITIES - PRICE INDEX
Exchange Rates
77 640023985 ∆ ln SW SWISS FRANCS TO USD REAL INDEX VOLN
78 77000129 ∆ ln CN CANADIAN DOLLARS TO 1 U.S. DOLLAR (MONTHLY AVERAGE)
79 741120006 ∆ ln UK NATIONAL CURRENCY UNIT TO US $ - MARKET RATE (EP)
80 741580006 ∆ ln JP NATIONAL CURRENCY UNIT TO US $ - MARKET RATE (EP)
Interest Rates
81 870004511 lv US FEDERAL FUNDS RATE NADJ
82 870004512 lv US PRIME RATE NADJ
83 870009005 lv US YIELD 10-YEAR FED GVT SECS (COMPOSITE) NADJ
84 870009003 lv US RATE 3-MONTH CDS NADJ
85 870009004 ∆lv US RATE 3-MONTH EURO-DOLLAR DEPOSITS NADJ
86 870009006 lv US YIELD 10-YEAR FED GVT SECS NADJ
87 741110441 lv US DISCOUNT RATE (EP)
88 741110450 lv US TREASURY BILL RATE
89 741110465 lv US 1-MONTH US $ DEPOSITS, LONDON OFFER
90 741110468 ∆lv US 3-MONTH US $ DEPOSITS, LONDON OFFER
91 741110471 lv US 6-MONTH US $ DEPOSITS, LONDON OFFER CURN
92 741110480 lv US GOVT BOND YIELD - LONGTERM
93 741110483 lv US GOVT BOND YIELD - MEDIUM TERM
Money and Credit Quantity Aggregates
94 870004548 ∆ ln US MONETARY AGGREGATE M1 CURA
95 870004544 ln US MONETARY AGGREGATE M2 CURA
96 870004546 ∆ ln US MONETARY AGGREGATE M3 - PROXY CURA
97 741110057 ∆ ln US INTERNATIONAL RESERVES CURN
98 64125508 ∆ ln US COMMERCIAL BANK ASSETS - LOANS & LEASES IN BANK CREDIT CURA
99 64104036 ∆ ln US COMMERCIAL BANK ASSETS - COMMERCIAL & INDUSTRIAL LOANS CURA
100 440337331 lv US COML BANK ASSETS-COMMERCIAL & INDL LOANS(BREAK ADJ,SAAR) SADJ
101 741110066 ∆ ln US FUND POSITION: SDR’S CURN
Price Indices
102 870004479 ∆ ln US CPI ALL ITEMS SADJ
103 870004480 ∆ ln US CPI ALL ITEMS WAGE EARNERS NADJ
104 870006150 ∆ ln US CPI FOOD EXCL. RESTAURANTS NADJ
105 870006151 ∆ ln US CPI ENERGY NADJ
106 870006152 ∆ ln US CPI ALL ITEMS NON-FOOD NON-ENERGY NADJ
107 870004477 ∆ ln US CPI ALL ITEMS NEW YORK NADJ
108 64110656 ∆ ln US PPI - FINISHED GOODS SADJ
109 60823485 ∆ ln US PPI - FINISHED GOODS LESS FOODS & ENERGY (CORE) SADJ
110 64582033 ∆ ln US PPI - CONSUMER NONDURABLE GOODS LESS FOOD SADJ
111 64636479 ∆ ln US PPI - OTHER HOUSEHOLD DURABLE GOODS NADJ
112 64636770 ∆ ln US PPI - SPORTING & ATHLETIC GOODS NADJ
113 64636762 ∆ ln US PPI - TOYS, SPORTING GOODS, SMALL ARMS, ETC. NADJ
114 60823515 ∆ ln US PPI - CONSUMER NONDURABLE GOODS LESS FOOD & ENERGY SADJ
115 60823535 ∆ ln US PPI - INTERMEDIATE MATERIALS LESS ENERGY SADJ
116 64583023 ∆ ln US PPI - INTERMEDIATE MATERIALS LESS ENERGY NADJ
117 64581996 ∆ ln US PPI - CRUDE NONFOOD MATERIALS EXCEPT FUEL SADJ
118 64633584 ∆ ln US PPI-PORK PRODS,FRESH,FROZEN,OR PROCESSED, EXCEPT SAUSAGE NADJ
119 64582021 ∆ ln US PPI - MANUFACTURED ANIMAL FEEDS SADJ
120 870009105 ∆ ln US HOURLY EARN: MFG SADJ
121 870004515 ∆ ln US HOURLY EARN: MFG NADJ
122 870010200 ∆ ln US HOURLY EARN: PRIVATE SECTOR SADJ
123 870004629 ∆ ln US ITS IMPORTS C.I.F. TOTAL CURA
124 870004626 ∆ ln US ITS EXPORTS F.A.S. TOTAL CURA
125 870004632 ∆ ln US ITS NET TRADE (F.A.S. - C.I.F.) CURA
126 870006320 lv US MFG - CONFIDENCE INDICATOR SADJ
127 61070005 lv US CAPACITY UTILIZATION RATE - ALL INDUSTRY SADJ
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Table A.11. Global Data
Series Number Mnemonics Tranf Description
Real Output
1 CN2PTOTCD ∆ ln CN GDP - INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION CONN
2 JPPRODVTE ∆lv JP LABOR PRODUCTIVITY INDEX - ALL INDUSTRIES SADJ
3 AUSTEELPP ∆ ln AU AUSTRALIA - STEEL PRODUCTION VOLN
4 UKIPTOT.G ∆ ln UK INDEX OF PRODUCTION - ALL PRODUCTION INDUSTRIES VOLA
5 SDIPTOT5G ∆ ln SD INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION - MINING & MANUFACTURING (CAL ADJ) VOLA
6 BDIP0093G ∆ ln BD INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION: MANUFACTURING VOLA
Employment
7 DKUNPTOTP ∆ ln DK UNEMPLOYMENT NET (METHDOLOGY BREAK APRIL 2000) VOLA
8 CNUN%TOTQ ∆ ln CN UNEMPLOYMENT RATE - CANADA (15 YRS & OVER) NADJ
9 JPUN%TOTQ ∆lv JP UNEMPLOYMENT RATE (METHO BREAK MAR 2011) SADJ
10 AUUN%TOTQ ∆lv AU UNEMPLOYMENT RATE (LABOUR FORCE SURVEY ESTIMATE) SADJ
11 NZMLM005P ∆ ln NZ REGISTERED UNEMPLOYMENT: LEVEL (ALL PERSONS) VOLN
12 UKUN%TOTQ ∆lv UK UNEMPLOYMENT RATE SADJ
13 SWUN%TOTR ∆lv SW UNEMPLOYMENT RATE NADJ
14 OEUN%TOTR ln OE UNEMPLOYMENT RATE % NADJ
15 NWUN%TOTQ ∆lv NW UNEMPLOYMENT RATE (% OF LFS) SADJ
Consumption
16 NWPERCGDG ∆ ln NW PRIVATE CONSUMPTION - GOODS VOLA
17 BCPIEXC ∆ ln BOC. WEEKLY EXCLUDING ENERGY - PRICE INDEX
18 AUIMPCSGB ln AU IMPORTS FOB - CONSUMPTION GOODS CURA
19 JPCCEPCSE ∆lv JP ELECTRIC POWER CONSUMPTION - LARGE CORPORATIONS SADJ
20 CNPPOCOMP ln CN PETROLEUM PRODUCTS: ALL PRODUCTS - OWN CONSUMPTION VOLN
21 AUIMPCGDA ln AU IMPORTS FOB - CONSUMPTION GOODS CURN
22 UKHYELECG ∆ ln UK CONSUMPTION OF HYDRO ELECTRICITY VOLA
23 SDECTOTLP ∆ ln SD CONSUMPTION OF ELECTRICITY VOLN
24 NWPERCGDG ∆ ln NW PRIVATE CONSUMPTION - GOODS VOLA
25 EUCNMCOIP ∆ ln EU CONSUMPTION - CRUDE OIL VOLN
26 DKESEIWBP ∆lv DK ENERGY - CONSUMPTION, NATURAL GAS VOLN
Stock Price
27 JPSHRPRCF ∆ ln JP TOKYO STOCK EXCHANGE - TOPIX NADJ
28 CNSHRPRCF ∆ ln CN TORONTO STOCK EXCHANGE COMPOSITE SHARE PRICE INDEX NADJ
29 TOTXTER ∆lv EU-DS DS-MARKET EX TMT - PRICE INDEX
30 HLTHCDK ∆ ln DK-DS HEALTH CARE - PRICE INDEX
31 TOTMKAU ∆lv AU-DS MARKET - PRICE INDEX
32 FINANUK ∆ ln UK-DS FINANCIALS - SHARE HOLDERS EQUT
33 MSSWDNL ∆lv MSCI SWEDEN PRICE INDEX
34 MSSWITL ∆lv MSCI SWITZERLAND PRICE INDEX
Price Indices
35 CNCONPRCF ∆ ln CN CPI NADJ
36 JPCONPRCF ∆lv JP CPI: NATIONAL MEASURE NADJ
37 AUCPANNL ∆lv AU INFLATION RATE (DS CALCULATED QUARTERLY) NADJ
38 NZCPANNL ∆lv NZ INFLATION RATE NADJ
39 UKOCP009R ln UK CPI ALL ITEMS NADJ
40 SWCONPRCF ∆lv SW CPI NADJ
41 SDCONPRCF ∆ ln SD CPI NADJ
42 NWCONPRCF ∆lv NW CPI NADJ
43 EUOCP009F ∆ ln EU CPI ALL ITEMS NADJ
44 DKCONPRCF ln DK CPI NADJ
45 CNMPIFG1F ∆ ln CN TOTAL PPI FINISHED GOODS NADJ
46 JPOPIFG2F ∆ ln JP DOMESTIC PPI FINISHED GOODS NADJ
47 UKPROPRCF ∆ ln UK PPI - OUTPUT OF MANUFACTURED PRODUCTS (HOME SALES) NADJ
48 SWPROPRCE ∆lv SW PPI SADJ
49 NWPROPRCF ∆ ln NW PPI NADJ
50 EUOPIMP2F ∆ ln EU DOMESTIC PPI MFG NADJ
51 DKESPPINF ∆ ln DK PPI: NON-DURABLE CONSUMER GOODS NADJ
Interest Rates
52 ECCAD1M lv CANADA EURO-$ 1 MTH (FT/ICAP/TR) - MIDDLE RATE
53 ECJAP1M lv JAPAN EURO-YEN 1 MTH (FT/ICAP/TR) - MIDDLE RATE
54 ECUKP1M ∆lv UK EURO-1M (FT/ICAP/TR) - MIDDLE RATE
55 ECWGM1M ∆lv GERMANY EU-MARK 1M (FT/ICAP/TR) - MIDDLE RATE
56 ECSWF1M ∆lv SWTZRLAND EU-FRC-1M (FT/ICAP/TR) - MIDDLE RATE
57 ECDKN1M ∆lv DENMARK EURO-KRONE 1M (FT/ICAP/TR) - MIDDLE RATE
58 ECUSD1M ∆lv US EURO-$ 1 MTH (FT/ICAP/TR) - MIDDLE RATE
59 ECCAD3M lv CANADA EURO-$ 3 MTH (FT/ICAP/TR) - MIDDLE RATE
60 ECJAP3M lv JAPAN EURO-YEN 3 MTH (FT/ICAP/TR) - MIDDLE RATE
61 ECWGM3M ∆lv GERMANY EU-MARK 3M (FT/ICAP/TR) - MIDDLE RATE
62 ECSWF3M ∆lv SWTZRLAND EU-FRC-3M (FT/ICAP/TR) - MIDDLE RATE
63 ECDKN3M ∆lv DENMARK EURO-KRONE 3M (FT/ICAP/TR) - MIDDLE RATE
64 ECUSD3M lv US EURO-$ 3 MTH (FT/ICAP/TR) - MIDDLE RATE
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Table A.11. Global Data (continued)
Series Number Mnemonics Tranf Description
International Trade
65 CNVISBOPB lv CN VISIBLE TRADE BALANCE (BALANCE OF PAYMENTS BASIS) CURA
66 JPVISGDSA lv JP VISIBLE TRADE BALANCE CURN
67 AUBALGOSA lv AU BALANCE OF TRADE IN GOODS & SERVICES (BOP BASIS) CURN
68 NZVISGDSA lv NZ VISIBLE TRADE BALANCE CURN
69 UKVISBOPB ∆lv UK VISIBLE TRADE BALANCE - BALANCE OF PAYMENTS BASIS CURA
70 SWTA2891E lv SW TRADE BALANCE TOTAL 1 CURA
71 SDVISGDSA lv SD VISIBLE TRADE BALANCE CURN
72 NWVISGDSA lv NW VISIBLE TRADE BALANCE CURN
73 BDVISGDSB ∆lv BD VISIBLE TRADE BALANCE CURA
74 DKVISGDSA lv DK VISIBLE TRADE BALANCE CURN
75 USVISGDSB ∆lv US VISIBLE TRADE BALANCE F.A.S.-F.A.S. CURA
Reserves
76 870008751 lv DK SDR RESERVE ASSETS CURN
77 498012588 lv JP FOREIGN RESERVES - FOREIGN CURRENCY CURN
78 360790010 lv SW OFFICIAL RESERVES MINUS GOLD (US$) CURN
97 60700010 ∆ln US FOREIGN RESERVE ASSETS CURN
80 77001675 lv CN OFFICIAL INTERNATIONAL RESERVES: CONVERTIBLE NON-U.S.$ CURRENCY
81 100700010 lv AU OFFICIAL RESERVE ASSETS CURN
82 109998872 ∆ln AU AUSTRALIAN $ EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATE INDEX
83 USNLTSECA lv US FOREIGN NET LONG TERM FLOWS IN SECURITIES CURN
84 116600110 ∆ln NZ PRIVATE SECTOR CREDIT CURN
85 116600740 ∆ln NZ TOTAL OFFICIAL RESERVES CURN
86 870008981 ∆ln NW RESERVE ASSETS CURN
87 SDRESERVA ∆ln SD BANK OF SWEDEN: ASSETS - GOLD & FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVE CURN
G7 Economies
88 G7MPI009R ∆ln G7 DOMESTIC PPI MFG NADJ
89 G7MPI009R ∆lv G7 ITS EXPORTS F.O.B. TOTAL SADJ
90 G7MXT008Q ∆lv G7 ITS IMPORTS C.I.F. TOTAL SADJ
91 505676793 ∆lv G7 NET TRADE CURA
92 502621288 lv G7 PRODUCTION - TOTAL INDUSTRY EXCL. CONSTRUCTION SADJ
93 503351909 ∆ln G7 CPI ALL ITEMS NON FOOD NON ENERGY NADJ
94 503547075 ∆lv G7 CPI FOOD NADJ
95 504352258 lv G7 HOURLY EARN: MFG SADJ
96 502120123 lv G7 TOTAL RETAIL TRADE (VOLUME) SADJ
97 MSCIG7$ ∆ln G7 MSCI (US$) PRICE INDEX
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A.1.3 Bakshi and Panayotov (2013) Predictors
Here, we provide a brief description of the predictive variables used in Bakshi
and Panayotov (2013) and employed in this article. We try to keep the same
notation with Bakshi and Panayotov (2013) for the convenience of the reader.
Their sample begins in January 1985 and ends in August 2011, focusing on G10
countries.
• Commodity Measure
∆CRBt =
1
3
log(CRBt/CRBt−3), (A.1)
where CRBt represents the Raw Industrials Subindex of the CRB Spot
Commodity Index.
• Volatility Measure
∆σfxt =
1
3
log(σavgt /σ
avg
t−3), (A.2)
where σavgt represents the average volatility at time t across the currencies
of our data.
• Liquidity Measure
∆LIQt = −(LIQavgt −
1
3
3∑
j=1
LIQavgt−j), (A.3)
where LIQavgt is the equivalent of the average TED spread, which is defined
as the difference between the 3-month LIBOR and the 3-month Treasury
Bills (or an equivalent measure) across the G10 countries. All the measures
are normalized in order to represent monthly frequencies.
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A.2 Figures
Panel A: Currency Premia & US IP growth (Global Factors)
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Panel B: Currency Premia & US IP growth (Domestic Factors)
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Figure A.1. Countercyclical Currency Premia (US)
The figure displays standardized 12-month moving average of carry trade and dollar carry
trade excess returns, when considering the global (Panel A) or domestic (Panel B) factors as
well as the 12-month moving average of the US IP growth. The blue line represents the carry
trade strategy, the red line is the dollar carry trade and the yellow line depicts the IP growth.
We consider the group of All countries. The shaded areas represent the NBER recessions of
the U.S. economy.
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Panel A: Currency Premia & G7 IP growth (Global Factors)
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Panel B: Currency Premia & G7 IP growth (Domestic Factors)
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Figure A.2. Countercyclical Currency Premia (G7)
The figure displays standardized 12-month moving average of carry trade and dollar carry
trade excess returns, when considering the global (Panel A) or domestic (Panel B) factors as
well as the 12-month moving average of the G7 IP growth. The blue line represents the carry
trade strategy, the red line is the dollar carry trade and the yellow line depicts the IP growth.
We consider the group of All countries. The shaded areas represent the NBER recessions of
the U.S. economy.
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Table B.1. Univariate Predictive Regressions - Alternative Formation Periods
This table reports univariate predictive regressions of currency momentum returns with global political risk (∆PRt), volatility (∆RVFXt ),
correlation (∆RCFXt ) and liquidity (∆LFXt ) innovations as well as CDS spreads (∆CDSt). NW represents Newey and West (1987) t-statistics
corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (HAC) using the optimal number of lags as in Andrews (1991). We also present R-squares
(R2) for each regression and below the R2 we present χ2 in squared brackets. Panel A shows results for WML3,1t and Panel B for WML6,1t .
The data is collected from Datastream via Barclays and Reuters. The data contain monthly series from January 1985 to January 2014 with the
exception of the CDS data that spans the period October 2000 to January 2014.
Panel A: Currency Momentum (f = 3, h = 1)
cons ∆PRt ∆RVFXt ∆RCFXt ∆LFXt ∆CDSt R2 cons ∆PRt ∆RVFXt ∆RCFXt ∆LFXt ∆CDSt R2
Without Transaction Costs With Transaction Costs
(a) 0.73 -5.62 0.02 0.43 -5.97 0.02
NW [4.62] [-3.01] [9.09] [2.75] [-3.17] [10.03]
(b) 0.74 2.52 0.00 0.43 2.33 0.00
NW [4.58] [1.24] [1.55] [2.71] [1.15] [1.32]
(c) 0.73 1.31 0.00 0.43 1.24 0.00
NW [4.61] [0.79] [0.62] [2.72] [0.74] [0.55]
(d) 0.73 -8.49 0.00 0.43 -10.40 0.00
NW [4.56] [-0.94] [0.89] [2.70] [-1.16] [1.35]
(e) 0.95 -0.82 0.01 0.64 -0.82 0.01
NW [4.09] [-1.20] [1.43] [2.82] [-1.21] [1.46]
Panel B : Currency Momentum (f = 6, h = 1)
(a) 0.59 -3.23 0.00 0.30 -3.63 0.01
NW [3.88] [-1.43] [2.06] [1.95] [-1.63] [2.66]
(b) 0.60 0.45 0.00 0.30 0.16 0.00
NW [3.85] [0.17] [0.03] [1.94] [0.06] [0.00]
(c) 0.60 1.01 0.00 0.30 0.87 0.00
NW [3.87] [0.68] [0.46] [1.94] [0.58] [0.34]
(d) 0.59 -6.23 0.00 0.30 -7.82 0.00
NW [3.86] [-0.53] [0.28] [1.94] [-0.66] [0.44]
(e) 0.73 -0.70 0.00 0.43 -0.70 0.00
NW [2.94] [-0.82] [0.67] [1.74] [-0.84] [0.70]
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Table B.2. Robustness: Asset Pricing Tests - Longer Formation
Periods
This table reports asset pricing results for the two-factor model that comprises the DOL
and FPR risk factors. We use as test assets six currency portfolios sorted based on past
performances of currency returns. Particularly, we employ formation periods of 9 and 12
months. We rebalance our portfolios on a monthly basis. We reportFama and MacBeth (1973)
estimates of the factor loadings (b) and factor prices of risk (λ). We also display Newey and
West (1987) standard errors (in parenthesis) or t-statistics (in squared brackets) corrected
for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity with Andrews (1991) optimal lag selection and Sh
are the corresponding values of Shanken (1992). The table also shows χ2, cross-sectional R2,
HJ distance following Hansen and Jagannathan (1997) as well as a generalized version of the
cross-sectional F -test statistic of Shanken (1985) (CSRTSH). Panel A controls for transaction
costs and Panel B for short-run reversals. The excess returns are expressed in percentage
points. We report p-values in curly brackets. The data are collected from Datastream via
Barclays and Reuters. The data contain monthly series from January 1985 to January 2014.
Panel A: Factor Prices - Transaction Costs
cons λDOL λFPR χ2NW χ
2
SH χ
2
GMM1 χ
2
GMM2 R
2 HJ dist
Momentum (f = 9, h = 1)
FMB 0.12 0.23 14.98 14.60 9.19 9.80 0.55 0.09
(NW ) (0.11) (0.11) {0.01} {0.01} {0.06} {0.04} {0.28}
(Sh) (0.11) (0.11)
FMBc 0.01 -0.85 0.27 CSRTSH 0.16 {0.12}
[NW ] [1.63] [−1.40] [2.50]
Momentum (f = 12, h = 1)
FMB 0.11 0.10 2.93 2.89 2.32 2.45 0.88 0.09
(NW ) (0.11) (0.05) {0.71} {0.72} {0.68} {0.65} {0.41}
(Sh) (0.11) (0.05)
FMBc 0.01 -0.71 0.16 CSRTSH 0.21 {0.19}
[NW ] [1.27] [−1.08] [2.41]
Panel B : Factor Prices - Reversals
cons λDOL λFPR χ2NW χ
2
SH χ
2
GMM1 χ
2
GMM2 R
2 HJ dist
Momentum (f = 9, h = 1)
FMB 0.20 0.35 26.36 24.90 12.87 13.80 0.55 0.09
(NW ) (0.11) (0.11) {0.00} {0.00} {0.01} {0.01} {0.30}
(Sh) (0.11) (0.11)
FMBc 0.01 -0.53 0.38 CSRTSH 3.62 {0.01}
[NW ] [1.19] [−0.85] [3.46]
Momentum (f = 12, h = 1)
FMB 0.20 0.15 2.73 2.62 3.06 3.14 0.96 0.08
(NW ) (0.11) (0.06) {0.74} {0.76} {0.55} {0.53} {0.43}
(Sh) (0.11) (0.06)
FMBc 0.01 -0.45 0.20 CSRTSH 0.30 {0.80}
[NW ] [0.97] [−0.66] [2.96]
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Table B.3. Robustness: Other Variables
This table presents descriptive statistics of global political risk innovations (∆PR) along with Uncertainty,
Macroeconomic and Financial measures. The first group consists of changes in the ∆VIX , the University
of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index (∆CONSSENT ), the macroeconomic uncertainty of ? (∆MU1)
and the Economic Policy uncertainty of Baker et al. (2012) (∆EPU). Panel B shows results for the growth
rates of Industrial production (∆IP), inflation (∆CPI), consumption (∆CONS) and employment (∆EMP).
Panel C displays summary statistics for financial variables such as the ∆T ED spread, the term spread
(T ERM), the default spread (DEF) and the return on the US MSCI index. Moreover, the table shows mean,
median, standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis, minimum and maximum values. We also report first order
autocorrelations (AC(1)), Corr is the overall correlation of global political risk with all the other variables.
Figures in parenthesis display p-values. Currency data is collected from Datastream via Barclays and Reuters
and contain monthly series from January 1985 to January 2014.
Panel A: Uncertainty Variables
∆PR ∆VIX ∆CONSSENT ∆MU1 ∆EPU
Mean 0.00 -0.02 -0.04 0.00 0.00
Median 0.00 0.00 -0.20 0.00 -0.02
Std 0.07 3.80 3.97 0.01 0.32
Skew -0.43 0.90 0.05 0.91 0.29
Kurt 10.32 9.89 4.43 7.85 4.14
Min -0.46 -15.28 -12.70 -0.05 -1.03
Max 0.35 20.50 17.30 0.08 1.14
AC(1) 0.09 -0.01 -0.03 0.67 -0.54
(0.10) (0.85) (0.61) (0.00) (0.00)
Corr 1.00 -0.06 0.21 0.02 0.12
– (0.23) (0.00) (0.67) (0.03)
Panel B : Macro Variables
∆PR ∆IP ∆CPI ∆CONS ∆EMP
Mean 0.00 0.18 0.23 0.43 0.10
Median 0.00 0.23 0.23 0.42 0.13
Std 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
Skew -0.43 -1.66 -1.51 -0.12 -1.30
Kurt 10.32 11.88 15.40 8.13 5.93
Min -0.46 -4.30 -1.79 -2.04 -0.62
Max 0.35 2.06 1.37 2.73 0.48
AC(1) 0.09 0.21 0.43 -0.21 0.76
(0.10) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Corr 1.00 -0.07 0.04 -0.08 0.08
– (0.19) (0.51) (0.15) (0.13)
Panel C : Financial Variables
∆PR ∆T ED T ERM DEF MSCI
Mean 0.00 0.63 0.02 1.00 0.01
Median 0.00 0.50 0.03 0.92 0.01
Std 0.07 0.46 0.01 0.40 0.05
Skew -0.43 1.87 -0.25 2.80 -0.74
Kurt 10.32 8.14 1.90 14.79 5.62
Min -0.46 0.12 0.00 0.55 -0.22
Max 0.35 3.15 0.05 3.38 0.16
AC(1) 0.09 0.96 0.97 0.96 0.03
(0.10) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.57)
Corr 1.00 0.10 -0.03 0.09 0.17
– (0.01) (0.55) (0.09) (0.00)
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Figure B.1. Cumulative Returns of Momentum Portfolios
The figure presents cumulative momentum returns of cross-sectional and time-series momentum
(red dashed line). The holding period is one month for both strategies but the formation period
ranges from 1-12 months for the cross-sectional momentum and it is one month for the time-
series counterpart. The data contain monthly series from January 1985 to January 2014.
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Figure B.2. Correlation of U.S. with Foreign Components of Political
Risk
The figure shows correlations between foreign and US innovations of the different components
of political risk. Bars in red represent statistically significant correlations (i.e. a p-value that
is not greater than 0.05). Switzerland and Europe are missing from this dataset. The data
contain monthly series from January 1985 to July 2013.
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Figure B.2. Correlation of U.S. with Foreign Components of Political
Risk (Continued)
The figure shows correlations between foreign and US innovations of the different components
of political risk. Bars in red represent statistically significant correlations (i.e. a p-value that
is not greater than 0.05). Switzerland and Europe are missing from this dataset. The data
contain monthly series from January 1985 to July 2013.
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Figure B.2. Correlation of U.S. with Foreign Components of Political
Risk (Continued)
The figure shows correlations between foreign and US innovations of the different components
of political risk. Bars in red represent statistically significant correlations (i.e. a p-value that
is not greater than 0.05). Switzerland and Europe are missing from this dataset. The data
contain monthly series from January 1985 to July 2013.
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Figure B.2. Correlation of U.S. with Foreign Components of Political
Risk (Continued)
The figure shows correlations between foreign and US innovations of the different components
of political risk. Bars in red represent statistically significant correlations (i.e. a p-value that
is not greater than 0.05). Switzerland and Europe are missing from this dataset. The data
contain monthly series from January 1985 to July 2013.
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Figure B.3. Portfolio Turnover - Global Political Risk
The figure shows the portfolio turnover of currency portfolios sorted on global political risk
based on a 60-month rolling window. The data contain monthly series from January 1985 to
January 2014.
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Figure B.4. Portfolio Turnover - Momentum
The figure shows the portfolio turnover of currency portfolios sorted on currency momentum,
i.e. winners vs. losers. The data contain monthly series from January 1985 to January 2014.
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Figure B.5. Global Political Risk Betas
The figure presents average rolling betas of low and high political risk portfolios that are
estimated based on a 60-month rolling window. We both consider US and global political risk
innovations. The data contain monthly series from January 1985 to January 2014.
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Figure B.6. Pricing Error Plots - Porfolio Level Net Excess Returns
The figure displays pricing error plots for the asset pricing models with the DOL as well
as the mimicking portfolio of global political risk innovations as the risk factor. We report
result for thee currency momentum strategy (i.e. f = 1, 3, 6). We take into consideration the
implementation cost of each strategy. The data contain monthly series from January 1985 to
January 2014.
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Figure B.7. Conditional Pricing Error Plots - Portfolio Level
The figure displays pricing error plots for the asset pricing models with the DOL as well as
the conditional (on past returns) mimicking portfolio of global political risk innovations as the
risk factor. We report result for thee currency momentum strategy (i.e. f = 1, 3, 6). The data
contain monthly series from January 1985 to January 2014.
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Figure B.8. Currency Momentum and Global Political Risk
The figure visualizes the relationship between global political risk and currency momentum.
Particularly, we show annualized average excess returns for currency momentum portfolios
conditional on global political risk innovations in the top and bottom quartiles of each sample
distribution. Each bar represents annualized mean returns of going long the winner portfolio
(based on past returns) and short the loser portfolio (based on past returns) for different
formation periods (i.e. f = 1, 3, 6). we consider the 33 countries of the filtered data The data
contain monthly series from January 1985 to January 2014.
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Figure B.9. Currency Value, Carry Trades and Global Political Risk
The figure visualizes the relationship between global political risk and currency value as well as currency carry trades. Particularly, we show
annualized average excess returns for currency value and carry trade portfolios conditional on global political risk innovations in the top and
bottom quartiles of each sample distribution. Panel A shows results for the currency value and Panel B for currency carry trades. In Panel A
Each bar represents annualized mean returns of going long the undervalued currency (relative to PPP) portfolio and short the overvalued (relative
to PPP) currency portfolio. In Panel B Each bar represents annualized mean returns of going long the high interest rate portfolio and short the
low interest rate portfolio. For the currency value we use a group of 22 currencies, as they are analysed in the text and carry trades are based on
the 33 countries of the filtered data. The data contain monthly series from January 1985 to January 2014.
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Figure B.10. Currency Momentum and Global Political Risk (IFO)
The figure visualizes the relationship between global political risk (IFO data) and currency
momentum returns. Particularly, we show annualized average excess returns for currency
momentum portfolios conditional on global political risk innovations in the top and bottom
quartiles of each sample distribution. Each bar represents annualized mean returns of going
long the loser portfolio and short the winner portfolio for different formation periods (i.e.
f = 1, 3, 6). Panel A shows results for the raw data and Panel B for the filtered data. The
data contain quarterly series from 1992:Q1 to 2013:Q4.
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